Gresson, Rt Hon. Sir Kenneth (Macfarlane), (18 July 1891–7 Oct. 1974), Judge of Supreme Court of New Zealand 1947–57; President of New Zealand Court of Appeal, 1957–63; Member Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, since 1963; President, Indecent Publications Tribunal (NZ)

2007 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Court Of Appeal

scholarly journals The Illusory Trust Doctrine: Formal or Substantive?

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mark Bennett
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

"A document is put before us. Does it or does it not create a trust?" This article considers the illusory trust doctrine (ITD) and claims that although the ITD has been criticised as doctrinally unfounded and therefore based in substantive, non-legal reasons rather than pre-existing law, there are formal reasons of trusts law to support it. It begins by considering Atiyah and Summers' concepts of form and substance, and then examines how they apply in the context of equity (in general), and then trusts law (in particular). It then briefly considers a number of recent decisions on the ITD: the four cases constituting the Clayton v Clayton litigation in New Zealand, Pugachev and the Cook Islands Court of Appeal and Privy Council decisions in Webb v Webb. Finally, it analyses these ITD decisions using the form and substance distinction, concluding that it is arguable that the ITD is grounded in principles of established trust law, as opposed to purely substantive reasoning.

Appealing to history: the New Zealand Supreme Court debate

Legal Studies ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 24 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 210-227
Author(s):  
Richard Cornes
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Police Officer ◽  
Privy Council

For a New Zealander one of the odder tourist experiences available in London - and soon to disappear - was to go to the top of Downing Street, and after a brief word with the police officer at the gates, to be ushered in to watch a hearing of the highest court of (though not actually in) New Zealand. Beginning with the arrival of British settlers the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council served as New Zealand's court of final appeal. Sitting in the very heart of London it was possible to hear lawyers with New Zealand accents argue about places and concepts quite literally a world away.

scholarly journals Human Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Butler
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The paper examines whether there was any basis for Parliament to enact section 3(2) of the Supreme Court Act 2003 in regard to human rights decisions of the Court of Appeal. The paper asks whether the Court of Appeal has indeed been "activist" in its human rights decisions. The discussion focuses on the areas where judicial activism might be suspected, firstly the filling of legislative gaps, and secondly statutory interpretation, with a special focus on implied repeal. Relevant decisions of the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) are used as a contrast to the decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been activist in the area of human rights.

The Privy Council and New Zealand

1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 908-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Richardson
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
First Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ambivalent Attitude

Historically, New Zealand has indicated an ambivalent attitude to the Privy Council. The appeal has existed for New Zealand since the Supreme Court was established in 1841 and the first case on appeal was heard in 1849. But, as early as 1903, the Bench and Bar protested against the judgment of the Privy Council in Wallis v. Solicitor-General as showing ignorance of New Zealand law and social conditions.

Res Ipsa Loquitur: The Australasian Experience

1954 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-132
Author(s):  
D. P. O'Connell
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Difference Of Opinion ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Res Ipsa Loquitur

Dr. T. Ellis Lewis in this Journal in 1951 discussed the operation of the maxim res ipsa loquitur in relation to the burden of proof and proposed certain conclusions. So thorough was his analysis of the question that one would hesitate to intrude upon the field but for the fact that the problems posed by his article and specifically left open by the House of Lords in Barkway's case have recently been considered by the New Zealand Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. A frank difference of opinion on the nature of res ipsa loquitur manifested itself in each court, and hence no excuse is offered for advancing this discussion, which can only be complementary to that of Dr. Ellis Lewis. Advantage will be taken of the opportunity to consider the Australian contributions to the subject. There is perhaps too little awareness in England that many of the academic battles of the law are regularly being fought out in the Australian and New Zealand courts.

scholarly journals Hohepa Wi Neera: Native Title and the Privy Council Challenge

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
John William Tate
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
The Other ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Native Title ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
The One ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The case of Hohepa Wi Neera illustrates an unprecedented clash of judicial approaches to native title claims. On the one hand, the New Zealand Court of Appeal was determined to continue the line of reasoning most notably enshrined in Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington. On the other hand, the Privy Council, in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker had partially overturned Wi Parata by insisting that native title fell within the jurisdiction of the courts, at least when prerogative powers were not involved. The author argues that in Hohepa Wi Neera, the Court of Appeal quite deliberately tried to avoid the implications of the Privy Council's decision. In doing so, it exhibited a marked "colonial consciousness" which it was prepared to defend even to the extent of open breach with the Privy Council. The 1912 case of Tamihana Korokai v Solicitor-General, however, showed the extent to which the Court of Appeal was capable of shedding that "colonial consciousness" and embracing the earlier Privy Council ruling. The author demonstrates that this apparent irony sheds light on our understanding of the earlier cases.

More about illusory trusts: is “tantamount” to ownership the same as “ownership”? The Privy Council takes a step too far

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Nitikman
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
The Supreme Court

Abstract In Webb v. Webb,1 a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Cook Islands, the Board2 had to consider a number of issues arising from matrimonial proceedings. One of the issues was whether Mr Webb had created a valid trust or whether he had retained such extensive powers in relation to the trust that the trust was an “illusion”. The Board held that the trust was invalid. In doing so, the Board purported to follow the reasoning of the New Zealand Supreme Court in another matrimonial decision, Clayton v. Clayton,3 about which I have written before.4 But, for the reasons discussed below, in my opinion, the Board in Webb went beyond what the Supreme Court decided in Clayton. I believe that the Board has taken a step too far in its reasoning.

scholarly journals Extending The Scope Of Proprietary Remedies To Recovery Of Pure Profits From Successful Investment Of Bribes: The Endgame In Lister V Stubbs

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman ◽  
Mohsin Hingun
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Fiduciary Duty ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Fiduciary Duties ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Harsh Reality

For more than a century Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 stood as authoritative Court of Appeal judgment denying the recovery of profits acquired from the successful investment of gains obtained in breach of fiduciary duties. The rule was rationalized on the basis that while the claimant was entitled to the proceeds so unlawfully obtained, he lacked any form of proprietary title to the profits accumulated by the defaulting fiduciary. The harsh reality of the rule produced an unfair outcome to the claimant and the Privy Council refused to apply it in Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324. The rule also fell out of favour in other leading commonwealth jurisdictions and recently the English courts at all levels had the opportunity to reassess its relevance when the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] 4 All ER 79 consigned it to oblivion. The objective of this paper is to analyse the merits and the deficiencies of the rule and show how the judges of the English courts were prepared to act on policy ground, in comity with other common law jurisdictions in upholding justice in a borderless world. Keywords: breach of Fiduciary duty; Accounts of profits; Proprietary interests; Recovery of pure profits.

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