Leader-follower tracking with prescribed transient and steady state performance guarantees for a class of unknown nonlinear multi-agent systems

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilias Katsoukis ◽  
George A. Rovithakis
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Performance Guarantees ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Transient And Steady State ◽  
Steady State Performance

scholarly journals Nonlinear Uncertainties Canceling in Multi-Agent Systems Enabled by Cooperative Adaptation

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Cyuansi Shih ◽  
Chengyu Cao
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Control ◽  
Multi Agent System ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Adaptation Mechanism ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Nonlinear Uncertainties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Local Agent ◽  
Transient And Steady State ◽  
Steady State Performance

This paper deals with uncertainties problem in multi-agent systems with novel cooperative adaptation approach. Since uncertainties in multi-agent systems are interconnected, local agent often faces uncertainties not only from itself but also from neighbors. The proposed approach is that a local agent estimates uncertainties from itself and neighboring agents and then changes control strategy. The uncertainties or the equivalences of neighbors can be estimated based on their available outputs; thus, the local agent can adapt to them to cancel out these effects. Stability analysis is also derived that characterizes the transient and steady state performance of multi-agent system. The simulation presents the details of the proposed cooperative adaptation mechanism by compared typical cooperative control.

scholarly journals Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 62 ◽  
pp. 433-458
Author(s):  
Natasha Alechina ◽  
Joseph Y. Halpern ◽  
Ian A. Kash ◽  
Brian Logan
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Theoretical Results

We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results, which apply to systems with a large number of agents, hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents–the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.

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