Intercept 1961: From Air Defense SA-1 to Missile Defense System A [Scanning our Past]

2016 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 883-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Gruntman
Politeja ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 14 (5 (50)) ◽  
pp. 295-322
Author(s):  
Robert WĘŻOWICZ

MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLISH SECURITY The purpose of the article is to present the multifaceted issue that is missile defense in the context of Polish safety. The fact that Poland is a member of NATO, but also its geographical location and the nature of potential security risks, mean that its position in terms of missile defense is not equivalent to that of other countries. In the case of Poland, we are dealing with plans to create a broadly understood air defense system; a compromise solution, the result of irreconcilable requirements, in which missile defense will be just one of many tasks rather than a priority.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Eugeniusz CIEŚLAK

The article discusses operational context for the development of Poland's air defense system. The assessment focuses on air defense operations in high intensity conflict. Recommendations include setting a realistic level of ambition in the field of air defense and increasing operational capabilities through modernization of its combat assets. The priority proposed for Poland’s air defense system is to introduce a new generation of short range surface to air missile systems and then to develop medium range air and missile defense capabilities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
Furqan Khan ◽  
Khadijah Saeed

The global change in perception following the Cold War from deterrence by punishment in the form of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) to deterrence by denial has multiplied the utility of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). India’s willingness to acquire and develop the advanced BMD shield is inspired, especially by Reagan’s Star Wars and the global shift in using it as an instrument of deterrence by denial. But as the application of its offensive-defensive paradox, India is raising a multi-layer air defense system to enhance its freedom of action and to acquire impunity in carrying out what New Delhi believes as its ‘limited war’ strategy against Pakistan. However, despite having a number of air defense systems in place including the recently acquired advanced S-400 air defense system, India is unable to shield itself completely from the counter-force or counter-value strikes by Pakistan as evident by the Balakot debacle. This is not only because India lags behind in BMD technology but also because of its inability to afford a comprehensive pan-national BMD shield. Therefore, the paper argues that, India’s attempt to build a multi-layer air defense system, rather than ensuring balance of power, destabilizes it and the delicate deterrence in place. This is because the threat asymmetry allows Pakistan to develop advanced nuclear capabilities including BMD evading delivery vehicles like MIRV as the offensive firepower to communicate the threat as an effective deterrence. Resultantly, the employment of BMD in South Asia disturbs strategic parity, fractures deterrence, drags down nuclear threshold and hence raises the cost of conflict between Pakistan and India with an elevated threat of annihilation.


2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
James B. Michael ◽  
Philip E. Pace ◽  
Man-Tak Shing ◽  
Murali Tummala ◽  
Joel Babbitt

1997 ◽  
Vol 117 (2) ◽  
pp. P93-P93
Author(s):  
R KOPKE ◽  
T VANDEWATER ◽  
R GABAIZEDEH ◽  
H STEINMAN ◽  
D HENDERSON ◽  
...  

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