On the stability robustness of the continuous-time LQG optimal control

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (10) ◽  
pp. 1039-1043 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Shaked ◽  
E. Soroka
Author(s):  
J-H Chou ◽  
W-H Liao

In this paper, under assumptions that the nominal linear singular system is regular and impulse-free and has all its finite eigenvalues lying inside certain specified regions, a sufficient condition is proposed to preserve the assumed properties when the structured parameter perturbations are added into the nominal singular system. No restriction is imposed on the shapes of the specified regions. The proposed method is applicable to both the continuous-time case and the discrete-time case. When all the finite eigenvalues are just required to locate in the stable region, the proposed criterion will become the stability robustness criterion. By mathematical analysis, the presented criterion is proved to be less conservative than the existing criterion reported recently.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
N. H. Sweilam ◽  
S. M. Al-Mekhlafi ◽  
A. O. Albalawi ◽  
D. Baleanu

Abstract In this paper, a novel coronavirus (2019-nCov) mathematical model with modified parameters is presented. This model consists of six nonlinear fractional order differential equations. Optimal control of the suggested model is the main objective of this work. Two control variables are presented in this model to minimize the population number of infected and asymptotically infected people. Necessary optimality conditions are derived. The Grünwald–Letnikov nonstandard weighted average finite difference method is constructed for simulating the proposed optimal control system. The stability of the proposed method is proved. In order to validate the theoretical results, numerical simulations and comparative studies are given.


Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.


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