New military rule is entrenching itself in Chad

Significance Although Deby and French President Emmanuel Macron discussed Chad’s political transition from military to civilian rule, the meeting’s emphasis was on security issues in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, in Libya, and within Chad itself. Impacts Deby is investing substantial energy in foreign relations, not just with France but also with neighbouring states. If Deby and the CMT ultimately decide to prolong the transition, foreign objections will likely be fairly minimal and brief. Despite outcry from human rights groups over the security forces’ treatment of protesters in April and May, accountability is unlikely.

Subject COVID-19 and jihadists. Significance Jihadist attacks are rising across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, as are conflict fatalities more broadly. However, the increase cannot be solely, or even primarily, attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. The remote areas where jihadists fight are in the early stages of their respective outbreaks; much of the increased violence reflects pre-existing conflict dynamics. Many of the fatalities, meanwhile, are caused by state security forces, who may be taking advantage of the pandemic, even more than jihadists are, to target civilians with relative impunity. Impacts Sensitive talks between humanitarian aid groups and jihadists may determine the level of famine in parts of the Sahel over the short term. Relationships between governments and human rights groups and journalists will grow even tenser during COVID-19-related restrictions. Accurate information about conflict zones may become harder to obtain amid restrictions and increased government defensiveness.


Subject Boko Haram outlook. Significance The Nigerian Air Force announced on August 20 that it carried out “massive” bombing attacks earlier this month against Boko Haram forces regrouping around their former stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This follows soon after the military allegedly killed Momodu Bama, second-in command to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Yet despite these renewed military efforts, the Nigerian army faces two still-capable Boko Haram factions, each of which has staged multiple deadly attacks in recent months. Impacts The Islamic State-linked Boko Haram faction has emerged as the most dangerous security threat in the Lake Chad Basin in the short term. The military will struggle to differentiate between Boko Haram factions, undermining operational efficacy. Leadership turnover within the security forces will not overcome the systemic problem of under-equipped and underprepared troops. Neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Cameroon, will bolster border security amid worsening Boko Haram and other criminal threats.


Significance Previously, there was accommodation and even cooperation between them. Global rivalries between al-Qaida and the Islamic State do not explain the shifts in the Sahara-Sahel. Rather, it concerns local political calculations and territorial control. Impacts The JNIM-ISGS clashes contribute to surging displacements of civilians in the Sahel, especially in northern Burkina Faso and central Mali. If ISGS loses, it will thwart the ambition to connect ISGS to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad basin. France will likely redouble its efforts to kill ISGS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.


Significance This follows the death of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May at the hands of his rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroonian authorities are also reporting a surge in defections. Though the numbers may be exaggerated, this represents a significant new development in the ongoing struggle against jihadist insurgency. Impacts Shekau’s death will allow ISWAP to consolidate its control in the Lake Chad basin by removing a major rival. ISWAP’s overall fighting strength may not substantially increase as many former Boko Haram fighters may defect rather than join ISWAP. The Nigerian military’s use of indiscriminate airstrikes may deter future defections and fuel recruitment into ISWAP.


Earth ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 340-356
Author(s):  
Forrest W. Black ◽  
Jejung Lee ◽  
Charles M. Ichoku ◽  
Luke Ellison ◽  
Charles K. Gatebe ◽  
...  

The present study investigated the effect of biomass burning on the water cycle using a case study of the Chari–Logone Catchment of the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The Chari–Logone catchment was selected because it supplies over 90% of the water input to the lake, which is the largest basin in central Africa. Two water balance simulations, one considering burning and one without, were compared from the years 2003 to 2011. For a more comprehensive assessment of the effects of burning, albedo change, which has been shown to have a significant impact on a number of environmental factors, was used as a model input for calculating potential evapotranspiration (ET). Analysis of the burning scenario showed that burning grassland, which comprises almost 75% of the total Chari–Logone land cover, causes increased ET and runoff during the dry season (November–March). Recent studies have demonstrated that there is an increasing trend in the LCB of converting shrubland, grassland, and wetlands to cropland. This change from grassland to cropland has the potential to decrease the amount of water available to water bodies during the winter. All vegetative classes in a burning scenario showed a decrease in ET during the wet season. Although a decrease in annual precipitation in global circulation processes such as the El Niño Southern Oscillation would cause droughts and induce wildfires in the Sahel, the present study shows that a decrease in ET by the human-induced burning would cause a severe decrease in precipitation as well.


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