scholarly journals Iterated Belief Revision

2019 ◽  
pp. 49-68
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Explicit Representation ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Level Of Abstraction ◽  
Meta Information ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
New Evidence

A discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new evidence, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new evidence. The emphasis in the chapter is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed constraints. Some specific constraints that have been proposed are criticized. The chapter emphasizes the importance of meta-information—information about one’s sources of information—and argues that little of substance can be said about constraints on iterated belief revision at a level of abstraction that lacks the resources for explicit representation of meta-information.

scholarly journals Observations on Darwiche and Pearl's Approach for Iterated Belief Revision

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theofanis Aravanis ◽  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
Preference Ordering ◽  
Satisfactory Solution ◽  
Entire Class ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Belief States

Notwithstanding the extensive work on iterated belief revision, there is, still, no fully satisfactory solution within the classical AGM paradigm. The seminal work of Darwiche and Pearl (DP approach, for short) remains the most dominant, despite its well-documented shortcomings. In this article, we make further observations on the DP approach. Firstly, we prove that the DP postulates are, in a strong sense, inconsistent with Parikh's relevance-sensitive axiom (P), extending previous initial conflicts. Immediate consequences of this result are that an entire class of intuitive revision operators, which includes Dalal's operator, violates the DP postulates, as well as that the Independence postulate and Spohn's conditionalization are inconsistent with (P). Lastly, we show that the DP postulates allow for more revision polices than the ones that can be captured by identifying belief states with total preorders over possible worlds, a fact implying that a preference ordering (over possible worlds) is an insufficient representation for a belief state.

scholarly journals Iterated Belief Base Revision: A Dynamic Epistemic Logic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 3076-3083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlo Souza ◽  
Álvaro Moreira ◽  
Renata Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Revision Operation ◽  
Belief Bases ◽  
Negative Results ◽  
Base Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

AGM’s belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent’s belief state - whether representing the agent’s ‘explicit beliefs’ or as a computational model for her belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic epistemic logic. This work investigates how priority graphs, a syntactic representation of preference relations deeply connected to prioritised bases, can be used to characterise belief change operators, focusing on well-known postulates of Iterated Belief Change. We provide syntactic representations of belief change operators in a dynamic context, as well as new negative results regarding the possibility of representing an iterated belief revision operation using transformations on priority graphs.

(DIS)BELIEF CHANGE AND ARGUED FEED-BACK DIALOG

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (05) ◽  
pp. 511-538
Author(s):  
LAURENT PERRUSSEL ◽  
JEAN-MARC THÉVENIN
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Belief Change ◽  
Preference Relation ◽  
Belief State ◽  
Temporal Aspects ◽  
Incoming Information ◽  
Multi Agent

This paper focuses on the features of belief change in a multi-agent context where agents consider beliefs and disbeliefs. Disbeliefs represent explicit ignorance and are useful to prevent agents to entail conclusions due to their ignorance. Agents receive messages holding information from other agents and change their belief state accordingly. An agent may refuse to adopt incoming information if it prefers its own (dis)beliefs. For this, each agent maintains a preference relation over its own beliefs and disbeliefs in order to decide if it accepts or rejects incoming information whenever inconsistencies occur. This preference relation may be built by considering several criteria such as the reliability of the sender of statements or temporal aspects. This process leads to non-prioritized belief revision. In this context we first present the * and − operators which allow an agent to revise, respectively contract, its belief state in a non-prioritized way when it receives an incoming belief, respectively disbelief. We show that these operators behave properly. Based on this we then illustrate how the receiver and the sender may argue when the incoming (dis)belief is refused. We describe pieces of dialog where (i) the sender tries to convince the receiver by sending arguments in favor of the original (dis)belief and (ii) the receiver justifies its refusal by sending arguments against the original (dis)belief. We show that the notion of acceptability of these arguments can be represented in a simple way by using the non-prioritized change operators * and −. The advantage of argumentation dialogs is twofold. First whenever arguments are acceptable the sender or the receiver reconsider its belief state; the main result is an improvement of the reconsidered belief state. Second the sender may not be aware of some sets of rules which act as constraints to reach a specific conclusion and discover them through argumentation dialogs.

PLAUSIBILITY ORDERINGS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Plausibility Ordering

In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.

Alignment Evolution under Ontology Change

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Zahaf ◽  
Mimoun Malki
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Semantic Interoperability ◽  
Evolution Problem ◽  
Ontology Matching ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Experimental Process ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

The alignment of ontologies is the backbone of semantic interoperability. It facilitates the import of data from an ontology to another, translating queries between them or merging ontologies in a global one. However, these services cannot be guaranteed throughout the life cycle of the ontology. The problem is that the evolution of mapped ontologies may be affected and make obsolete the relationship of the mapping. Inspired by belief revision theory, the authors identify and formalize the constraints and requirements of the alignment evolution problem. Then they give an orchestration of designed operations to resolve the problem. The satisfaction of these constraints and requirements is discussed for each operation showing its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the authors conduct an experimental process with the objective to show the limits of alignment evolution methods and ontology matching tools when dealing with alignment evolution problem highlighting the emergency to invest in dedicated methods.

scholarly journals On the logic of iterated belief revision

1997 ◽  
Vol 89 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adnan Darwiche ◽  
Judea Pearl
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

Convergence Analysis of Iterated Belief Revision in Complex Fusion Environments

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 598-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thanuka L. Wickramarathne ◽  
Kamal Premaratne ◽  
Manohar N. Murthi ◽  
Nitesh V. Chawla
Keyword(s):  
Convergence Analysis ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision

scholarly journals Admissible and Restrained Revision

2006 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 127-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Booth ◽  
T. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Composite Operator ◽  
Iterated Belief Revision ◽  
Future Work

As partial justification of their framework for iterated belief revision Darwiche and Pearl convincingly argued against Boutilier's natural revision and provided a prototypical revision operator that fits into their scheme. We show that the Darwiche-Pearl arguments lead naturally to the acceptance of a smaller class of operators which we refer to as admissible. Admissible revision ensures that the penultimate input is not ignored completely, thereby eliminating natural revision, but includes the Darwiche-Pearl operator, Nayak's lexicographic revision operator, and a newly introduced operator called restrained revision. We demonstrate that restrained revision is the most conservative of admissible revision operators, effecting as few changes as possible, while lexicographic revision is the least conservative, and point out that restrained revision can also be viewed as a composite operator, consisting of natural revision preceded by an application of a "backwards revision" operator previously studied by Papini. Finally, we propose the establishment of a principled approach for choosing an appropriate revision operator in different contexts and discuss future work.

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