scholarly journals A game-theoretic approach for minimizing security risks in the Internet-of-Things

Author(s):  
George Rontidis ◽  
Emmanouil Panaousis ◽  
Aron Laszka ◽  
Tasos Dagiuklas ◽  
Pasquale Malacaria ◽  
...  
Sensors ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (23) ◽  
pp. 6761
Author(s):  
Anjan Bandyopadhyay ◽  
Vikash Kumar Singh ◽  
Sajal Mukhopadhyay ◽  
Ujjwal Rai ◽  
Fatos Xhafa ◽  
...  

In the Internet of Things (IoT) + Fog + Cloud architecture, with the unprecedented growth of IoT devices, one of the challenging issues that needs to be tackled is to allocate Fog service providers (FSPs) to IoT devices, especially in a game-theoretic environment. Here, the issue of allocation of FSPs to the IoT devices is sifted with game-theoretic idea so that utility maximizing agents may be benign. In this scenario, we have multiple IoT devices and multiple FSPs, and the IoT devices give preference ordering over the subset of FSPs. Given such a scenario, the goal is to allocate at most one FSP to each of the IoT devices. We propose mechanisms based on the theory of mechanism design without money to allocate FSPs to the IoT devices. The proposed mechanisms have been designed in a flexible manner to address the long and short duration access of the FSPs to the IoT devices. For analytical results, we have proved the economic robustness, and probabilistic analyses have been carried out for allocation of IoT devices to the FSPs. In simulation, mechanism efficiency is laid out under different scenarios with an implementation in Python.


2018 ◽  
Vol 200 ◽  
pp. 00002
Author(s):  
El Arbi Abdellaoui alaoui ◽  
Mustapha El Moudden

The Internet of Things (IoT) is considered as a modern concept that will revolutionize the near future. Its interest is to create an environment of combined intelligent devices and systems, communicating with each other through wireless networks. Urban logistics are an applicative field of this new technology, especially for smart parcels and vehicles. Actually, in the context of economy development, the competitiveness between companies and territories necessarily involves an improvement of logistics services. Although these gains offered by IoT, there are significant obstacles to counter. One of the important obstacles to consider is the security. In this paper, we will analyze the interaction between selfish smart vehicles/parcels and malicious smart vehicles/parcels, that was formulated as a game model. As a result, we have calculated the Nash equilibrium and the utilities for the both selfish smart vehicles/parcels and malicious smart vehicles/parcels, evaluated the parameters that can maximize the selfish smart vehicles/parcels’s utility when the smart parcels are transported by vehicles between different centers (shops, supermarket, etc) was planned and identify the potential malicious smart vehicles/parcels.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-40
Author(s):  
Siddhartha Vadlamudi ◽  

The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the leading forces in modern-day technology. The concept has been proposed to be a new way of interconnecting a multiplicity of devices and rendering services to a variety of applications. According to the industry’s insiders, IoT will make it possible to link transport, energy, smart cities, and healthcare together. The purpose of this paper is to understand the economics of the Internet of Things. It is meant to shed light on how world IoT applications can affect the information market. When every sector and industry of the world has been connected via this technology, what will become of the ICT niche? The information economic approach is currently being adopted and presented with its possible applications in IoT. Firstly, this paper reviews the kinds of economic models that have been designed for IoT services. Secondly, it focuses on the two major subject matters of information economics that are critical to IoT. While one considers the value of the information itself, the other addresses information with good pricing. Lastly, the paper proposes a game-theoretic model to examine the price competition of IoT-based services. We take a look at how these two sectors will fare against each, both at full capacity.


2019 ◽  
pp. 958-964 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wissam Abbass ◽  
◽  
Zineb Bakraouy ◽  
Amine Baina ◽  
Mostafa Bella

2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-394
Author(s):  
Uday Khanapurkar

Huawei, the Chinese telecom giant, has emerged as a key player in the provision of infrastructure required to support 5G wireless networks, the adoption of which will be foundational to recipient countries’ deployment of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and the Internet of things.   At the same time, however, security concerns with respect to Huawei’s ties to the Chinese army and state abound, prompting a number of countries to ban the company from supplying them said telecom infrastructure. India, however, is on the fence in this regard. This article assesses India’s Huawei conundrum through a conceptual framework of economic dependence wherein the costs of a ban and willingness to ban are examined in detail. It is argued that since the expected costs of banning Huawei equipment and the security risks of using them are both substantially high, India’s course of action must be to defer a quick decision and bargain for benefits and assurances.


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