COVID-19 crisis may not benefit Sahelian jihadists

Subject COVID-19 and jihadists. Significance Jihadist attacks are rising across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, as are conflict fatalities more broadly. However, the increase cannot be solely, or even primarily, attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic. The remote areas where jihadists fight are in the early stages of their respective outbreaks; much of the increased violence reflects pre-existing conflict dynamics. Many of the fatalities, meanwhile, are caused by state security forces, who may be taking advantage of the pandemic, even more than jihadists are, to target civilians with relative impunity. Impacts Sensitive talks between humanitarian aid groups and jihadists may determine the level of famine in parts of the Sahel over the short term. Relationships between governments and human rights groups and journalists will grow even tenser during COVID-19-related restrictions. Accurate information about conflict zones may become harder to obtain amid restrictions and increased government defensiveness.

Significance Opposition leader Raila Odinga and supporters of his National Super Alliance (NASA) have long since lost faith in the capacity of the IEBC to deliver a free and fair election and have regularly alleged that the ruling party plans to steal the vote. Opposition supporters claim Msando was killed because he was determined to ensure that the technology designed to prevent electoral fraud worked -- his murder lends credibility to Odinga's narrative that the process is being undermined from within. With only a week until the election, attention is focused not on political platforms but on the potential for voter fraud or a contested result. Impacts Electoral controversies and the delegitimisation of the electoral commission increase the risk of post-election violence. Widespread ethnic clashes on the scale of 2007-08 are unlikely due to heavy deployments of state security forces. Political instability, even if limited, will deter tourism and investment, hurting short-term economic growth.


Significance Although Deby and French President Emmanuel Macron discussed Chad’s political transition from military to civilian rule, the meeting’s emphasis was on security issues in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, in Libya, and within Chad itself. Impacts Deby is investing substantial energy in foreign relations, not just with France but also with neighbouring states. If Deby and the CMT ultimately decide to prolong the transition, foreign objections will likely be fairly minimal and brief. Despite outcry from human rights groups over the security forces’ treatment of protesters in April and May, accountability is unlikely.


Subject Boko Haram outlook. Significance The Nigerian Air Force announced on August 20 that it carried out “massive” bombing attacks earlier this month against Boko Haram forces regrouping around their former stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. This follows soon after the military allegedly killed Momodu Bama, second-in command to Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau. Yet despite these renewed military efforts, the Nigerian army faces two still-capable Boko Haram factions, each of which has staged multiple deadly attacks in recent months. Impacts The Islamic State-linked Boko Haram faction has emerged as the most dangerous security threat in the Lake Chad Basin in the short term. The military will struggle to differentiate between Boko Haram factions, undermining operational efficacy. Leadership turnover within the security forces will not overcome the systemic problem of under-equipped and underprepared troops. Neighbouring countries, such as Niger and Cameroon, will bolster border security amid worsening Boko Haram and other criminal threats.


Significance In recent months, ISWAP has apparently seized large amounts of military weapons and equipment from the Nigerian military, including heavy armour, and strengthened its control of seized areas. With a raging banditry crisis in the north-west dividing its attention, the army is on the back foot against both ISWAP and the Abubakar Shekau-led Boko Haram faction in the Lake Chad Basin. Impacts ISWAP’s funding will likely remain locally based over the short term, but concerns will grow over increasing international links. Shekau’s Boko Haram faction is less potent currently but remains a serious threat over the short-to-medium term. Minimal reported clashes between ISWAP and Boko Haram fighters indicate both are mainly occupied with attacking military targets for now. Scrutiny will grow over the alleged role of Ansaru, a small group of al-Qaida-linked former Boko Haram fighters, in north-western violence.


Significance On November 1, three Chinese workers who had been kidnapped by unknown gunmen last July were released, but even this positive development underscores some of the main problematic issues confronting the country, such as the southward spread of violence, the criminality accompanying the multi-sided civil war and the security forces’ relative incapacity in face of these cross-cutting drivers of insecurity. Impacts Worsening security in southern Mali will further elevate concerns in coastal West African countries, especially Mauritania and Senegal. The degradation of security does not appear to be elevating coup risks in the short term. Mali’s conflict zones are already food-stressed, and this will spread into parts of the southern Koulikoro and Kayes Regions.


Significance These have long been matters of serious concern. President Cyril Ramaphosa on August 5 responded with a cabinet reshuffle that replaced the minister of defence, closed down the ministry of state security and moved intelligence agencies into the presidency. Impacts Planned cuts to security force budgets will be politically unsustainable. Ramaphosa’s decision to retain Minister of Police Bheki Cele in post casts doubt on the prospects of much-needed police reform. Incorporating intelligence functions into the presidency may speed reforms but also poses long-term dangers of more abuses.


Significance His nomination to run for yet another term met large protests in major towns including N'Djamena, where fighting broke out with security forces leading to arrests. In the last three years, Chad’s security and humanitarian situations have deteriorated as Deby battles escalating jihadist violence in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, growing discontent from diverse interest groups and pressing humanitarian needs across the country. Impacts Chad and other G5 Sahel countries will seek an extension to the G20’s debt moratorium to help improve their precarious fiscal situation. The G5 Sahel will pursue expansion, potentially to include Ivory Coast and Senegal, in a bid to boost troop strength. Aid agencies will intensify their appeal for funds to help over 12 million people in need before the onset of the rainy period in June.


Subject Nigeria's restructuring debates. Significance Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, a potential presidential candidate for the opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP) in next year's elections, has publicly backed restructuring Nigeria's centralised, federal system. His comments follow shortly after a committee from the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) produced a report that proposed giving each of Nigeria's 36 states control over mineral resources, decentralising the security forces and reviewing the states' revenue allocation formula. Despite advocating for restructuring during his 2015 presidential campaign, President Muhammadu Buhari has recently dismissed calls for greater devolution. Impacts Significant national restructuring would likely necessitate a census, something there is currently little political appetite for. Police force devolution is one of the APC restructuring proposals most likely to find favour with Buhari's government. Ending a Senate-presidency impasse over central bank nominations will bring short-term investor relief, but divisions will likely linger.


Subject Russian private military companies. Significance Despite casualties and other reverses in Syria, the Wagner private military company (PMC) is increasingly active in Africa. It is operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan, and talk of a further expansion intensified in November when Wagner's owner Yevgeny Prigozhin attended a meeting between Russian defence officials and Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar, military commander and powerbroker in eastern Libya. Impacts In the short term, Wagner and other PMCs offer the Kremlin a quick route to building influence in Africa and beyond. PMCs are likely to proliferate along with Moscow's deeper involvement in conflict zones and countries with serious security challenges. Russian companies now doing private security work will increasingly take on more aggressive tasks.


Author(s):  
Ivan A. Zakharov ◽  
◽  
Stanislav A. Gorokhov ◽  
Ruslan V. Dmitriev ◽  
◽  
...  

The article attempts to identify the impact of religious competition on the spatial development of conflict zones in Africa. On the basis of ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) for 1997–2017 three conflict zoned are identified: the Sudan-Sahel Corridor, the periphery of Catholic “Domain” in the central part of the Continent and the countries of the Lake Chad basin. The results made it possible to clarify some findings and conclusions about the conflict potential of the macroregion obtained in civilizational studies. It is confirmed that the most conflicts in Africa are located in the Sudan-Sahel Corridor (territory roughly corresponds to the boarder of Islamic and African Civilizations), primarily to the countries a fairly equal number of adherents of Christianity and Islam adherents. Correlation analysis confirmed that such a confessional structure of the population is conflict prone, it contributes to increased ferocity of conflicts. However, religion-based violence does not exclusively appears in the zones of Islam and Christianity competition, there are other conflict zones where the emergence on conflicts is due to growing competition between branches of the same religion. On the periphery of the Catholic “Domain” conflicts are currently ethno-political in nature, but their occurrence is ascribed largely to the competition between Catholic and Protestant missionary societies. The countries of the Lake Chad basin are characterized by competition between Sunnism and Shiism. At the same time, this conflict zone is one of the largest “producers” of radical Islamist groups; the organization level of the latter is often higher than that of opposing state and international bodies. There is a close spatial connection between conflict zones. In this regard, countries belonging to several conflict zones are at higher risk of emergence of complex conflicts. The findings indicate a strong influence of the religious factor on the conflict potential of the African continent. The analysis of historical materials showed that the occurrence of conflicts in the identified conflict zones is determined primarily by the evolution logic of the confessional space of African countries and can be explained from the standpoint of the concept of confessional geospace competitive development.


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