Distinct brain mechanisms linked to evidence accumulation and crime-type bias in juror decisions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime J. Castrellon ◽  
Shabnam Hakimi ◽  
Jacob M. Parelman ◽  
Lun Yin ◽  
Jonathan R. Law ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Brain Activation ◽  
Juror Decision Making ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Use Patterns ◽  
Crime Type ◽  
Competing Models ◽  
Jury Decisions

AbstractEfforts to explain jury decisions have focused on competing models emphasizing utility, narrative, and social-affective mechanisms, but these are difficult to distinguish using behavior alone. Here, we use patterns of brain activation derived from large neuroimaging databases to look for signatures of the cognitive processes associated with models of juror decision making. We asked jury-eligible subjects to rate the strength of a series of criminal cases while recording the resulting patterns of brain activation. When subjects considered evidence, utility and narrative processes were both active, but cognitive processes associated with narrative models better explain the patterns of brain activation. In contrast, a biasing effect of crime type on perceived strength of the case was best explained by brain patterns associated with social cognition.

scholarly journals Race–Crime Congruency Effects Revisited: Do We Take Defendants' Sexual Orientation Into Account?

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher D. Petsko ◽  
Galen V. Bodenhausen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sexual Orientation ◽  
Black Men ◽  
Congruency Effect ◽  
White Men ◽  
Juror Decision Making ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Crime Type ◽  
Black Defendants

Decades ago, social psychologists documented a juror decision-making bias called the race–crime congruency effect: a tendency to condemn Black men more than White men for stereotypically Black crimes but to do the reverse for stereotypically White crimes. We conducted two high-powered experiments ( N = 2,520) to see whether this pattern replicates and to examine whether it is attenuated when the defendant is gay. When participants reported on what the average American juror would do (Experiment 1), we observed greater harshness toward Black defendants accused of stereotypically Black crimes but not the previously documented reversal for stereotypically White crimes. Defendant sexual orientation did not moderate this pattern. When participants reported their own judgments about the same criminal cases (Experiment 2), they expressed greater harshness toward White (vs. Black) defendants and toward heterosexual (vs. gay) defendants. These effects were not moderated by crime type. Implications for the race–crime congruency effect are discussed.

The Influence of Inconsistency in Eyewitness Reports, Eyewitness Age and Crime Type on Mock Juror Decision-Making

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bailey M. Fraser ◽  
Simona Mackovichova ◽  
Lauren E. Thompson ◽  
Joanna D. Pozzulo ◽  
Hunter R. Hanna ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Mock Juror ◽  
Juror Decision Making ◽  
Crime Type ◽  
Eyewitness Reports

scholarly journals Should I stay or should I go? Evidence accumulation drives decision making in human drivers

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
David Abbink ◽  
Gustav Markkula
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Naturalistic Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Constraints ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Out Of Sample

Laboratory studies of abstract, highly controlled tasks point towards noisy evidence accumulation as a key mechanism governing decision making. Yet it is unclear whether the cognitive processes implicated in simple, isolated decisions in the lab are as paramount to decisions that are ingrained in more complex behaviors, such as driving. Here we aim to address the gap between modern cognitive models of decision making and studies of naturalistic decision making in drivers, which so far have provided only limited insight into the underlying cognitive processes. We investigate drivers' decision making during unprotected left turns, and model the cognitive process driving these decisions. Our model builds on the classical drift-diffusion model, and emphasizes, first, the drift rate linked to the relevant perceptual quantities dynamically sampled from the environment, and, second, collapsing decision boundaries reflecting the dynamic constraints imposed on the decision maker’s response by the environment. We show that the model explains the observed decision outcomes and response times, as well as substantial individual differences in those. Through cross-validation, we demonstrate that the model not only explains the data, but also generalizes to out-of-sample conditions, effectively providing a way to predict human drivers’ behavior in real time. Our results reveal the cognitive mechanisms of gap acceptance decisions in human drivers, and exemplify how simple cognitive process models can help us to understand human behavior in complex real-world tasks.

scholarly journals An evidence accumulation model of perceptual discrimination with naturalistic stimuli

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hector Palada ◽  
Rachel A Searston ◽  
Annabel Persson ◽  
Timothy Ballard ◽  
Matthew B Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Decision Process ◽  
Dynamic Decision Making ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Natural Stimuli ◽  
Perceptual Judgments ◽  
Linear Ballistic Accumulator ◽  
Decision Making Model ◽  
Speed Accuracy

Evidence accumulation models have been used to describe the cognitive processes underlying performance in tasks involving two-choice decisions about unidimensional stimuli, such as motion or orientation. Given the multidimensionality of natural stimuli, however, we might expect qualitatively different patterns of evidence accumulation in more applied perceptual tasks. One domain that relies heavily on human decisions about complex natural stimuli is fingerprint discrimination. We know little about the ability of evidence accumulation models to account for the dynamic decision process of a fingerprint examiner resolving if two different prints belong to the same finger or not. Here, we apply a dynamic decision-making model — the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) — to fingerprint discrimination decisions in order to gain insight into the cognitive processes underlying these complex perceptual judgments. Across three experiments, we show that the LBA provides an accurate description of the fingerprint discrimination decision process with manipulations in visual noise, speed-accuracy emphasis, and training. Our results demonstrate that the LBA is a promising model for furthering our understanding of applied decision-making with naturally varying visual stimuli.

An Exemplar-Based Random-Walk Model of Categorization and Recognition

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Nosofsky ◽  
Thomas J. Palmeri
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Random Walk ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Object Identification ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Response Time Models ◽  
Individual Object ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Skilled Performance

In this chapter, we provide a review of a process-oriented mathematical model of categorization known as the exemplar-based random-walk (EBRW) model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997a). The EBRW model is a member of the class of exemplar models. According to such models, people represent categories by storing individual exemplars of the categories in memory, and classify objects on the basis of their similarity to the stored exemplars. The EBRW model combines ideas ranging from the fields of choice and similarity, to the development of automaticity, to response-time models of evidence accumulation and decision-making. This integrated model explains relations between categorization and other fundamental cognitive processes, including individual-object identification, the development of expertise in tasks of skilled performance, and old-new recognition memory. Furthermore, it provides an account of how categorization and recognition decision-making unfold through time. We also provide comparisons with some other process models of categorization.

scholarly journals Social cognitive processes explain bias in juror decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaime J. Castrellon ◽  
Shabnam Hakimi ◽  
Jacob Parelman ◽  
Lun Yin ◽  
Jonathan R. Law ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Racial Bias ◽  
Brain Activation ◽  
Juror Decision Making ◽  
Neural Activation ◽  
Mock Jurors ◽  
Activation Patterns ◽  
Crime Type

Jury decisions are among the most consequential social decisions in which bias plays a notable role. While courts take a number of measures to reduce the influence of bias on decisions about case strength or deserved punishment based on evidence introduced during a trial, jurors may still incorporate personal biases based on knowledge, experience, emotion, and beliefs independent of evidence. One common form of this bias, crime-type bias, is the extent to which the perceived strength of a case depends on the severity of the crime. A number of explanations from psychology and law point to the role of moral judgment, social cognition, and affect as core processes of bias. However, behavioral evidence alone makes these explanations difficult to distinguish. To overcome this challenge, we used fMRI to record brain activation patterns of mock jurors as they read a series of criminal scenarios and rated the strength of the cases and deserved punishment. Compared to patterns of brain activation derived from large neuroimaging databases, mock jurors’ neural activation patterns related to crime-type bias were most similar to patterns associated with social cognition (such as those associated with mentalizing and racial bias) but not affect or moral judgment. Further, results indicated that crime-type bias could be explained by variability in victim harm. Our results support a central role for social cognition in juror decision making and suggest that crime-type bias may arise from similar mechanisms that precipitate other biases like stereotypes about culture or race.

scholarly journals Evidence Accumulation Models: Current Limitations and Future Directions

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan J. Evans ◽  
Eric-Jan Wagenmakers
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Response Time ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Measurement Tool ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Choice Response ◽  
Experimental Conditions ◽  
Evidence Accumulation ◽  
Choice Response Time ◽  
Response Time Distributions

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) have been the dominant models of speeded decision-making for several decades. These models propose that evidence accumulates for decision alternatives at some rate, until the evidence for one alternative reaches some threshold that triggers a decision. As a theory, EAMs have provided an accurate account of the choice response time distributions in a range of decision-making tasks, and as a measurement tool, EAMs have provided direct insight into how cognitive processes differ between groups and experimental conditions, resulting in EAMs becoming the standard paradigm of speeded decision-making. However, we argue that there are several limitations to how EAMs are currently tested and applied, which have begun to limit their value as a standard paradigm. Specifically, we believe that a theoretical plateau has been reached for the level of explanation that EAMs can provide about the decision-making process, and that applications of EAMs have started to become restrictive and of limited value. We provide several recommendations for how researchers can help to overcome these limitations. As a theory, we believe that EAMs can provide further value through being constrained by sources of data beyond the standard choice response time distributions, being extended to the entire decision-making process from encoding to responding, and having the random sources of variability replaced by systematic sources of variability. As a measurement tool, we believe that EAMs can provide further value through being a default method of inference for cognitive psychology in place of mean response time and choice, and being applied to a broader range of empirical questions that better capture individual differences in cognitive processes.

LGBTQ in the Courtroom

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Blair Woods
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Best Practices ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Juror Decision Making ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Sexuality And Gender ◽  
And Gender

This chapter reviews a limited but emerging body of research on biases that arise and affect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) jurors as well as juror decision-making when LGBTQ individuals are involved in criminal cases. The chapter also discusses recent research and legal developments surrounding jury selection and LGBTQ identity and describes debates over best practices to identify and combat anti-LGBTQ juror biases. Finally, the chapter reviews gay and trans “panic” defenses in cases involving the murders of LGBTQ individuals and examines other challenges that LGBTQ defendants and victims face in different criminal contexts. Although there is a need for future studies, the available research illustrates how challenges linked to sexuality and gender identity in the criminal jury system can compromise legitimacy and fairness in the criminal justice system more broadly.

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