Emboldened Boko Haram will undermine Nigerian military

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Islamic State ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Leadership Turnover ◽  
Operational Efficacy ◽  
The Military

Subject Boko Haram outlook. Significance The Nigerian Air Force announced on August 20 that it carried out “massive” bombing attacks earlier this month against Boko Haram forces regrouping around their former stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This follows soon after the military allegedly killed Momodu Bama, second-in command to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Yet despite these renewed military efforts, the Nigerian army faces two still-capable Boko Haram factions, each of which has staged multiple deadly attacks in recent months. Impacts The Islamic State-linked Boko Haram faction has emerged as the most dangerous security threat in the Lake Chad Basin in the short term. The military will struggle to differentiate between Boko Haram factions, undermining operational efficacy. Leadership turnover within the security forces will not overcome the systemic problem of under-equipped and underprepared troops. Neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Cameroon, will bolster border security amid worsening Boko Haram and other criminal threats.

Nigeria defector reintegration will meet challenges

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
West Africa ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
New Development

Significance This follows the death of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in May at the hands of his rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Cameroonian authorities are also reporting a surge in defections. Though the numbers may be exaggerated, this represents a significant new development in the ongoing struggle against jihadist insurgency. Impacts Shekau’s death will allow ISWAP to consolidate its control in the Lake Chad basin by removing a major rival. ISWAP’s overall fighting strength may not substantially increase as many former Boko Haram fighters may defect rather than join ISWAP. The Nigerian military’s use of indiscriminate airstrikes may deter future defections and fuel recruitment into ISWAP.

Jihadist Insurgencies in the Sahel

2021 ◽  
pp. 568-586
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Communal Violence ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
State And Local ◽  
Sahel Region ◽  
Local Levels

Over the last decade, jihadist violence has expanded and intensified throughout the Sahel region. Jihadi groups, including Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Katiba Macina, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have established strongholds in many places in the central Sahel, as well as in and around the Lake Chad Basin. As they strengthen their presence, Sahelian jihadists have introduced new changes in local social relations and practices, experimented with new forms of governance, and attempted to insert themselves into the local political economy. Yet, as they gain ground and conquer new spaces, their governance model has also shown its limits: their presence has increasingly fueled deadly communal violence, and infighting among jihadi groups has become recurrent and deadly. This chapter analyses the factors and dynamics behind this surge of jihadi violence in the Sahel. It attempts to situate the global jihadi discourse within the spectrum of Islamic ideologies and discourses and elaborates on the dynamics, both at the state and local levels, that have favored the emergence of jihadi groups.

COVID-19 crisis may not benefit Sahelian jihadists

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Humanitarian Aid ◽  
Accurate Information ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Remote Areas ◽  
State Security ◽  
Lake Chad Basin

Subject COVID-19 and jihadists. Significance Jihadist attacks are rising across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, as are conflict fatalities more broadly. However, the increase cannot be solely, or even primarily, attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. The remote areas where jihadists fight are in the early stages of their respective outbreaks; much of the increased violence reflects pre-existing conflict dynamics. Many of the fatalities, meanwhile, are caused by state security forces, who may be taking advantage of the pandemic, even more than jihadists are, to target civilians with relative impunity. Impacts Sensitive talks between humanitarian aid groups and jihadists may determine the level of famine in parts of the Sahel over the short term. Relationships between governments and human rights groups and journalists will grow even tenser during COVID-19-related restrictions. Accurate information about conflict zones may become harder to obtain amid restrictions and increased government defensiveness.

scholarly journals The Split in Boko Haram and Its Impact for the Lake Chad Basin Region

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-230
Author(s):  
T. S. Denisova ◽  
S. V. Kostelyanets
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Military Tactics ◽  
Basin Region

The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaatu Ahl-is-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience.The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration.The LCB has now become a huge human reservoir for jihadist recruitment. The situation in the region is further complicated by the fact that a significant portion of the population supports the Islamists, while the majority of locals are targeted by them and seek to leave their homes.The authors note that the division of BH into separate factions has made it more difficult for the LCB armed forces to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and for the LCB governments to negotiate cease fires or retrieve hostages, although, simultaneously, the split has led to a certain decline in the level of violence and to the weakening of the influence of the Islamists on the socio-economic development in the region.

New military rule is entrenching itself in Chad

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Lake Chad Basin

Significance Although Deby and French President Emmanuel Macron discussed Chad’s political transition from military to civilian rule, the meeting’s emphasis was on security issues in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, in Libya, and within Chad itself. Impacts Deby is investing substantial energy in foreign relations, not just with France but also with neighbouring states. If Deby and the CMT ultimately decide to prolong the transition, foreign objections will likely be fairly minimal and brief. Despite outcry from human rights groups over the security forces’ treatment of protesters in April and May, accountability is unlikely.

Boko Haram strains under a resurgent Nigerian army

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
State Of Emergency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Far North ◽  
North Lake ◽  
State Group

Significance One consequence is that insurgents are retreating into neighbouring countries. Several civilians died in Boko Haram attacks in Niger's Diffa region on November 11 and Chad declared a state of emergency on November 9 in its far-north Lake Chad region. Impacts The significance of Boko Haram's pledged allegiance to Islamic State group (ISG) is far less than other ISG affiliates. The recent Abuja bombings, while claimed by ISG-affiliated militants, resemble previous attacks and signal no tactical or resource shifts. Boko Haram's increasingly weak position in Nigeria would hamper efforts to make any such link meaningful.

Resurgent Boko Haram will damage Nigeria's Buhari

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Internally Displaced Persons ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Humanitarian Crisis ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Internally Displaced ◽  
High Profile ◽  
Full Control ◽  
Lake Chad Basin

Subject Renewed Boko Haram attacks. Significance The Nigerian government’s previous assertions of victory in the war against Boko Haram have once again been undermined following several spectacular and deadly terrorist attacks. Despite the military’s claims that it had taken full control of Boko Haram’s former Sambisa forest base and “broken the heart and soul” of the insurgency, the terrorist group’s various factions remain capable of severely impairing the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and further hampering the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout the region. Impacts While international focus on the security and humanitarian crisis will increase, investments in security for IDPs will nonetheless lag. Increased high-profile attacks by Boko Haram could undermine Buhari’s standing within the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC). Doctors Without Borders (MSF)'s suspension of its Rann operations will further diminish services for IDPs and hamper return efforts.

Deby will face underlying tensions in Chad

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
The Past ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Effective Deterrent

Significance On the instructions of President Idriss Deby, the Independent National Electoral Commission set April 11, 2021 for the next presidential elections and October 24 the same year for legislative elections that have been delayed repeatedly. Deby then partly reshuffled his cabinet on July 14, the most notable move being the appointment of Amine Abba Siddick as foreign minister. Siddick, previously ambassador to France, has been a key player in improving French-Chadian relations over the past three years. Impacts Deby's re-election will draw an outcry from various rebel groups, but none of them appears to pose a serious threat to him. The counter-strike against Boko Haram appears an effective deterrent, but the group's operations in Chad have long been intermittent. Deby, with close ties to Paris, will maintain his pre-eminence among political and security actors in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

Intra-jihadist conflict worsens Sahel security outlook

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
West Africa ◽  
Burkina Faso ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
Territorial Control

Significance Previously, there was accommodation and even cooperation between them. Global rivalries between al-Qaida and the Islamic State do not explain the shifts in the Sahara-Sahel. Rather, it concerns local political calculations and territorial control. Impacts The JNIM-ISGS clashes contribute to surging displacements of civilians in the Sahel, especially in northern Burkina Faso and central Mali. If ISGS loses, it will thwart the ambition to connect ISGS to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the Lake Chad basin. France will likely redouble its efforts to kill ISGS leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi.

Pastoralists and the State ... and 'islamic State' On Eastern Niger's Frontier: Between Evasion And Engagement

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-79
Author(s):  
Florian Köhler
Keyword(s):  
Current Situation ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Boko Haram ◽  
Lake Chad ◽  
Chad Basin ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Mobile Pastoralists ◽  
Lake Chad Basin ◽  
State And Society ◽  
Peripheral Areas

In the current situation of militant Islamist groups encroaching on peripheral areas of different Sahelian states, mobile pastoralists are often accused of sympathising or collaborating with jihadists. Examining this phenomenon with a focus on eastern Niger and in the context of the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad basin, this article relates it to the debates about incorporation and evasion of pastoralists with regard to state and society, and frontiers and borderlands as spaces not only of difficult governance but also of economic and political opportunities.

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