PLAUSIBILITY ORDERINGS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Plausibility Ordering

In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.

scholarly journals BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Use Of Knowledge ◽  
Information Games

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

Alignment Evolution under Ontology Change

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Zahaf ◽  
Mimoun Malki
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Semantic Interoperability ◽  
Evolution Problem ◽  
Ontology Matching ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Experimental Process ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

The alignment of ontologies is the backbone of semantic interoperability. It facilitates the import of data from an ontology to another, translating queries between them or merging ontologies in a global one. However, these services cannot be guaranteed throughout the life cycle of the ontology. The problem is that the evolution of mapped ontologies may be affected and make obsolete the relationship of the mapping. Inspired by belief revision theory, the authors identify and formalize the constraints and requirements of the alignment evolution problem. Then they give an orchestration of designed operations to resolve the problem. The satisfaction of these constraints and requirements is discussed for each operation showing its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the authors conduct an experimental process with the objective to show the limits of alignment evolution methods and ontology matching tools when dealing with alignment evolution problem highlighting the emergency to invest in dedicated methods.

scholarly journals ERRATUM: "RATIONAL DYNAMICS AND EPISTEMIC LOGIC IN GAMES"

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 377-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHAN VAN BENTHEM
Keyword(s):  
Backward Induction ◽  
Recursive Algorithms ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
Solution Sets ◽  
Solution Algorithms ◽  
Mutual Knowledge ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Theoretic Solution ◽  
Extensive Games

Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and computation.

Optimal eco-labeling strategy with imperfectly informed consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (6) ◽  
pp. 1166-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tijun Fan ◽  
Yang Song ◽  
Huan Cao ◽  
Haiyang Xia
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Environmental Quality ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Quality Criteria ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Strategies ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to find the optimal environmental quality criteria for a strategic eco-labeling authority with three objectives (i.e. maximizing the aggregate environmental quality, maximizing the industry profit and maximizing the social welfare). Particularly, the authors investigate how the existence of imperfectly informed consumers affects labeling criteria determination and competition among firms. Design/methodology/approach A game-theoretic modeling approach was adopted in this paper. A three-stage sequential game was modeled and backward induction was used to solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To investigate the impacts of the existence of imperfectly informed consumers, the equilibrium, if all consumers are perfectly informed of the eco-label, was studied as a benchmark. Findings A more strict eco-labeling criterion improves revenues for both the labeled and unlabeled firms. It is interesting to find that the eco-labeling criteria to maximize industry profits are stricter than the criteria to maximize social welfare. Moreover, when the fraction of imperfectly informed consumers increases, the eco-labeling criteria to maximize aggregate environmental quality or industry profits will be more strict, while the criteria to maximize the social welfare will be looser. Originality/value The authors analyze the equilibrium strategies for firms against the eco-labeling criteria certified by authority with different objectives. The obtained optimal labeling strategies could provide insightful guidelines for the certifying authority to select the best suitable labeling criteria to achieve its goals.

Rationalization and Incomplete Information

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierpaolo Battigalli ◽  
Marciano Siniscalchi
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Form Solution ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
First Order ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information ◽  
Intuitive Criterion ◽  
Signalling Games

We analyze a family of extensive-form solution procedures for games with incomplete information that do not require the specification of an epistemic type space a la Harsanyi, but can accommodate a (commonly known) collection of explicit restrictions D on first-order beliefs. For any fixed D we obtain a solution called D-rationalizability.In static games, D-rationalizability characterizes the set of outcomes (combinations of payoff types and strategies) that may occur in any Bayesian equilibrium model consistent with D; these are precisely the outcomes consistent with common certainty of rationality and of the restrictions D. Hence, our approach to the analysis of incomplete-information games is consistent with Harsanyi's, and it may be viewed as capturing the robust implications of Bayesian equilibrium analysis.In dynamic games, D-rationalizability yields a forward-induction refinement of this set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. Focusing on the restriction that first-order beliefs be consistent with a given distribution on terminal nodes, we obtain a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium. In signalling games, this refinement coincides with the Iterated Intuitive Criterion.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document