scholarly journals Working dogs transfer different tasks in reciprocal cooperation

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 20170460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nastassja Gfrerer ◽  
Michael Taborsky
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Frequent Occurrence ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Specific Task ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Cooperative Partner ◽  
Working Dogs ◽  
Natural Interactions ◽  
Experiment Individual

Direct reciprocity can establish stable cooperation among unrelated individuals. It is a common assumption of direct reciprocity models that agents exchange like with like, but this is not necessarily true for natural interactions. It is yet unclear whether animals apply direct reciprocity rules when successive altruistic help involves different tasks. Here, we tested whether working dogs transfer help from one to another cooperative task in an iterated prisoner's dilemma paradigm. In our experiment, individual dogs received help to obtain food from a conspecific, which involved a specific task. Subsequently, the focal subject could return received favour by using a different task. Working dogs transferred the cooperative experience received through one task by applying an alternative task when they helped a previously cooperative partner. By contrast, they refrained from helping previously defecting partners. This suggests that dogs realize the cooperative act of a conspecific, which changes their propensity to provide help to that partner by different means. The ability of animals to transfer different tasks when helping a social partner by satisfying the criteria of direct reciprocity might explain the frequent occurrence of reciprocal cooperation in nature.

Selective Play: Choosing Partners in an Uncertain World

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 276-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahoko Hayashi ◽  
Toshio Yamagishi
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Opportunity Costs ◽  
Positive Bias ◽  
Expected Payoff ◽  
Cooperative Partner

The theoretical implications of introducing the “selective play” paradigm to experimental gaming research are discussed. In the traditional “forced play” environment, players are locked in a particular relationship and do not have options of leaving the current relationship and joining another. In the selective play environment players are given the options of leaving the current relationship andforming a new relationship. A previous computer tournament of prisoner's dilemma network (Hayashi, 1993) showed that out-for-tat (OFT) strategy performed very well in the selective play environment. OFT keeps cooperating with a partner until the partner defects; it deserts the partner and turns to someone else as soon as the partner defects. Results of a new computer tournament that introduced opportunity costs, however, point to the limits of the OFT's strength. OFT prematurely forms a commitment relationship with a cooperative partner and fails to utilize better opportunities. The best performer in the second tournament was the only one who was “trustful” and had a positive bias in calculating the expected payoff of interactions with a “stranger.”

scholarly journals Reciprocity creates a stake in one's partner, or why you should cooperate even when anonymous

2020 ◽  
Vol 287 (1929) ◽  
pp. 20200819
Author(s):  
Pat Barclay
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Models ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Cooperative Partner ◽  
Reciprocal Arrangement ◽  
Better Than

Why do we care so much for friends, even making sacrifices for them they cannot repay or never know about? When organisms engage in reciprocity, they have a stake in their partner's survival and wellbeing so the reciprocal relationship can persist. This stake (aka fitness interdependence) makes organisms willing to help beyond the existing reciprocal arrangement (e.g. anonymously). I demonstrate this with two mathematical models in which organisms play a prisoner's dilemma, and where helping keeps their partner alive and well. Both models shows that reciprocity creates a stake in partners' welfare: those who help a cooperative partner––even when anonymous––do better than those who do not, because they keep that cooperative partner in good enough condition to continue the reciprocal relationship. ‘Machiavellian' cooperators, who defect when anonymous, do worse because their partners become incapacitated. This work highlights the fact that reciprocity and stake are not separate evolutionary processes, but are inherently linked.

scholarly journals Long-term social bonds promote cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2009 ◽  
Vol 276 (1676) ◽  
pp. 4223-4228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angèle St-Pierre ◽  
Karine Larose ◽  
Frédérique Dubois
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Reciprocal Altruism ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Zebra Finches ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Opposite Sex ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Reciprocal altruism, one of the most probable explanations for cooperation among non-kin, has been modelled as a Prisoner's Dilemma. According to this game, cooperation could evolve when individuals, who expect to play again, use conditional strategies like tit-for-tat or Pavlov. There is evidence that humans use such strategies to achieve mutual cooperation, but most controlled experiments with non-human animals have failed to find cooperation. One reason for this could be that subjects fail to cooperate because they behave as if they were to play only once. To assess this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment with monogamous zebra finches ( Taeniopygia guttata ) that were tested in a two-choice apparatus, with either their social partner or an experimental opponent of the opposite sex. We found that zebra finches maintained high levels of cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game only when interacting with their social partner. Although other mechanisms may have contributed to the observed difference between the two treatments, our results support the hypothesis that animals do not systematically give in to the short-term temptation of cheating when long-term benefits exist. Thus, our findings contradict the commonly accepted idea that reciprocal altruism will be rare in non-human animals.

scholarly journals Aggression, fast and slow: Intuition also favors defensive aggression

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jim Albert Charlton Everett ◽  
Zachary Ingbretsen ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman ◽  
Mina Cikara
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Scientific Literature ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Social Encounters ◽  
Opposite View

In certain threatening social encounters, humans seem to act distrustfully, uncooperatively, even aggressively by default, and must reason themselves towards comity and moderation. Yet, the contemporary scientific literature mostly supports the opposite view, according to which we are “intuitively prosocial”: acting cooperatively by default in positive-sum interactions in games such as the Prisoner’s dilemma. Could a change in the nature of the game elicit a different profile of default behavior? Across four studies we investigate whether intuition might also favor defensive aggression. We develop a “pre-emptive strike game” in which two players make a series of decisions about whether to live-and-let-live, or instead pay a small cost to imposing a large cost on the other player, knocking them out of the game. In this setting we find that default aggression prevails. Moreover, this aggressive tendency can be overridden when playing the game against in-group members, but tends not to be when playing against out-group members. In short, when faced with a social partner who may choose to harm them, people default towards defensive aggression.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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