The Dynamics of Nigeria’s Policy for Africa in the Post-Colonial Period

All heads of state of independent Nigeria have left their mark on the formation of national foreign policy, including the policy for Africa, and brought their vision to the development of this sphere, although the greatest contribution to the formation of relations of the Giant of Africa with other states of the continent was made during the years of the Fourth Republic (1999 – present), when, after a long period of military rule, civilian politicians came to power in the country. Throughout the entire period of independent development, the main principles of Nigeria’s formation of contacts with other countries were respect for equality and territorial integrity of sovereign states; non-interference in their internal affairs; active membership in international organizations; non-alignment with military-political blocs, etc. However, the main priority of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post-colonial period was the development of relations with African countries – a phenomenon that has come to be known as Afrocentrism. In accordance with the principles declared in all Constitutions of the country (1960, 1979, 1993, and 1999), Nigeria made a great contribution to the struggle for the true political and economic independence of African countries, for the liberation of the continent from the remnants of colonialism and apartheid. Since the 1970s, when the country became one of the world’s largest oil producers and exporters and began to provide financial and logistical assistance to African countries in need, a new objective has appeared in its foreign policy – gaining the status of “the leader of the continent”. This desire has been fueled by the fact that Nigeria is the most populous state on the continent and has one of the largest and fastest growing economies in Africa. Not all Nigerian leaders were able to correctly identify political priorities and to a certain extent demonstrated naiveté, limiting their foreign policy primarily to the African direction. While in the first years of independence this was legitimate and justified, with the advent of globalization, the development of a multipolar world, and the transformation of the world political and economic order, it became necessary to ensure that Nigeria’s foreign policy was adapted to modern realities. Meanwhile, thanks to its economic potential, huge reserves of hydrocarbons, which all countries in the region need, and military-political power, Nigeria quite rightly claims a central role in coordinating joint efforts to achieve true economic and political independence by West African states, although one of the obstacles to the transformation Nigeria into a real “hegemon” both in West Africa and throughout the continent remains political instability in the country.

The Portable Coup: The Jurisprudence of ‘Revolution’ in Uganda and Nigeria

In the years after independence, former British colonies in eastern and southern Africa struggled to fill the ranks of their judiciaries with African judges. Beginning in the mid-1960s, states including Uganda, Tanzania, and Botswana solved this problem by retaining judges from the Caribbean and West Africa, especially Nigeria. In this same period, a wave of coups brought many independent states under the rule of their militaries (or authoritarian civilian regimes). Foreign judges who had been appointed in the name of pan-African cooperation were tasked with interpreting the laws that soldiers imposed, and assessing the legitimacy of regimes born of coups. The decisions they rendered usually accommodated authoritarianism, but they could also be turned against it. To understand how colonial law and postcolonial solidarities shaped Africa's military dictatorships, this article focuses on one judge, Sir Egbert Udo Udoma of Nigeria, who served as Uganda's first African chief justice and was an influential member of the Nigerian Supreme Court. Udoma and other judges like him traversed the continent in the name of African cooperation, making a new body of jurisprudence as they did so. Their rulings were portable, and they came to underpin military rule in many states, both in Africa and in the wider Commonwealth.

8. Looking backwards, going forward?

‘Looking backwards, going forward?’ begins with a statement by Imran Khan, prime minister of Pakistan, wherein he mentioned Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the prophet Hazrat Muhammad and Allama Muhammad Iqbal. He tied the three historical figures with the thread of Islam as he sketched plans for his Naya Pakistan. In its seventieth year, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had settled down to a democratic pattern or ‘hybrid regime’. Pakistan’s three successive elections since 2008 after six decades of military rule are important here. The question is whether Naya Pakistan is something new or is simply old Pakistan dressed up in a new outfit?

4. Consolidation and fragmentation

‘Consolidation and fragmentation’ recounts how the government of Pakistan has shifted back and forth from democracy and military rule to secular state and religious state from the time the country was created. For the democratically elected rulers of Pakistan, it has always been a case of holding onto power. As a result, institutional structures, party politics, and the public sphere of Pakistan weakened and eroded, while the crucial role of the army was strengthened. Pakistan's army was strengthened and consolidated by a civil bureaucracy of client–patron networks. The army–bureaucracy nexus formed the cornerstone of Pakistan that made it into an Islamic nation-state.

Sudan coup will trigger complex political standoff

Significance Protest leaders are demanding a full transition to civilian rule. However, military leaders appear determined to retain power, setting the stage for an escalating confrontation. Impacts The transition has challenged ingrained gender inequalities, and women may play a key role in resisting military rule. Economic fallout from the coup will be significant, erasing recent limited progress and intensifying hardships for ordinary Sudanese. Military rule may mean a more confrontational posture over border and water-sharing disputes with Ethiopia.

Mali

In 2012, Mali began a long slide into insecurity and political instability. This chapter reviews the historical roots of that crisis, beginning in the waning days of French colonialism and continuing through periods of socialist nationalism, military rule, and liberal democracy. Mali’s postcolonial state has faced numerous internal and external threats. Some stemmed from hierarchical structures within the country’s heterogeneous population and the conflicts these structures engendered. Others emanated from heavy-handed government attempts to impose order and national identity on this population. Some were posed by other states in the Sahel and beyond. Still others came in the form of non-state actors exploiting state weakness to advance their own political and social agendas. Critically examining the competing narratives about Mali’s ongoing crisis, which focus on neocolonialism, geopolitics, and political institutions, this chapter demonstrates that the origins of the crisis are neither simple nor monocausal.

Militaries in Sahelian Politics

The chapter analyses the trajectories of military rule across the francophone Sahel. It distinguishes between three clusters of countries. Senegal constitutes one extreme on the civil–military spectrum as it has enjoyed continuous civilian rule. Mauritania and Chad, where military rulers have remained part of the ruling elites since the 1970s, constitute the other extreme. Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali are located somewhere in between. Although the Burkinabè armed forces for a long time acted as a pillar of autocratic rule, a large segment of the military eventually helped pave the way for democratization. In Niger and Mali military rule ended with the liberalization of Africa’s political sphere in the early 1990s. Both militaries have again intervened in politics through coups, yet each intervention has proven short-lived. There remains, however, a visible faction that wishes to return to military rule within the armed forces in every Sahelian country.