A STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF PLANNING FAILURES

Kybernetes ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
TAKEHIKO MATSUDA ◽  
MASAAKI HIRANO
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
The Status

In this paper, we first explain our hypothesis describing the planning behaviour of an individual and an organization, which we have postulated elsewhere, in reference with the model of so called “rational” decision‐making, as well as seven dimensions to be considered when evaluating each planning alternative. Of eight possible causes of planning failures obtained from our model, the ambiguity in the utility functions, the wrong forecast of the alternatives, and the wrong forecast of planning alternatives are identified as important and crucial. Some supplementary considerations on the above identified causes, as well as brief discussion on the relation between the status of our model and this study follow.

Post-Keynesian Economics, Rationality, and Conventions

2013 ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Boylan ◽  
Paschal O'Gorman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Keynesian Economics ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Face ◽  
Radical Uncertainty

The role of conventions has been an area of increasing interest to writers in the post-Keynesian tradition, particularly over the last thirty years. This has arisen from the reexamination of John Maynard Keynes’s notion of convention in the context of radical uncertainty along with the status of rationality in the face of uncertainty. This chapter discusses some of the principal tenets of Henri Poincaré’s analysis of conventions and relates them to the post-Keynesian methodological agenda, more specifically to provide a Poincaréan defense of the role of conventions in rational decision-making. It argues that this provides an innovative and more adequate philosophical defense of nonergodicity in economic theory, which has become a central axiom of post-Keynesian economics. The chapter first provides an overview of the post-Keynesian literature on uncertainty and conventions arising from Keynes’s employment of the concept. It then outlines the emergence of conventions and conventionalism in philosophy, examines Poincaré’s conventionalism and its relationship with rationality, and considers the implications of Poincaré’s conventionalism for post-Keynesian economics.

Consequence and Utility Modeling in Rational Decision Making

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc A. Maes ◽  
Michael H. Faber ◽  
Sherif S. Abdelatif
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Large Structures ◽  
Utility Optimization ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Cascade Effects

Offshore design and risk assessment are typically marked by far-reaching choices and important one-time decisions. Decision analysis involving large structures, sensitive environments, and difficult operations, requires a very careful formulation of utility and consequences. It is shown in this paper that one of the most important shortcomings of such analyses stems from an incomplete definition of the system, and from the failure to include various “follow-up” consequences. “Follow-up” consequences are, generally speaking, triggered by extreme losses, such as excessive business losses, consequences from unexpected cascade effects, collateral and indirect losses, or other intangible losses. The non-inclusion of such losses occurs either voluntarily or involuntarily. Often the identification and the valuation of follow-up consequences can be prohibitively difficult. For such cases, it is possible to use a simple model based on risk aversion to the consequences associated with extreme discrete hazards during the lifetime of a system. This model is developed in the framework of a lifecycle utility optimization. To add practical value to this model, we also introduce the concept of a Bayesian updating of utility functions. Since utility functions are all about expressing the preferences of expert decision makers, we refer to the Bayesian parameters as “preference” parameters. The paper shows that the approaches developed lead to better and more risk-consistent decision making. An illustrative example is given in the paper, highlighting the significance of the findings.

Resource-rational decision making

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Rahul Bhui ◽  
Lucy Lai ◽  
Samuel J Gershman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making

Author reply: Empathy Does Provide Rational Support for Decisions. But Is It the Right Decision?

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fritz Breithaupt
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Author Reply ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Rational Support ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This article examines the relation of empathy and rational judgment. When people observe a conflict most are quick to side with one of the parties. Once a side has been taken, empathy with that party further solidifies this choice. Hence, it will be suggested that empathy is not neutral to judgment and rational decision-making. This does not mean, however, that the one who empathizes will necessarily have made the best choice.

Evidential Decision Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arif Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Evidential Decision Theory ◽  
Radical Theory ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Evidential Decision ◽  
Theoretic Foundations

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.

Toward More Rational Decision Making

1988 ◽  
pp. 257-283
Author(s):  
Michael R. Gottfredson ◽  
Don M. Gottfredson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making

scholarly journals The Psychological Puzzle: Contributing Factors to the Top-Down Politicization of Intelligence

Elements ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Symbiotic Relationship ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Rational Decision Making

Policy and intelligence are intimately intertwined. Policymakers need intelligence to make decisions, while the intelligence community derives significance from its ability to provide policy makers with reliable information. In this symbiotic relationship, it is healthy for intelligence consumers to at times check and direct the work of intelligence producers. However, if undertaken maliciously, this checking mechanism manifests as top-down politicization. Here, leaders use intelligence post facto to legitimize their policies instead of using it to guide them, reversing the rational decision-making process. Certain factors may compel leaders to manipulate intelligence to reflect their policy preferences. This essay demonstrates how three distinct processes of top-down politicization can arise from ambiguous evidence, the psychology of intelligence consumers, and the nature of the leaders’ political positions and responsibilities. It then proceeds to argue that political leaders’ psychology is the most potent source of top-down politicization.

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