scholarly journals Ontology Revision on the Semantic Web: Integration of belief revision theory

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seung Kang ◽  
Sim Lau
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Web Integration

PLAUSIBILITY ORDERINGS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Plausibility Ordering

In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.

Alignment Evolution under Ontology Change

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Zahaf ◽  
Mimoun Malki
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Semantic Interoperability ◽  
Evolution Problem ◽  
Ontology Matching ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Experimental Process ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

The alignment of ontologies is the backbone of semantic interoperability. It facilitates the import of data from an ontology to another, translating queries between them or merging ontologies in a global one. However, these services cannot be guaranteed throughout the life cycle of the ontology. The problem is that the evolution of mapped ontologies may be affected and make obsolete the relationship of the mapping. Inspired by belief revision theory, the authors identify and formalize the constraints and requirements of the alignment evolution problem. Then they give an orchestration of designed operations to resolve the problem. The satisfaction of these constraints and requirements is discussed for each operation showing its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the authors conduct an experimental process with the objective to show the limits of alignment evolution methods and ontology matching tools when dealing with alignment evolution problem highlighting the emergency to invest in dedicated methods.

BELIEF REVISION IN NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOV GABBAY ◽  
ODINALDO RODRIGUES ◽  
ALESSANDRA RUSSO
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
First Order ◽  
General Methodology ◽  
Definition Of

In this article, we propose a belief revision approach for families of (non-classical) logics whose semantics are first-order axiomatisable. Given any such (non-classical) logic $L$, the approach enables the definition of belief revision operators for $L$, in terms of a belief revision operation satisfying the postulates for revision theory proposed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM revision, Alchourrón et al. (1985)). The approach is illustrated by considering the modal logic K, Belnap's four-valued logic, and Łukasiewicz's many-valued logic. In addition, we present a general methodology to translate algebraic logics into classical logic. For the examples provided, we analyse in what circumstances the properties of the AGM revision are preserved and discuss the advantages of the approach from both theoretical and practical viewpoints.

scholarly journals Iterated Belief Revision

2019 ◽  
pp. 49-68
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Explicit Representation ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Level Of Abstraction ◽  
Meta Information ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
New Evidence

A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.

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