Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions

Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions among individuals. Signals and quorum dynamics may also drive cooperation. Here, we resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical model to jointly analyse these two mechanisms and study the conditions in which evolution selects for direct reciprocity, signalling, or their combination. We show that signalling alone leads to higher levels of cooperation than when combined with reciprocity, while offering additional robustness against errors. Specifically, successful strategies in the realm of direct reciprocity are often not selected in the presence of signalling, and memory of past interactions is only exploited opportunistically in the case of earlier coordination failure. Differently, signalling always evolves, even when costly. In the light of these results, it may be easier to understand why direct reciprocity has been observed only in a limited number of cases among non-humans, whereas signalling is widespread at all levels of complexity.

Download Full-text

Evolutionary game theoretical model for stable femtocells’ clusters formation in HetNets

Computer Communications ◽

10.1016/j.comcom.2020.07.041 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 161 ◽

pp. 266-278

Author(s):

Katty Rohoden ◽

Rebeca Estrada ◽

Hadi Otrok ◽

Zbigniew Dziong

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Model ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Game Theoretical Model

Download Full-text

Hypocrisy and Corruption: How Disparities in Power Shape the Evolution of Social Control

Evolutionary Psychology ◽

10.1177/1474704918756993 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 147470491875699

Author(s):

Omar Tonsi Eldakar ◽

J. Oliver Kammeyer ◽

Nikhil Nagabandi ◽

Andrew C. Gallup

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Model ◽

Social Control ◽

Social Evolution ◽

Social Systems ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Power Structure ◽

Large Power ◽

Egalitarian Society ◽

The Masses ◽

Animal Societies

Altruism presents an evolutionary paradox, as altruistic individuals are good for the group yet vulnerable to exploitation by selfish individuals. One mechanism that can effectively curtail selfishness within groups is punishment. Here, we show in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that punishment can effectively evolve and maintain high levels of altruism in the population, yet not all punishment strategies were equally virtuous. Unlike typical models of social evolution, we explicitly altered the extent to which individuals vary in their power over others, such that powerful individuals can more readily punish and escape the punishment of others. Two primary findings emerged. Under large power asymmetries, a powerful selfish minority maintained altruism of the masses. In contrast, increased symmetry of power among individuals produced a more egalitarian society held together by altruism and punishment carried out by the collective. These extremes are consistent with the coercive nature of the powerful elites in social insects and egalitarian mechanisms of punishment in humans such as coalitional enforcement and gossip. Our overall findings provide insights into the importance of oversight, the consequences to changes in the power structure of social systems, and the roots of hypocrisy and corruption in human and nonhuman animal societies.

Download Full-text

An evolutionary game theoretical model shows the limitations of the additive partitioning method for interpreting biodiversity experiments

Journal of Ecology ◽

10.1111/1365-2745.12706 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 105 (2) ◽

pp. 345-353 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Peter J. Vermeulen ◽

Jasper van Ruijven ◽

Niels P. R. Anten ◽

Wopke van der Werf

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Model ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Additive Partitioning ◽

Game Theoretical Model

Download Full-text

Cooperation on Interdependent Networks by Means of Migration and Stochastic Imitation

Entropy ◽

10.3390/e22040485 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 22 (4) ◽

pp. 485 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Sayantan Nag Chowdhury ◽

Srilena Kundu ◽

Maja Duh ◽

Matjaž Perc ◽

Dibakar Ghosh

Keyword(s):

Social Systems ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Adverse Conditions ◽

Interdependent Networks ◽

Network Layers ◽

Interdependent Network ◽

Human Decision

Evolutionary game theory in the realm of network science appeals to a lot of research communities, as it constitutes a popular theoretical framework for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent research has shown that cooperation is markedly more resistant in interdependent networks, where traditional network reciprocity can be further enhanced due to various forms of interdependence between different network layers. However, the role of mobility in interdependent networks is yet to gain its well-deserved attention. Here we consider an interdependent network model, where individuals in each layer follow different evolutionary games, and where each player is considered as a mobile agent that can move locally inside its own layer to improve its fitness. Probabilistically, we also consider an imitation possibility from a neighbor on the other layer. We show that, by considering migration and stochastic imitation, further fascinating gateways to cooperation on interdependent networks can be observed. Notably, cooperation can be promoted on both layers, even if cooperation without interdependence would be improbable on one of the layers due to adverse conditions. Our results provide a rationale for engineering better social systems at the interface of networks and human decision making under testing dilemmas.

Download Full-text

Exploring a Resolution Method Based on an Evolutionary Game-Theoretical Model for Minimizing the Machines with Limited Workload Capacity and Interval Constraints

Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing - Modelling, Computation and Optimization in Information Systems and Management Sciences ◽

10.1007/978-3-319-18167-7_28 ◽

2015 ◽

pp. 321-329

Author(s):

Óscar C. Vásquez ◽

Luis Osorio-Valenzuela ◽

Franco Quezada

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Model ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Resolution Method ◽

Game Theoretical Model ◽

Workload Capacity ◽

Interval Constraints

Download Full-text

EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS OF WEIGHTED SOCIAL NETWORKS

International Journal of Modern Physics C ◽

10.1142/s0129183109013923 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 20 (05) ◽

pp. 701-710 ◽

Cited By ~ 16

Author(s):

WEN-BO DU ◽

XIAN-BIN CAO ◽

HAO-RAN ZHENG ◽

HONG ZHOU ◽

MAO-BIN HU

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Behavior ◽

Social Systems ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Evolutionary Games ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Multi Agent Systems ◽

Snowdrift Game ◽

Cooperation Level ◽

The Social ◽

Multi Agent

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

Download Full-text

A Compensation Game: MNC vs. SME

10.31219/osf.io/vkpm8 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Quan-Hoang Vuong

Keyword(s):

Theoretical Model ◽

Game Theoretical Model ◽

Initial Idea

What described below is a just some initial idea on how a game-theoretical model can be structured, with the purpose of considering a head-on competition for talent in the marketplace. The solutions, albeit carefully checked, are not complete either.

Download Full-text