Achieving Differentially Private Location Privacy in Edge-Assistant Connected Vehicles

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 4472-4481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Zhou ◽  
Le Yu ◽  
Suguo Du ◽  
Haojin Zhu ◽  
Cailian Chen
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ante Dagelić ◽  
Toni Perković ◽  
Bojan Vujatović ◽  
Mario Čagalj

User’s location privacy concerns have been further raised by today’s Wi-Fi technology omnipresence. Preferred Network Lists (PNLs) are a particularly interesting source of private location information, as devices are storing a list of previously used hotspots. Privacy implications of a disclosed PNL have been covered by numerous papers, mostly focusing on passive monitoring attacks. Nowadays, however, more and more devices no longer transmit their PNL in clear, thus mitigating passive attacks. Hidden PNLs are still vulnerable against active attacks whereby an attacker mounts a fake SSID hotspot set to one likely contained within targeted PNL. If the targeted device has this SSID in the corresponding PNL, it will automatically initiate a connection with the fake hotspot thus disclosing this information to the attacker. By iterating through different SSIDs (from a predefined dictionary) the attacker can eventually reveal a big part of the hidden PNL. Considering user mobility, executing active attacks usually has to be done within a short opportunity window, while targeting nontrivial SSIDs from user’s PNL. The existing work on active attacks against hidden PNLs often neglects both of these challenges. In this paper we propose a simple mathematical model for analyzing active SSID dictionary attacks, allowing us to optimize the effectiveness of the attack under the above constraints (limited window of opportunity and targeting nontrivial SSIDs). Additionally, we showcase an example method for building an effective SSID dictionary using top-N recommender algorithm and validate our model through simulations and extensive real-life tests.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaemin Lim ◽  
Hyunwoo Yu ◽  
Kiyeon Kim ◽  
Minho Kim ◽  
Suk-Bok Lee

Author(s):  
Wuping Xin ◽  
Hasan M. Moonam ◽  
Jonathan Petit ◽  
William Whyte

High-frequency awareness messages, such as basic safety messages, in a network of connected vehicles render a continuous stream of location data susceptible to tracking attacks. As a countermeasure, each vehicle transmits the messages under a regularly changing pseudonym. The pseudonym-change approach is most effective when multiple vehicles change their respective pseudonyms during a collective period of radio silence; this helps obfuscate locations. However, it may compromise safety owing to the missing messages, when silent, defeating the primary goal of connected vehicles enhancing road safety. It is essential to fully understand the safety impact of silence-based privacy schemes to achieve a reasonable balance between safety and privacy. To that end, a microscopic traffic simulation framework was developed, built on an industry-standard microscopic simulator of roadway traffic. Importantly, a unique field-tested collision-inclusive driver behavioral model was incorporated into the simulator for generating rigorous network-wide crash measures. A new Adaptive Silent Period Strategy was formulated synthesizing several silence-based location privacy schemes. This strategy permits entry and exit of the silent period adaptively based on the driving context or preconfigured rules. A network-wide privacy measure was designed around traffic flow conditions and roadway topologies. Two test sites were selected: a central business district arterial in Manhattan, New York City, and an urban grid network in Arcadia, California. The results present the network-wide safety impacts and privacy protection effectiveness of the Adaptive Silent Period Strategy, while demonstrating the value of the simulation framework in the design, optimization, and evaluation of silence-based location privacy schemes.


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