Motive and conflict in the disaster recovery process

Purpose The purpose of this study is to address the key factors for the sustainable process of long-term recovery from disaster, with focus on interdependent decisions of various players. Design/methodology/approach The consistency among strategies of recovery players, who make a decision based not only on direct motive but also on various complex motives and interactions with other players, is considered. Interactive decision-making during the housing reconstruction project in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is analyzed using game theory. Findings Regarding two important decisions defining the result of recovery, players’ possible decisions are evaluated, and by using the game theoretic approach, the reasons for poor output and the conditions to shift equilibrium to that which is suitable for the long-term goal of recovery are discussed. Originality/value These analyses show that motive compatibility among players should be considered when we design processes for recovery from disasters.

Download Full-text

The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats

Kybernetes ◽

10.1108/03684921011043279 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 39 (5) ◽

pp. 825-837 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jing Zhang ◽

Shifei Shen ◽

Rui Yang

Keyword(s):

Information Disclosure ◽

Stochastic Game ◽

Adaptive Strategies ◽

Decision Makers ◽

Strategic Decision ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Content Type ◽

Disclosure Policy ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.

Download Full-text

A hierarchical, market-based, non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to projecting flexible demand-side resources: Towards more realistic demand response-integrated, long-term energy planning models

2020 17th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM) ◽

10.1109/eem49802.2020.9221977 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Soheil Mohseni ◽

Alan C. Brent ◽

Scott Kelly

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Game ◽

Demand Response ◽

Energy Planning ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Demand Side ◽

Planning Models ◽

Term Energy ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

Download Full-text

Strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market – a simplified experimental approach

International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis ◽

10.1108/ijhma-03-2013-0018 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 526-557

Author(s):

David Kim Hin Ho ◽

Eddie C.M. Hui ◽

Tai Wing Ho ◽

Satyanarain Rengarajan

Keyword(s):

Development Strategy ◽

Residential Development ◽

Pricing Strategy ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Behavioral Pricing ◽

Content Type ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Term Benefit

Purpose This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment. Design/methodology/approach Results show that residential developers cooperate implicitly for long-term benefit, leading to a slow-down in sales. Developers are motivated to deviate from cooperating at the beginning and at the end of successive periods in a sub-market. Relatively high profits, earnable in the first few periods, provide an allowance to undercut prices and improve sales. For the last few periods, the punishment for any deviation from cooperating is insignificant or zero. Note that the first-mover advantage in a new market is evident. On the effect of uncertainty on the developer’s residential prices, results show that as uncertainty increases, prices decrease while price variability increases. Research limitations/implications This study highlights the merits of a uniquely simplified experimental research design for the strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market using a game theoretic approach. Practical implications This study enhances the understanding of the residential development strategy of developers in the residential development market. Originality/value There is limited research on pricing strategy for the private residential development market in Asia.

Download Full-text