A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Energy Efficiency and Performance for Cloud Computing in Communication Networks

In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by the unpredictability of the users' demand. Nevertheless, standard mechanisms charge fixed per-unit prices that do not depend on the variability of the users' demand. In this paper, we study a variance-based pricing rule in a two-provider market setting and perform a game-theoretic analysis of the resulting competitive effects. We show that an innovative provider who employs variance-based pricing can choose a pricing strategy that guarantees himself a higher profit than using fixed per-unit prices for any individually rational response of a provider playing a fixed pricing strategy. We then characterize all equilibria for the setting where both providers use variance-based pricing strategies. We show that, in equilibrium, the providers' profits may increase or decrease, depending on their cost functions. However, social welfare always weakly increases.

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Energy efficiency in multi-hop CDMA networks: A game theoretic analysis considering operating costs

2008 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing ◽

10.1109/icassp.2008.4518226 ◽

2008 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Sharon Betz ◽

H. Vincent Poor

Keyword(s):

Energy Efficiency ◽

Operating Costs ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Cdma Networks ◽

Game Theoretic

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Energy efficiency in multi-hop CDMA networks: a game theoretic analysis

12th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems - (ICPADS'06) ◽

10.1109/icpads.2006.42 ◽

2006 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

S. Betz ◽

H.V. Poor

Keyword(s):

Energy Efficiency ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Cdma Networks ◽

Game Theoretic

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Temporal Information Design in Contests

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence ◽

10.24963/ijcai.2019/61 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Priel Levy ◽

David Sarne ◽

Yonatan Aumann

Keyword(s):

Information Disclosure ◽

Information Design ◽

Temporal Information ◽

Equilibrium Strategy ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Tullock Contests ◽

Potential Benefits ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

And Performance

We study temporal information design in contests, wherein the organizer may, possibly incrementally, disclose information about the participation and performance of some contestants to other (later) contestants. We show that such incremental disclosure can increase the organizer's profit. The expected profit, however, depends on the exact information disclosure structure, and the optimal structure depends on the parameters of the problem. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of such information disclosure schemes as they apply to two common models of contests: (a) simple contests, wherein contestants' decisions concern only their participation; and (b) Tullock contests, wherein contestants choose the effort levels to expend. For each of these we analyze and characterize the equilibrium strategy, and exhibit the potential benefits of information design.

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