scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

scholarly journals Ownership structure, board of directors and firm performance: evidence from Taiwan

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mao-Feng Kao ◽  
Lynn Hodgkinson ◽  
Aziz Jaafar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms

PurposeUsing a data set of listed firms domiciled in Taiwan, this paper aims to empirically assess the effects of ownership structure and board of directors on firm value.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1997 to 2015, this study uses a panel estimation to exploit both the cross-section and time–series nature of the data. Furthermore, two stage least squares (2SLS) regression model is used as robustness test to mitigate the endogeneity issue.FindingsThe main results show that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the smaller the board size, together with a two-tier board system and no chief executive officer duality, the stronger the firm’s performance. With respect to ownership structure, block-holders’ ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and family ownership are all positively related to firm value.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough the Taiwanese corporate governance reform concerning the independent director system which is mandatory only for newly-listed companies is successful, the regulatory authority should require all listed companies to appoint independent directors to further enhance the Taiwanese corporate governance.Originality/valueFirst, unlike most of the previous literature on Western developed countries, this study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance in a newly industrialised country, Taiwan. Second, while a number of studies used a single indicator of firm performance, this study examines both accounting-based and market-based firm performance. Third, this study addresses the endogeneity issue between corporate governance factors and firm performance by using 2SLS estimation, and details the econometric tests for justifying the appropriateness of using 2SLS estimation.

The impact of VC backing on the corporate governance of Chinese IPOs

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing (Sophie) Wang ◽  
Hamish D. Anderson ◽  
Jing Chi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Political Ties ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Industry Experience

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how venture capital (VC) backing influences the board size and independence and how VC backing and board structure impact firm performance in China. Design/methodology/approach Using hand-collected data from 924 initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses covering the period from January 2004 to December 2012, the authors investigate the impact of VC backing on board size, board independence and firm market performance through regression analysis. A two-stage approach is also used to address the endogeneity issue. Findings The authors find robust evidence that VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards, after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, and the potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, firms backed by VCs with management political ties (PTs) have more independent directors with industry relevant expertise than other firms. While no significant relationship is found between board independence and firm performance, the authors present some evidence that IPOs which have a larger percentage of independent directors with industry relevant expertise exhibit higher long-term stock returns, and VCs with management PTs also improve IPO long-run stock performance. Research limitations/implications Although VC is new in China and the Chinese capital market has relative poor corporate governance and weak minority shareholder protection, the authors find support in this paper that VC backing is valuable to IPO firms in China not only through providing funding but also by providing political ties and industry experience. However, Chinese regulatory and institutional settings have strong impact on test results and they change rapidly, so the results may not apply to other period in Chinese markets. Originality/value This paper sheds lights on the influences of VC backing on corporate governance and firm performance in a transitional and emerging economy. It discovers the value of VC investors in a transitional economy as of providing political ties and industry experience. The new definition of independent directors suggested by Suchard (2009) is first used by our paper in the Chinese context.

Does corporate governance matter in determining CEO compensation in the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An empirical investigation

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Sazali Abidin ◽  
Linjuan You
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010. Design/methodology/approach – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance. Findings – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Research limitations/implications – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis. Practical implications – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation. Originality/value – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

Corporate governance, ownership structure and firms’ financial performance: insights from Muscat securities market (MSM30)

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdelbaset Queiri ◽  
Araby Madbouly ◽  
Sameh Reyad ◽  
Nizar Dwaikat
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Firm Financial Performance ◽  
Individual Ownership

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between selected board characteristics and ownership elements and the performance of firms listed in the Muscat Securities Market (MSM30). The examination focused on how the firm financial performance was affected by the board size, the number of board meetings and the ratio of the independent board of directors along to the ownership concentration types (i.e. institutional, state and concentrated individual ownership). Design/methodology/approach Data were extracted from the annual reports available online on the MSM30 website over a period of seven years (2009–2015). The sample consisted of 14 firms belonging to the non-financial sector. The data were of a balanced type and there were 98 observations. The analysis was conducted using the ordinary least square in STATA with the use of the robustness technique of standard error. Findings The findings of this study provide evidence that the selected elements for board characteristics and ownership influence firm performance. Nevertheless, such influence has its interpretation that differs to some extent from other securities markets in the developing countries. For instance, the ratio of the independent board of directors, the number of board director’s meetings, state ownership and concentrated individual ownership were inversely affecting the firm performance. However, institutional ownership and board size were found to have a positive effect on firm performance. Originality/value Studies on the influence of corporate governance and ownership structures in the context of Oman are still scarce. MSM30 received little attention, even though such an index encompasses the most liquid and the most profitable firms. MSM30 is an important index for investors in Oman looking for capital gains. Accordingly, this present study contributes to the knowledge body by providing new findings related to Oman and compares it with the other markets within Gulf Council Countries (GCC) and around the world. This will provide more understanding of the Omani context. Moreover, the authors anticipate that the outcomes of this research, which so far is the most comprehensive study in the Omani context in terms of the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on firm financial performance can significantly shape corporate governance discourse, practices and policies in Oman, in particular, and in other GCC countries in general, to improve financial performance and corporate sustainability.

Corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in a developing country

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Puni ◽  
Alex Anlesinya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Discourse Practices ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms recommended by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of Ghana on firm performance as measured by accounting-based ratios (return on assets, return on equity and earning per share) as well as market-based measure (Tobin’s Q) among listed Ghanaian companies from 2006 to 2018. These mechanisms are: board composition (board size, inside directors and outside directors), board committees (audit, remuneration and nomination), chief executive officer (CEO) duality/separation, board meetings and shareholder concentration. Design/methodology/approach The study used panel regression analysis of data from 38 listed firms in Ghana from 2006 to 2018 to test how each corporate governance variable initiated by the SEC of Ghana contributed to firm performance. Data were extracted from the annual reports of listed companies. Findings The study found that the presence of both insiders and outsiders on the corporate board improved financial performance. Similarly, board size, frequency of board meetings and shareholder concentration/ownership structure generally had a positive impact on financial performance. However, the presence of board committees generally had a negative impact on financial performance while CEO duality had no impact on financial performance. Practical implications The study contributes to the understanding of how good corporate governance practices affect firm performance for both academics and particularly Ghanaian policymakers. Originality/value This study provided new findings to bridge the gaps in the general corporate governance literature relative to the lack of consensus on financial impacts of corporate governance mechanisms. The finding contributes to knowledge by providing new and original evidence that some current corporate governance mechanisms are not effective in minimizing the agency problem in a developing setting. Furthermore, the authors anticipate that the outcomes of this research, which so far is the most comprehensive study in the Ghanaian context in terms of the coverage of corporate governance mechanisms specified by the SEC of Ghana, can significantly shape corporate governance discourse, practices and policies in Ghana, particularly and in other developing countries generally to improve financial performance and corporate sustainability.

Family firms, board structure and firm performance: evidence from top Indian firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 699-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Rathish Bhatt ◽  
Sujoy Bhattacharya
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Family Management ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Given the prevalence of family-run businesses in India, this paper aims to empirically investigate the impact of family firms on the relationship between firm performance and board characteristics. The effectiveness of board characteristics such as independent directors, chairman independence, role duality, non-executive directors, board busyness, board size, board meetings and board attendance are studied in the Indian context. Design/methodology/approach The sample consists of top-listed firms in India for the period 2002 to 2012. Board index was constructed to capture the governance quality of the firm. The authors also study the relationship between board structure and firm performance by segregating the sample based on family management, family ownership and family representative directors. Random effects model was used for the regression analysis in the study. Findings The authors find a negative effect of board structure on firm performance in family firms compared to non-family firms. Contrary to the most Western literature, family management was not found to significantly affect firm performance as compared to that of professionally managed firms. In the subset analysis of family firms, higher proportion of family ownership and family representative directors did not show any significant impact on the firm performance. Having a higher proportion of independent directors, larger board size or an independent chairman does not appear to improve this insignificant relationship between family firms and firm performance. Also, in family firms, no significant difference in performance is noticed before and during recession period. Originality/value The study uses a self-defined corporate governance index to measure the governance parameters, specifically the board characteristics. The results documented in this study adds to the debate on the generalizability of the findings in Western governance studies in emerging markets like India with unique institutional development background.

scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance on firm performance in Egyptian listed companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 691-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehab K. A. Mohamed ◽  
Mohamed A. Basuony ◽  
Ahmed A. Badawi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Book Value ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on firm performance using cross sectional data from non-financial companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. The 88 non-financial companies on EGX100 index of listed companies on the Egyptian Stock Market are studied to examine the relationship between ownership structure, board structure, audit function, control variables and firm performance by using OLS regression analysis. The results show that ownership structure has no significant effect on firm performance. The only board structure variable that has an effect on firm market performance is board independence. Firm book value performance is affected by both board independence and CEO duality. Firm size and leverage have varying effects on both market and book value performance of firms

scholarly journals Corporate governance: the impact of director and board structure, ownership structure and corporate control on the performance of listed companies on the Ghana stock exchange

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josephine Darko ◽  
Zakaria Ali Aribi ◽  
Godfrey C. Uzonwanne
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of listed Ghanaian companies. Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts a longitudinal and cross-sectional data set of 20 sampled companies over a period of five years. The data were analyzed using a panel regression and ANOVA analysis to establish the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Corporate governance is defined in terms of three indices – board structure, ownership structure and corporate control, while firm performance is measured by return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin and Tobin’s Q. Findings The empirical results show that ownership concentration and female representation on board have a positive impact on performance. Although the results revealed no evidence to support the impact of board size and audit committee size on performance, there is significant evidence to support the fact that independent directors and audit committee frequency both adversely affect firm performance. Research limitations/implications The scope of this paper can be expanded to include non-listed firms. In addition, other corporate governance mechanisms could be considered to broaden the scope of the paper. Originality/value This paper contributes to the scarce literature on corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper provides useful information that is of great value to policymakers, academics and other stakeholders.

scholarly journals The mediating role of board size, philanthropy and working capital management between basic corporate governance factors and firm's performance

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Naeem Shahid ◽  
Aamir Abbas ◽  
Khalid Latif ◽  
Ayesha Attique ◽  
Safwan Khalid
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Capital Management ◽  
Working Capital ◽  
Working Capital Management ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Sugar Mills ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThis study aims to identify the impact of corporate governance on performance of sugar mills. In order to study this relation, a model is constructed in which ownership structure and independent directors are taken as independent variables. Whereas firm performance is analyzed by using proxy variables such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and sales growth. Moreover, size of board, working capital management (WCM) and philanthropy are taken as mediating variables between governance variables and firm performance.Design/methodology/approachThe data of 32 sugar mills listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange for the period of four years (i.e. 2014–2017) is used for this research. Moreover, to investigate the model, generalized least squares statistical method is used to measure the relationship between variables.FindingsThe results revealed that there is significant but positive relationship between independent directors and ROA while ownership structure and ROE have significant but negative relationship. Thus, the board of directors should make it sure that all stakeholders and organizations should increase the nonfamily ownership in firms for better corporate performance. Moreover, philanthropy and WCM mediate the relationship between corporate governance and firms' performance.Practical/implicationsThis research work will be helpful in the corporate governance, and further researchers can conduct their study by considering executive/nonexecutive director and institutional owners as governance variables.Originality/valueThis paper fulfills an identified need to study how Corporate Governance effect the performance of firm.

Examining the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital efficiency

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4/5) ◽  
pp. 347-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ranjith Appuhami ◽  
Mohammed Bhuyan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Intellectual Capital ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Service Firms ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital (IC) in top service firms in Australia. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on the agency theory, the paper develops hypotheses about relationships between corporate governance mechanisms (chief executive officer [CEO] duality, board size, board composition and subcommittee composition) and IC. The study uses a multiple regression analysis on data collected from corporate annual reports of 300 firm-year observations. Findings – The findings of the regression analysis indicate that CEO duality, board composition and remuneration committee composition are significantly associated with IC. In contrast, there is no evidence that board size and audit committee composition have an effect on IC. The study contributes to agency theory in general and the literature on IC and corporate governance more specifically. Practical implications – The findings of the study might be of interest to regulators, investment analysts, shareholders, company directors and managers in Australia, as well as academics, in designing corporate governance mechanisms to develop IC. Originality/value – Corporate governance is country-specific and, hence, its impact on managerial decisions leading to IC is different from country to country. This study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance and IC in top service firms in Australia.

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