Optimal Incentive Mechanism Design under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Author(s):  
Jianzhang Li
2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1569-1574
Author(s):  
Xu Ding ◽  
Wei Dong Meng ◽  
Bo Huang ◽  
Feng Ming Tao

It is studied that how to use profit sharing arrangement as an incentive mechanism to stimulate both parties of R&D outsourcing to reveal their private information and commit enough R&D resources or efforts. First, it is proved that the double-sided moral hazard in R&D outsourcing can not be totally prevented under traditional profit-sharing arrangement, namely, fixed, proportional or mixed profit-sharing arrangement. And a new mixed profit sharing arrangement is proposed, which is composed of a fixed transfer payment and allocation proportion, and proved to be able to prevent the double-sided moral hazard, and motivate both parties to reveal their private information and commit enough efforts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 542-553
Author(s):  
Youming Sun ◽  
Zhiyong Du ◽  
Qihui Wu ◽  
Yuhua Xu ◽  
Alagan Anpalagan

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (10) ◽  
pp. 9575-9588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Yang Bryan Lim ◽  
Zehui Xiong ◽  
Chunyan Miao ◽  
Dusit Niyato ◽  
Qiang Yang ◽  
...  

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