Consequence and Utility Modeling in Rational Decision Making

Author(s):  
Marc A. Maes ◽  
Michael H. Faber ◽  
Sherif S. Abdelatif

Offshore design and risk assessment are typically marked by far-reaching choices and important one-time decisions. Decision analysis involving large structures, sensitive environments, and difficult operations, requires a very careful formulation of utility and consequences. It is shown in this paper that one of the most important shortcomings of such analyses stems from an incomplete definition of the system, and from the failure to include various “follow-up” consequences. “Follow-up” consequences are, generally speaking, triggered by extreme losses, such as excessive business losses, consequences from unexpected cascade effects, collateral and indirect losses, or other intangible losses. The non-inclusion of such losses occurs either voluntarily or involuntarily. Often the identification and the valuation of follow-up consequences can be prohibitively difficult. For such cases, it is possible to use a simple model based on risk aversion to the consequences associated with extreme discrete hazards during the lifetime of a system. This model is developed in the framework of a lifecycle utility optimization. To add practical value to this model, we also introduce the concept of a Bayesian updating of utility functions. Since utility functions are all about expressing the preferences of expert decision makers, we refer to the Bayesian parameters as “preference” parameters. The paper shows that the approaches developed lead to better and more risk-consistent decision making. An illustrative example is given in the paper, highlighting the significance of the findings.

Author(s):  
Galit Berenstok ◽  
Ishak Saporta

This chapter proposes a rational-pluralistic model for decision making in organizations. The authors developed this model as a potential solution to the negative moral implications (such as alienation from the workplace) that the formal rational decision making model has on organization employees. The negative moral implications are due to the fact that the formal rational model is monistic, limited by the considerations of the organization's utility, and neglects moral values and non-utility values that are related to the employee. The rational-pluralistic model is based on a revision of the concept of rationality and rational action. The basic assumption of this model is that there is a range of values other than the utility value that are involved in rational decision making. The more extended definition of rationality makes it possible to avoid a situation in which employees are only the means for organization goals, rather than ends in themselves.


2015 ◽  
pp. 1394-1413
Author(s):  
Galit Berenstok ◽  
Ishak Saporta

This chapter proposes a rational-pluralistic model for decision making in organizations. The authors developed this model as a potential solution to the negative moral implications (such as alienation from the workplace) that the formal rational decision making model has on organization employees. The negative moral implications are due to the fact that the formal rational model is monistic, limited by the considerations of the organization's utility, and neglects moral values and non-utility values that are related to the employee. The rational-pluralistic model is based on a revision of the concept of rationality and rational action. The basic assumption of this model is that there is a range of values other than the utility value that are involved in rational decision making. The more extended definition of rationality makes it possible to avoid a situation in which employees are only the means for organization goals, rather than ends in themselves.


Kybernetes ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
TAKEHIKO MATSUDA ◽  
MASAAKI HIRANO

In this paper, we first explain our hypothesis describing the planning behaviour of an individual and an organization, which we have postulated elsewhere, in reference with the model of so called “rational” decision‐making, as well as seven dimensions to be considered when evaluating each planning alternative. Of eight possible causes of planning failures obtained from our model, the ambiguity in the utility functions, the wrong forecast of the alternatives, and the wrong forecast of planning alternatives are identified as important and crucial. Some supplementary considerations on the above identified causes, as well as brief discussion on the relation between the status of our model and this study follow.


2012 ◽  
Vol 246-247 ◽  
pp. 551-555
Author(s):  
Hong Gao ◽  
Wu Gao ◽  
Guo Lu

To start from the investment characteristics of wind power projects, account for wind power projects in the life-cycle costs and project income, decision analysis and application of cost-effectiveness of wind power projects, the final project decision makers come to the scientific and rational decision-making program. To carry out the analysis of the case by cost-effectiveness, then come to a scientific and rational conclusion.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Fisher ◽  
David R. Mandel

This article surveys the latest research on risky-choice framing effects, focusing on the implications for rational decision-making. An influential program of psychological research suggests that people’s judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. We discuss recent theoretical and empirical research that challenges the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. These approaches typically pay close attention to how decision-makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice) and they highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle. We conclude by indicating avenues for future research that could bring us closer to a complete – and potentially rationalizing – explanation of framing effects.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah A. Fisher ◽  
David R. Mandel

An influential program of psychological research suggests that people’s judgements and decisions depend on the way in which information is presented, or ‘framed’. In a central choice paradigm, decision-makers seem to adopt different preferences, and different attitudes to risk, depending on whether the options specify the number of people who will be saved or the corresponding number who will die. It is standardly assumed that such responses violate a foundational tenet of rational decision-making, known as the principle of description invariance. However, recent theoretical and empirical research has begun to challenge the dominant ‘irrationalist’ narrative. The alternative approaches being developed typically pay close attention to how decision- makers represent decision problems (including their interpretation of numerical quantifiers or predicate choice). They also highlight the need for a more robust characterization of the description invariance principle itself.


Author(s):  
Pedro A. Ortega ◽  
Daniel A. Braun

Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected utility, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining optimal actions. Here, we propose a thermodynamically inspired formalization of bounded rational decision-making where information processing is modelled as state changes in thermodynamic systems that can be quantified by differences in free energy. By optimizing a free energy, bounded rational decision-makers trade off expected utility gains and information-processing costs measured by the relative entropy. As a result, the bounded rational decision-making problem can be rephrased in terms of well-known variational principles from statistical physics. In the limit when computational costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered. We discuss links to existing decision-making frameworks and applications to human decision-making experiments that are at odds with expected utility theory. Since most of the mathematical machinery can be borrowed from statistical physics, the main contribution is to re-interpret the formalism of thermodynamic free-energy differences in terms of bounded rational decision-making and to discuss its relationship to human decision-making experiments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 15-21
Author(s):  
Rahul Bhui ◽  
Lucy Lai ◽  
Samuel J Gershman

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