scholarly journals New Zealand: The Privy Council is replaced with a domestic Supreme Court

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-127
Author(s):  
P. Nevill
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Privy Council

Appealing to history: the New Zealand Supreme Court debate

Legal Studies ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 24 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 210-227
Author(s):  
Richard Cornes
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Police Officer ◽  
Privy Council

For a New Zealander one of the odder tourist experiences available in London - and soon to disappear - was to go to the top of Downing Street, and after a brief word with the police officer at the gates, to be ushered in to watch a hearing of the highest court of (though not actually in) New Zealand. Beginning with the arrival of British settlers the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council served as New Zealand's court of final appeal. Sitting in the very heart of London it was possible to hear lawyers with New Zealand accents argue about places and concepts quite literally a world away.

The Privy Council and New Zealand

1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 908-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Richardson
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
First Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ambivalent Attitude

Historically, New Zealand has indicated an ambivalent attitude to the Privy Council. The appeal has existed for New Zealand since the Supreme Court was established in 1841 and the first case on appeal was heard in 1849. But, as early as 1903, the Bench and Bar protested against the judgment of the Privy Council in Wallis v. Solicitor-General as showing ignorance of New Zealand law and social conditions.

More about illusory trusts: is “tantamount” to ownership the same as “ownership”? The Privy Council takes a step too far

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Nitikman
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
The Supreme Court

Abstract In Webb v. Webb,1 a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Cook Islands, the Board2 had to consider a number of issues arising from matrimonial proceedings. One of the issues was whether Mr Webb had created a valid trust or whether he had retained such extensive powers in relation to the trust that the trust was an “illusion”. The Board held that the trust was invalid. In doing so, the Board purported to follow the reasoning of the New Zealand Supreme Court in another matrimonial decision, Clayton v. Clayton,3 about which I have written before.4 But, for the reasons discussed below, in my opinion, the Board in Webb went beyond what the Supreme Court decided in Clayton. I believe that the Board has taken a step too far in its reasoning.

The exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in new Zealand

2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110112
Author(s):  
Anna High
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Social Science Evidence ◽  
Science Evidence

Prison informant or ‘jailhouse snitch’ evidence is a notoriously unreliable category of evidence. In light of reliability concerns, the New Zealand Supreme Court has adopted a progressive approach to the exclusion of prison informant evidence, centred on greater use of general exclusionary provisions as a threshold of reliability for the admission of suspect evidence. In so doing, the court has shifted the emphasis from deference to the jury as arbiter of ultimate reliability and towards more robust judicial gatekeeping as a safeguard against false testimony. This article critically analyses the New Zealand approach, including by way of comparison with Canada, Australia and England and Wales. The New Zealand approach is presented as a principled and important example of adapting fundamental evidentiary principles and provisions in line with emerging social science evidence. However, in light of the general concerns surrounding this class of evidence, ultimately further safeguards are still needed

The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-302
Author(s):  
Roger Masterman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

scholarly journals The Illusory Trust Doctrine: Formal or Substantive?

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mark Bennett
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

"A document is put before us. Does it or does it not create a trust?" This article considers the illusory trust doctrine (ITD) and claims that although the ITD has been criticised as doctrinally unfounded and therefore based in substantive, non-legal reasons rather than pre-existing law, there are formal reasons of trusts law to support it. It begins by considering Atiyah and Summers' concepts of form and substance, and then examines how they apply in the context of equity (in general), and then trusts law (in particular). It then briefly considers a number of recent decisions on the ITD: the four cases constituting the Clayton v Clayton litigation in New Zealand, Pugachev and the Cook Islands Court of Appeal and Privy Council decisions in Webb v Webb. Finally, it analyses these ITD decisions using the form and substance distinction, concluding that it is arguable that the ITD is grounded in principles of established trust law, as opposed to purely substantive reasoning.

scholarly journals The Contractual Interpretation of Tipping J

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
The Future ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Way

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.

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