scholarly journals Network Space Search for Pareto-Efficient Spaces

Author(s):  
Min-Fong Hong ◽  
Hao-Yun Chen ◽  
Min-Hung Chen ◽  
Yu-Syuan Xu ◽  
Hsien-Kai Kuo ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Gagan Goel ◽  
Vahab Mirrokni ◽  
Renato Paes Leme

We consider auction settings in which agents have limited access to monetary resources but are able to make payments larger than their available resources by taking loans with a certain interest rate. This setting is a strict generalization of budget constrained utility functions (which corresponds to infinite interest rates). Our main result is an incentive compatible and Pareto-efficient auction for a divisible multi-unit setting with 2 players who are able to borrow money with the same interest rate. The auction is an ascending price clock auction that bears some similarities to the clinching auction but at the same time is a considerable departure from this framework: allocated goods can be de-allocated in future and given to other agents and prices for previously allocated goods can be raised.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Roger E. A. Farmer ◽  
Pawel Zabczyk

This paper is about the effectiveness of qualitative easing, a form of unconventional monetary policy that changes the risk composition of the central bank balance sheet. We construct a general equilibrium model where agents have rational expectations, and there is a complete set of financial securities, but where some agents are unable to participate in financial markets. We show that a change in the risk composition of the central bank’s balance sheet affects equilibrium asset prices and economic activity. We prove that, in our model, a policy in which the central bank stabilizes non-fundamental fluctuations in the stock market is self-financing and leads to a Pareto efficient outcome.


2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (5) ◽  
pp. 1229-1248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Francis ◽  
Katharina T. Huber ◽  
Vincent Moulton ◽  
Taoyang Wu

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-178
Author(s):  
Huiyi Guo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)


Ekonomika ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał M. Jakubowski ◽  
Paweł Kuśmierczyk

We analyse the possibility of an experimental study of the efficiency of market institutional structures. In the paper “On the new institutionalism of markets: the market as an organization” by R. Richter, the implicitly agreed upon market organization is regarded as a Nash equilibrium of a game between potential market participants. The solution of such coordination problem is not necessarily Pareto-efficient but could be efficient given assumptions of New Institutional Economics (i. e. could be NIE-efficient). This framework can be very helpful as a descriptive tool used to explain the persistence or transition of market institutions, but in can be difficult to be verified empirically.Economic experiments have been successfully applied to analyse market institutions and to compare their efficiency. In the paper, we demonstrate how this methodology could be used to analyse the “spontaneous” market organizations reached as a tacit agreement in a coordination problem. We also advocate that economic experiments can be a very useful tool to verify the efficiency of such institutions.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Cubel ◽  
Santiago Sanchez-Pages

Property rights often emerge from adversarial interactions in which agents make claims and defend them from the appropriation efforts of others. In this paper, we first offer a survey of the theoretical literature on this issue. We systematize the existing models by classifying them into two families and show that they can explain the emergence of classic types or property rights. We then explore a new model where agents can become the sole owner of a commonly owned production resource through an exclusion contest. We show that if overexploitation under joint property is severe enough relative to the returns to scale of conflict activities, private property emerges out of conflict. Inequality makes common ownership less likely to emerge. Finally, we characterize the set of common ownership regimes which are Pareto efficient and immune to conflict. Results show that proportionality to labour inputs in output sharing makes common ownership more resilient to conflict when inequality is higher.


Author(s):  
CHRISTIAN STUMMER ◽  
ELMAR KIESLING ◽  
WALTER J. GUTJAHR

The systematic and proactive development of human resources is of major importance in organizations that rely heavily on the competencies of their employees when engaging in innovative endeavors. Human capital, however, is not only a resource required for conducting research, but also the eventual result of that research. When selecting a research portfolio, the decision-maker (DM) thus needs to take into consideration both current and future competence requirements, as well as other financial and nonfinancial objectives and constraints. We introduce a proper multicriteria decision support system (MCDSS) that first determines the set of Pareto-efficient solutions and then allows the DM to interactively filter and/or explore this set in various ways. Its practical application is demonstrated by means of a showcase at the Electronic Commerce Competence Center (EC3) in Vienna, Austria.


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