An improved two-party Password Authenticated Key Exchange protocol without server's public key

Affiliation-hiding authenticated key exchange protocol, also called secret handshake, makes two parties from the same organization realize mutual authentication and key agreement via public key certificates without leaking the organization information to any others. Moreover, if the peer involved in the protocol is not from the same group, no any information of the affiliation can be known. In previous secret handshakes protocols, there is a problem which is linkability. That is to say, two activities of the same people can be associated by the attackers. It is not desirable for privacy because the association may deduce it’s affiliation with some other information. In this paper, an unlinkable affiliation-hiding authenticated key exchange protocol is brought out to conquer the linkability. Security analysis is given finally.

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A Generic Multifactor Authenticated Key Exchange with Physical Unclonable Function

Security and Communication Networks ◽

10.1155/2019/5935292 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 ◽

pp. 1-15 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Jin Wook Byun

Keyword(s):

Key Exchange ◽

Public Key ◽

Physical Unclonable Function ◽

Authenticated Key Exchange ◽

Key Exchange Protocol ◽

Embedded Device ◽

Multifactor Authentication ◽

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

We study how to generally construct a PUF-based multifactor authenticated key exchange (MAKE) protocol from any secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. We newly consider a new setting in which a user holding a PUF-embedded device desires to perform an authenticate key exchange through multifactor authentication factors (password, biometrics, secret). Our construction is the first PUF-based general MAKE construction. By applying a PUF in a device, our MAKE construction is still secure even if all authentication factors are totally compromised. Our construction is the first PUF-based generic MAKE protocol requiring additional three communication flows without any public key based primitives such as signature.

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A Security and Efficiency of Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol for Wireless Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Applied Mechanics and Materials ◽

10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.284-287.3280 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 284-287 ◽

pp. 3280-3284

Author(s):

Erl Huei Lu ◽

Henry Ker Chang Chang ◽

Shu Hwang Liaw ◽

Pin Chang Su

Keyword(s):

Wireless Networks ◽

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks ◽

Ad Hoc ◽

Key Exchange ◽

Public Key ◽

Authenticated Key Exchange ◽

Key Exchange Protocol ◽

Mobile Ad Hoc ◽

Hoc Networks ◽

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are infrastructure-free, self-configuring and stand alone wireless networks. Lack of efficient computations and secure based point authentication, the security and efficiency of MANETs have been the biggest challenges in its wide application. Many researchers have applied RSA and ECC cryptography algorithms in building secure ID and key exchange agreement; however, they also have difficult to face the challenges of factoring large composite integers and computing discrete logarithms. Generally, public key infrastructures are assumed to be unavailable in MANETs. The key exchange problem for this type of network has now become important. In this article, we propose a new NTRU-based authenticated key exchange protocol for MANETs. We take advantage of NTRU cryptosystem of the inherent efficiency and security in this type of wireless networks - without any public key infrastructure - to defend message exchange against the threat of session key attacks, the man-in-the-middle attacks and the brute force attacks.

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