More about illusory trusts: is “tantamount” to ownership the same as “ownership”? The Privy Council takes a step too far

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Nitikman
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
The Supreme Court

Abstract In Webb v. Webb,1 a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Cook Islands, the Board2 had to consider a number of issues arising from matrimonial proceedings. One of the issues was whether Mr Webb had created a valid trust or whether he had retained such extensive powers in relation to the trust that the trust was an “illusion”. The Board held that the trust was invalid. In doing so, the Board purported to follow the reasoning of the New Zealand Supreme Court in another matrimonial decision, Clayton v. Clayton,3 about which I have written before.4 But, for the reasons discussed below, in my opinion, the Board in Webb went beyond what the Supreme Court decided in Clayton. I believe that the Board has taken a step too far in its reasoning.

The Privy Council and New Zealand

1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 908-918 ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Richardson
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Solicitor General ◽  
First Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ambivalent Attitude

Historically, New Zealand has indicated an ambivalent attitude to the Privy Council. The appeal has existed for New Zealand since the Supreme Court was established in 1841 and the first case on appeal was heard in 1849. But, as early as 1903, the Bench and Bar protested against the judgment of the Privy Council in Wallis v. Solicitor-General as showing ignorance of New Zealand law and social conditions.

scholarly journals The Illusory Trust Doctrine: Formal or Substantive?

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Mark Bennett
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Cook Islands ◽  
Trust Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

"A document is put before us. Does it or does it not create a trust?" This article considers the illusory trust doctrine (ITD) and claims that although the ITD has been criticised as doctrinally unfounded and therefore based in substantive, non-legal reasons rather than pre-existing law, there are formal reasons of trusts law to support it. It begins by considering Atiyah and Summers' concepts of form and substance, and then examines how they apply in the context of equity (in general), and then trusts law (in particular). It then briefly considers a number of recent decisions on the ITD: the four cases constituting the Clayton v Clayton litigation in New Zealand, Pugachev and the Cook Islands Court of Appeal and Privy Council decisions in Webb v Webb. Finally, it analyses these ITD decisions using the form and substance distinction, concluding that it is arguable that the ITD is grounded in principles of established trust law, as opposed to purely substantive reasoning.

scholarly journals The Contractual Interpretation of Tipping J

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 227
Author(s):  
Matthew Barber
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
The Future ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Way

In the Supreme Court decision of Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy Ltd, Tipping J put forward an approach to contact interpretation that, while indebted to that of Lord Hoffmann, was expressed differently and promoted the use of evidence of prior negotiations. Despite not gaining the support of any of the other sitting judges, this approach was swiftly taken up in the lower courts and, until recently at least, seems to have been accepted as representing New Zealand law. This article attempts a comprehensive examination of Tipping J’s approach. It concludes that, while coherent in principle, the detail of the approach is flawed in a number of ways, especially the way in which evidence of subsequent conduct is assumed to work. The future of Tipping J’s approach is considered.

3 The Supreme Court and the Irish Free State

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Free State ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Parliamentary Sovereignty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Irish Free State ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

This chapter considers the performance of the Irish Supreme Court during the life of the Irish Free State (1922–37). It charts the way in which the right to appeal from the Supreme Court to the Privy Council was abolished (comparing the position in other Dominions) and shows that, despite the rhetoric of Irish politicians at the time, the judges were keen to uphold the British approach to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. The chapter then describes some of the emergency legislation enacted in the Free State to combat republican violence and examines how it was viewed by the Supreme Court, most notably in the very deferential (albeit split) decision in The State (Ryan) v Lennon. The chapter sums up the Court’s performance during the existence of the Irish Free State as disappointing and uninspiring.

Uncertain sovereignty: Ceylon as a Dominion 1948–1972

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 1258-1282
Author(s):  
Rehan Abeyratne
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Minority Communities ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Legislative Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject

Abstract This article, a contribution to a symposium on dominion constitutionalism, looks at sovereignty in Ceylon’s Dominion period (1948–1972). While the Ceylon Constitution has been the subject of in-depth historical and sociopolitical study, it has received less attention from legal scholars. This article hopes to fill that gap. It analyzes Ceylon Supreme Court and Privy Council judgments from this era on both rights-based and structural questions of constitutional law. In each area, sovereignty-related concerns influenced the judicial approach and case outcomes. On fundamental rights, both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council adopted a cautious approach, declining to invalidate legislation that had discriminatory effects on minority communities. This reluctance to entrench fundamental rights resulted, at least in part, from judges’ undue deference to the Ceylon Parliament, which was wrongly looked upon like its all-powerful British progenitor. On constitutional structure, the Ceylon Supreme Court deferred to Parliament even when legislation encroached into the judicial realm. The Privy Council, though, was not so passive. It upheld a separate, inviolable judicial power that Parliament could not legislate away. But by asserting itself as a check on legislative power, the Council—as a foreign judicial body intervening in Ceylonese affairs—stoked concerns that Ceylon was less than fully sovereign, which ultimately ended Dominion status.

Constraints on the Use of Adaptive Management in New Zealand’s Resource Management

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kirk
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Resource Management ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Adaptive Management ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Resource Management System ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Flexible Resource

This paper examines the development of adaptive management in New Zealand’s resource management case law. In particular, this paper investigates a Supreme Court decision (Sustain Our Sounds Inc v King Salmon New Zealand Co Ltd), which established a set of criteria for implementing adaptive management through New Zealand’s Resource Management Act. This paper describes King Salmon’s initial request for aquaculture permits, the Supreme Court appeal, and the Supreme Court’s justification for an adaptive management approach. Analyzing this justification, this paper explores the remaining constraints using an adaptive management approach to enable a more agile and flexible resource management system in New Zealand.

Appealing to history: the New Zealand Supreme Court debate

Legal Studies ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 24 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 210-227
Author(s):  
Richard Cornes
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Police Officer ◽  
Privy Council

For a New Zealander one of the odder tourist experiences available in London - and soon to disappear - was to go to the top of Downing Street, and after a brief word with the police officer at the gates, to be ushered in to watch a hearing of the highest court of (though not actually in) New Zealand. Beginning with the arrival of British settlers the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council served as New Zealand's court of final appeal. Sitting in the very heart of London it was possible to hear lawyers with New Zealand accents argue about places and concepts quite literally a world away.

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