scholarly journals Rational choice of social group size in mosquitofish

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 20180693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Reding ◽  
Molly E. Cummings
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Social Group ◽  
Constant Ratio ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Relative Preference ◽  
Social Species ◽  
Choice Decision ◽  
Ratio Rule

Choice of social group can affect the likelihood of survivorship and reproduction for social species. By joining larger social groups—shoals—small freshwater fish like the mosquitofish Gambusia affinis can reduce predation risk and forage more efficiently. We tested shoal choice in mosquitofish to determine whether such choices are economically rational, i.e. consistent and optimal. Although many studies of decision-making assume rational choice, irrational decision-making is common and occurs across contexts. We tested rationality of shoaling decisions by testing the constant ratio rule, which states that the relative preference for two options should not change in the presence of a third option. Female mosquitofish upheld this rule when tested for shoal preference based on group size. Our results contrast with other studies showing violations of the constant ratio rule in foraging and mate choice decision-making contexts. These results suggest that decisions that immediately influence survivorship or decision-making along a single dimension may favour rational decision-making.

scholarly journals Theorizing hit-and-run: A study of driver decision-making processes after a road traffic collision

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-61
Author(s):  
Matt Hopkins ◽  
Sally Chivers
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Road Traffic ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Decision To Leave ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Choice Decision ◽  
Road Traffic Collision ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Hit And Run

Explanations for driver decisions to hit-and-run have largely been based around a rational choice perspective that suggests drivers consider the expected costs of reporting a collision against the benefits of leaving the scene. Although such an explanation appears plausible, previous research has largely focused upon identifying contributory or contextual factors through analysis of quantitative datasets rather than engaging with drivers in order to understand how they make the decision to ‘run’. This article explores the application of the rational choice perspective to hit-and-run driving. First, it develops an analytical framework based upon the rational choice decision-making process put forward by Tay et al. in 2008. Second, through analysis of 52 interviews with offenders, it examines how drivers structure the decision to leave the scene. Third, a typology of drivers is developed that illustrates that hit-and-run is not always based upon rational decision making. Finally, the article concludes with some implications for further research and the prevention of hit-and-run collisions.

Reconciling Emotion and Rational Choice: Negativistic Auto Theft, Consequence Irrelevance, and the Seduction of Destruction

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 783-815
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Jacobs ◽  
Michael Cherbonneau
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Auto Theft ◽  
Choice Decision ◽  
Decision Making Models ◽  
Depth Interviews

Objectives: We explore negativism in the context of auto theft and examine its broader phenomenological significance for Rational Choice Theory. Methods: Data were drawn from qualitative, in-depth interviews with 35 active auto thieves operating out of a large Midwestern U.S. city. Results: Negativistic offending is malicious, spiteful, and/or destructive conduct whose purpose is typically more hedonic (i.e., short-term gratification) than instrumental (i.e., resource-generating) or normative (i.e., moralistic). It is made possible by the notion of ownership without responsibility: Offenders controlled a vehicle that was not theirs, promoting consequence irrelevance which in turn unleashed reckless conduct. Conclusions: Consequence irrelevance clarifies negativism’s logic and permits linkage between affect-based and rational choice decision-making models.

scholarly journals Enhancing Rationality: Heuristics, Biases, and The Critical Thinking Project

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Battersby
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Critical Thinking Instruction

Abstract: This paper develops four related claims: 1. Critical thinking should focus more on decision making, 2. the heuristics and bias literature developed by cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists provides many insights into human irrationality which can be useful in critical thinking instruction, 3. unfortunately the “rational choice” norms used by behavioral economists to identify “biased” decision making narrowly equate rational decision making with the efficient pursuit of individual satisfaction; deviations from these norms should not be treated as an irrational bias, 4. a richer, procedural theory of rational decision making should be the basis for critical thinking instruction in decision making.

The emotive causes of recurrent international conflicts

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Long ◽  
Peter Brecke
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Constructivist Approaches

Many international conflicts are recurrent, and many of these are characterized by periods of violence, including wars, that are hard to describe as planned products of rational decision-making. Analysis of these conflicts according to rational-choice international-relations theory or constructivist approaches has been less revealing than might have been hoped. We consider the possibility that emotive causes could better explain, or at least improve the explanation of, observed patterns. We offer three emotive models of recurrent conflict and we outline a method by which the reliability of emotive explanations derived from these models could be tested prospectively.

A Solution to the Predictor Paradox

1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-154
Author(s):  
Michael F. Stack
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Available Information

William Newcomb and Robert Nozick have provided us with the following problem in rational decision-making. There are two boxes, A and B. A contains either a million dollars (M) or nothing (0). B contains a thousand dollars (T). I come into the room in which we have the boxes, closed. I must make one of two choices. Either I open A and take whatever money is present, M or O, or I open both and take whatever money is present, M + T or O + T. What is the rational choice for me to make?Nothing unusual is meant by “rational” in this context. We assume that a person making the choice desires as much money as possible. We assume that he will take into account all relevant available information as to what decision will lead to more money. If he believes that doing X will, or is likely to, lead to more money than doing not-X, then he will do X.In the above case, it would seem that the rational choice is both. T is there for the taking, whether or not I get M, and I might as well try for both.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Movements ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Structural Factors ◽  
Egyptian Revolution ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Choice Decision ◽  
Individual Decisions ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter introduces the argument, situates the study in the theoretical literature, and outlines the path of the book. The chapter introduces key definitions and concepts, such as revolution, social movements, and rebellions. The chapter also demonstrates that individual decisions to protest are affected by structural factors and that emotions affect how people make decisions. By explaining the relationship between structural factors and rational choice decision-making, this chapter sets the stage for how political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes intersected with emotions to influence individuals’ decisions to either engage or not engage in collective action during the Egyptian Revolution.

Hobbes, Harsanyi and the Edge of the Abyss

1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriella Slomp ◽  
Manfredi M. A. La Manna
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Natural Conditions ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game

AbstractThe authors present a new game-theoretic interpretation of Hobbes's state of nature that, unlike existing rational-choice models, questions the possibility of individually rational decision making. They provide a general formulation of the two-player two-strategy game applied to the state of nature and derive existing models as special cases. A nonstandard version of Chicken under incomplete information, that interprets “death” as infinitely bad, provides an explanation for important and hitherto unaccounted for claims by Hobbes. The authors suggest that rational choice in Hobbesian political philosophy ought to examine not so much the mechanics of rational action in natural conditions, but rather the means whereby citizens already living in civil associations can be persuaded of the irrationality of civil war.

EPISTEMIC TRANSFORMATION AND RATIONAL CHOICE

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Transformative Experience ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Cultural Paradigm ◽  
Conscious Decision ◽  
Influential Book

Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result in experiences that are radically different from any that they have had, and that could radically change their personalities and preferences. For instance, most people make the conscious decision to either become or not become parents. In a recent but already influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) argues that transformative choices cannot be rational – or, more precisely, that they cannot be rational if one assumes what Paul sees as a cultural paradigm for rational decision-making. Paul arrives at this surprising conclusion due to her understanding of transformative experience as being both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if it ‘teaches [a person] something she could not have learned without having that kind of experience’ (11), but it is personally transformative if it changes the person's point of view and her fundamental preferences (16).

scholarly journals Bistable probabilities: a unified framework for studying rationality and irrationality in classical and quantum games

2020 ◽  
Vol 476 (2237) ◽  
pp. 20190839
Author(s):  
Shahram Dehdashti ◽  
Lauren Fell ◽  
Abdul Karim Obeid ◽  
Catarina Moreira ◽  
Peter Bruza
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Probabilistic Framework ◽  
Unified Framework ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Game Theoretic

This article presents a unified probabilistic framework that allows both rational and irrational decision-making to be theoretically investigated and simulated in classical and quantum games. Rational choice theory is a basic component of game-theoretic models, which assumes that a decision-maker chooses the best action according to their preferences. In this article, we define irrationality as a deviation from a rational choice. Bistable probabilities are proposed as a principled and straightforward means for modelling (ir)rational decision-making in games. Bistable variants of classical and quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken are analysed in order to assess the effect of (ir)rationality on agent utility and Nash equilibria. It was found that up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three classical bistable games and maximal utility was attained when agents were rational. Up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three quantum bistable games; however, utility was shown to increase according to higher levels of agent irrationality.

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