Moldovan election run-off too close to call

Significance Sandu, the pro-EU, reformist challenger, defied public opinion polls and early results to become the principal beneficiary of a large turnout among Moldovans abroad, almost twice those voting in the first-round 2016 presidential election. As neither scored over 50%, Sandu and Dodon will contest a second round on November 15. Impacts Electoral discourse around Moldova's external orientation will become more pointed. Dodon failed to anticipate a strong showing by a pro-Western and pro-reform diaspora. Practical voter mobilisation on both sides will be complicated by the pandemic.

Significance The conservative opposition New Democracy party (ND) leads the incumbent leftist Syriza party by a wide margin of about 7-13 percentage points in public opinion polls. That would give ND 155-165 seats in the 300-seat parliament, depending on how many other parties exceed the 3% threshold to gain seats. Impacts Hopes of an ND win have raised economic sentiment to its highest level since 2010; the Athens Exchange main index is 43% up since end-2018. Greek debt is becoming more attractive: 6-month T-bills were auctioned this week at a 0.23% yield compared to 0.41% last month. An ND government will accept the Prespa Agreement but be slow to promote North Macedonia's inclusion in European institutions.


Significance Her anti-Islamist, socially conservative Free Destourian Party (FDP) topped recent public opinion polls. Moussi -- currently an opposition leader in parliament -- glorifies many aspects of Ben Ali’s dictatorship, including his notorious security services. She also praises what she claims were past decades of relative political and economic stability and seeks to outlaw the Muslim democrat Ennahda party, a major social and political force. Impacts Political quarrels as well as FDP-led sit-ins and demonstrations will delay deputies’ work, including voting on key matters. Quarrels in parliament will weaken people's confidence in politics. Attacks on Ennahda may cause its leaders to seek supporters among more conservative religious forces.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-75
Author(s):  
Alexey Levinson

The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.


1949 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-111
Author(s):  
William F. Swindler

The historic upset of virtually all interpretations of public opinion polls in the Presidential election in November was perhaps the most striking journalistic event of 1948. The need for intensive self-examination and technical improvements became the order of business not only for poll takers but for the whole structure of market research which had been built upon them. The fact that for the fifth consecutive Presidential election the American press had supported the candidate rejected by the electorate was also a subject of considerable discussion by laymen and practitioners. Vastly shaken public confidence, as well as the rapid development of a powerful new competitor in the form of television, pointed to a need for major reforms in editorial methods and services of newspapers—an awareness of which was somewhat manifested in the growth of regional press institutes in several additional schools of journalism.—W. F. S.


1950 ◽  
Vol 19 (10) ◽  
pp. 101-103
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Feraru

Author(s):  
William W. Franko ◽  
Christopher Witko

Here the authors present the variation that exists in income inequality across the states, and variation in public awareness or concern about income inequality as measured by public opinion polls. Though politicians may decide to tackle income inequality even in the absence of public concern about inequality, the authors argue that government responses are more likely when and where there is a growing awareness of, and concern about, inequality, which is confirmed in the analyses in this book. To examine this question in subsequent chapters, a novel measure of public awareness of rising state inequality is developed. Using these estimates, this chapter shows that the growth in the public concern about inequality responds in part to objective increases in inequality, but also that state political conditions, particularly mass partisanship, shape perceptions of inequality.


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