The impact of VC backing on the corporate governance of Chinese IPOs

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qing (Sophie) Wang ◽  
Hamish D. Anderson ◽  
Jing Chi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate how venture capital (VC) backing influences the board size and independence and how VC backing and board structure impact firm performance in China. Design/methodology/approach Using hand-collected data from 924 initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses covering the period from January 2004 to December 2012, the authors investigate the impact of VC backing on board size, board independence and firm market performance through regression analysis. A two-stage approach is also used to address the endogeneity issue. Findings The authors find robust evidence that VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards, after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, and the potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, firms backed by VCs with management political ties (PTs) have more independent directors with industry relevant expertise than other firms. While no significant relationship is found between board independence and firm performance, the authors present some evidence that IPOs which have a larger percentage of independent directors with industry relevant expertise exhibit higher long-term stock returns, and VCs with management PTs also improve IPO long-run stock performance. Research limitations/implications Although VC is new in China and the Chinese capital market has relative poor corporate governance and weak minority shareholder protection, the authors find support in this paper that VC backing is valuable to IPO firms in China not only through providing funding but also by providing political ties and industry experience. However, Chinese regulatory and institutional settings have strong impact on test results and they change rapidly, so the results may not apply to other period in Chinese markets. Originality/value This paper sheds lights on the influences of VC backing on corporate governance and firm performance in a transitional and emerging economy. It discovers the value of VC investors in a transitional economy as of providing political ties and industry experience. The new definition of independent directors suggested by Suchard (2009) is first used by our paper in the Chinese context.

2007 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajay Kumars Garg

Corporate governance issues have attracted a good deal of public interest because of their apparent importance for the economic health of corporations and society in general, especially after the plethora of corporate scams and debacles in recent times. Corporate governance issues flow from the concept of accountability and governance and assume greater significance and magnitude in the case of corporate form of organization where the ownership and management of organizations are distanced. And, it is in this context that the pivotal role played by the board of directors in maintaining an effective organization assumes much importance. A major part of the debate on corporate governance centres around board composition especially board size and independence. Various committees have mandated a minimum number of independent directors and have given guidelines on board composition. However, the relationship of board characteristics such as composition, size, and independence with performance has not yet been established. This paper addresses this question: Does the board size and independence really matter in terms of influencing firm's performance? The findings suggest that: There is an inverse association between board size and firm performance. Different proportions of board independence have dissimilar impact on firm performance. The impact of board independence on firm performance is more when the board independence is between 50 and 60 per cent. Smaller boards are more efficient than the larger ones, the board size limit of six suggested as the ideal. Independent directors have so far failed to perform their monitoring role effectively and improve the performance of the firm. The guidelines on corporate governance should take into account the ‘cross-board’ phenomenon while defining the criteria for eligibility for appointment as an independent director. Lack of training to function as independent directors and ignorance of the procedures, tasks, and responsibilities expected of them could be reasons for the independent directors' non-performance. A bad performance leads to an increase in board size, which in turn, hampers performance. Guidelines are provided for future studies to include different variables to see which board composition is suitable for different companies at different stages of life cycle.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1362-1376
Author(s):  
Saarce Elsye Hatane ◽  
Stellania Supangat ◽  
Josua Tarigan ◽  
Ferry Jie

Purpose This study aims to examine the control of corporate governance towards firm risks for a sample of Indonesian firms in agriculture, mining and property industries. This study highlights the impact of four indicators of internal mechanism of corporate governance, i.e. board size, board independence, board gender and board ownership, on three measurements of firm risks, i.e. total risk, asset return risk and idiosyncratic risk. Design/methodology/approach Panel data analysis is conducted using a sample of 62 companies of agriculture, mining and property industries listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017. Pooled ordinary least square with hetero-corrected is the statistical approach conducted to test the hypotheses. Findings The result indicates that board size and board gender insignificantly influence firm risks. While board independence gives varied impacts towards firm risks, it gives positive influence towards total asset return risk, insignificant towards idiosyncratic risk and negative towards total risk. Other interesting results are found in board ownership that has insignificant influence on asset return risk and negative influence on idiosyncratic and total risk. Research limitations/implications Firms should incorporate corporate governance, especially the impactful roles of board independence and board ownership as they serve as tools in reducing firm risk. Moreover, investors may have a better understanding of corporate governance and factors that are influencing firm risks. Therefore, this study can assist them to make the right investment decision. Originality/value This study is notably the first to use comprehensively three measurements of firm risks in Indonesia. Risks can come from internal and external, thus the company should understand the various types of risks facing the company. Total risk measures both the internal and external risks, while asset return risk gives another perspective using overall market perception about the equity and assets of the company. Finally, this study also measures internal risk, which is the only risk that can be controlled and minimised by the board of the company.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Wang ◽  
Kaleemullah Abbasi ◽  
Bola Babajide ◽  
Kemi C. Yekini

Purpose This study aims to examine the extent to which board characteristics and ownership structure affect firm performance with specific focus on providing new empirical insights following the revised corporate governance (CG) code 2012. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX)-100 index for the years 2011-2014. Firm performance is measured by accounting-based performance indicators (ROA and ROE) and market-based performance indicators (Tobin’s Q and MTB). This study uses multivariate regression techniques including fixed effects model and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Findings The findings show that board diversity increases over the two periods (pre-2012 and post-2012), whereas there are cases that companies have not fully complied with the revised CG code 2012 in terms of board independence. In addition, the multiple regression results show that firm performance is negatively and significantly associated with institutional ownership. Nevertheless, the results show that board size, board independent, board diversity and board meetings do not have significant impact on firm performance. The findings are fairly consistent and robust across two periods (pre-2012 and post 2012) and a number of econometric models that sufficiently address the potential endogeneity problems. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first empirical study which investigates the impact of the compliance and implementation of 2012 CG code on firm performance in Pakistan. This study is different from the most prior studies in that they use independent non-executive directors rather than conventional non-executive directors to measure board independence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 597-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Arayssi ◽  
Mohammad Issam Jizi

PurposeThe aim of the paper is to examine the association of corporate governance (CG), the firms’ characteristics and the financial performance of firms operating in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Arab Spring. The study focuses on CG, exemplified by boards’ composition and ownership structure. It also explores the possible moderating effects of environmental social and governance characteristics (ESG), leverage and size on the relationship between CG and the company’s performance.Design/methodology/approachUsing Thomson-Reuters database, a sample of 67 firms was extracted in the MENA region to measure CG and financial performance post Arab Spring from 2012 to 2016. Panel GLS regression random effects is used to quantify the relationship; robustness is checked by using several alternative regressions and specifications to the performance measure.FindingsThe results reveal that board independence (BI) is negatively correlated with firm profitability but ownership concentration and board gender diversification contribute to profits. When firms that voluntarily form a governance committee are examined, ownership is less concentrated. We obtain a stronger impact of good governance on performance in these firms: board composition, in general, and workers’ satisfaction generate more profits; and undertaking ESG activities become a more dispensable activity. The effect of board size (BS) and forming a governance committee are studied and ensuing recommendations are drawn. In addition, relevant internal control of firms’ characteristics that strongly predict firms’ market values are discussed in the context of agency and stewardship theories.Originality/valueDespite the fact that governance-performance nexus has been extensively discussed and examined, the focus of this volume of research is on western developed countries. The growing economies of the MENA countries, and the limited governance-performance literature in the MENA context have created a demand to understand the governance environment in these countries and its influence on firm’s performance. In this region where firms’ owners are mainly family members, governments and/or institutions, governance is typically weak; moreover, ownership concentration is expected to guarantee good performance, as the role of independent directors becomes ineffective. For firms where ownership is more diluted, a sound governance system should be established to replace ownership concentration, and to more efficiently monitor management, and consequently improve firm performance. Therefore, this study not only contributes a summary of the prevailing corporate structure in MENA. Moreover, it explains the settings where both the stewardship and agency theories apply in MENA firms. Some recommendation on the importance of changes to the existing governance rules are highlighted in terms of more rules requiring board independence, board gender diversity, limits on board size and establishing governance committees.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 454-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Sun ◽  
George Lan ◽  
Zhenzhong Ma

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on high growth firms’ corporate governance. Specially, the study examines whether there is a negative impact of SOX on the interactive effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – Sample firms were selected from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Directors’ database. Both accounting- and market-based firm performance measures are used. Regressions are run to test the hypothesis. Findings – It was found that the impact of SOX on the interaction effect of board independence and investment opportunity set on firm performance is negative. Originality/value – The results suggest that the impact of SOX in corporate governance and regulatory environment mitigates the effect of board independence on the relationship between investment opportunity set and firm performance, consistent with the notion that the enactment of SOX increases monitoring costs of board governance especially for high-growth firms.


Author(s):  
Mayowa Ebenezer Ariyibi ◽  
Olusola Enitan Olowofela ◽  
Olaiya Kehinde Isaig

We examine the impact of corporate governance on firm performance using the accounting measures based on the profitability status of the companies depending on cash flows and inflow from the income statement. In a sample of selected consumer goods companies, the study revealed that board size has positive significant effect on return on sales. Board size and board independence has positive significant effect on profit margin. It also revealed that board size and board independence negative significant effect on operating cash flow. Based on the findings, it is recommended that the organization should take cognizance of its board size since it influences the rate of turnover which is an intrinsic component of the overall performance of the organization. The organization should make sure the board size is regulated on a low-cost reduction basis so it does not induce a negative impact on the profitability status of the organization.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thi Tuyet Mai Nguyen ◽  
Elaine Evans ◽  
Meiting Lu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of independent directors on firm performance in Vietnam and identify how different types of ownership structure and the presence of controlling shareholders influence the relationship. Design/methodology/approach For a sample of 217 non-financial Vietnam-listed companies during the period from 2010 to 2014, this study uses the ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Two econometric techniques – the fixed effects estimation and the difference in difference estimation – are used to control for endogeneity. The results are also robust to the lag variable of independent directors. Findings The results reveal that independent directors have an overall negative effect on firm operating performance. This finding may be because of information asymmetry, expertise disadvantage and the dominance of ownership concentration that prevent independent directors from fulfilling their monitoring function in governance. The negative relationship between independent directors and firm performance is stronger in firms where the State is a controlling shareholder. Research limitations/implications Findings suggest that changes relating to independent directors, as a response to the new corporate governance code in 2012, do not have a positive effect on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Further reform is required to improve internal control mechanisms and corporate governance systems in Vietnam. Originality/value This is the first study to provide a robust evidence on the relationship between independent directors and firm performance in Vietnam as well as to explore the impact of the type of controlling shareholders on the relationship.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 2818-2824

This study examines effects of board composition on firm performance among 24 selected companies which are listed on the National Stock Exchange. It strives to understand the influence of corporate governance by testing 3 variables of board composition namely – board size, number of independent directors and the number of female directors on a company’s profitability measured through the tool – Tobin’s Q. One-way Anova test is used to establish a relationship between each of the three variables of board composition with firm profits. The study is conducted over a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2018 and concentrates on the following sectors - Auto, Financial Services, FMCG, IT, Media, Metal, Pharma, and Realty. The results revealed a significant relationship between board size and number of independent directors with firm profits which meant a firm with a greater sized board or more independent directors also showed higher profits in comparison. While, no significant relationship was found between the number of women directors on a firms’ board and firm performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 260-267
Author(s):  
Hafiz Muhammad Naveed ◽  
Shoaib Ali ◽  
Yao Hongxing ◽  
Saqib Altaf ◽  
Jan Muhammad Sohu

The key purpose of present research study to examine the association among corporate governance and profitability banks in developing counties. For such primary objective, annually based data collected from 2004 to 2016. The data taken from annual financial reports which issued by conventional banks.  We have used ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) test to examine the unit-root of variables. Moreover, the multiple linear regression utilized for hypothetical estimation. The results indicates that corporate governance and conventional banks profitability of Pakistan are bidirectional (positive-negative) associated to each other. In addition, the board size (Board Directors) is negatively associated with Return on assets and return on equity of banks. Similarly, the board independence (Insider-Outsider Board Directors) is positively influenced to return on assets and return on equity of conventional banks of Pakistan. The overall findings shows that board size and board independence are highly associated with return on equity than return on assets. Moreover, banking sector in developing countries the board size should contain on appropriate strength and acquire more professional and qualified staff. An optimal number of directors in a board size there is a need of commercial banks as to increase the profitability. To enhance the investors’ confidence with the bank there is also a need of the commercial banks to increases the board independency.


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