Income Inequality and the Social Welfare Function

1981 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Moreh
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Commodity Taxation ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
The Social

Abstract Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.

scholarly journals The Limits of Income Inequality: Public Support for Social Policy across Rich Democracies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau ◽  
Carola Hommerich
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Income Inequality ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Support ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Institutional Contexts ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
Income Concentration

Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980-2006) we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English-speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.

Cost-Benefit Analysis and Social Welfare Functions

2019 ◽  
pp. 397-422
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Adler
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
The Social

This chapter describes and compares the two most important policy-analysis methodologies in economics: cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the social-welfare-function (SWF) framework. Both approaches are consequentialist and welfarist; both are typically combined with a preference-based view of well-being. Despite these similarities, the two methodologies differ in significant ways. CBA translates well-being impacts into monetary equivalents, and ranks outcomes according to the sum total of monetary equivalents. By contrast, the SWF framework relies upon an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being. Each possible outcome is mapped onto a list (vector) of these well-being numbers, one for each person in the population; the ranking of outcomes, then, is driven by some rule (the SWF) for ranking these well-being vectors. The utilitarian SWF and the prioritarian family of SWFs (each corresponding to well-developed positions in moral philosophy) are especially plausible. The case for using CBA rather than one of these SWFs is weak—or so the chapter argues.

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