scholarly journals Strategy Competition Dynamics of Multi-Agent Systems in the Framework of Evolutionary Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 152-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianlei Zhang ◽  
Ming Cao
2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARL TUYLS ◽  
ANN NOWÉ

In this paper we survey the basics of reinforcement learning and (evolutionary) game theory, applied to the field of multi-agent systems. This paper contains three parts. We start with an overview on the fundamentals of reinforcement learning. Next we summarize the most important aspects of evolutionary game theory. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of multi-agent reinforcement learning and the mathematical connection with evolutionary game theory.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Zhuozhuo Gou ◽  
Yansong Deng

Multi-agent collaboration is greatly important in order to reduce the frequency of errors in message communication and enhance the consistency of exchanging information. This study explores the process of evolutionary decision and stable strategies among multi-agent systems, including followers, leaders, and loners, involved in collaboration based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The main elements that affected the strategies are discussed, and a 3D evolution model is established. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and stable conditions were analyzed subsequently. Numerical simulation results were obtained through MATLAB simulation, and they manifested that leaders play an important role in exchanging information with other agents, accepting agents’ state information, and sending messages to agents. Then, with the positivity of receiving and feeding back messages for followers, implementing message communication is profitable for the system, and the high positivity can accelerate the exchange of information. At the behavior level, reducing costs can strengthen the punishment of impeding the exchange of information and improve the positivity of collaboration to facilitate the evolutionary convergence toward the ideal state. Finally, the EGT results revealed that the possibility of collaboration between loners and others is improved, and the rewards are increased, thereby promoting the implementation of message communication that encourages leaders to send all messages, improve the feedback positivity of followers, and reduce the hindering degree of loners.


Synthese ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 139 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Tuyls ◽  
Ann Nowe ◽  
Tom Lenaerts ◽  
Bernard Manderick

Author(s):  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Paolo Turrini ◽  
Michael Wooldridge

The existence of (Nash) equilibria with undesirable properties is a well-known problem in game theory, which has motivated much research directed at the possibility of mechanisms for modifying games in order to eliminate undesirable equilibria, or induce desirable ones. Taxation schemes are a well-known mechanism for modifying games in this way. In the multi-agent systems community, taxation mechanisms for incentive engineering have been studied in the context of Boolean games with costs. These are games in which each player assigns truth-values to a set of propositional variables she uniquely controls in pursuit of satisfying an individual propositional goal formula; different choices for the player are also associated with different costs. In such a game, each player prefers primarily to see the satisfaction of their goal, and secondarily, to minimise the cost of their choice, thereby giving rise to lexicographic preferences over goal-satisfaction and costs. Within this setting, where taxes operate on costs only, however, it may well happen that the elimination or introduction of equilibria can only be achieved at the cost of simultaneously introducing less desirable equilibria or eliminating more attractive ones. Although this framework has been studied extensively, the problem of precisely characterising the equilibria that may be induced or eliminated has remained open. In this paper we close this problem, giving a complete characterisation of those mechanisms that can induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly the set of Nash Equilibrium outcomes.


Author(s):  
Raymund J. Lin ◽  
Seng-Cho T. Chou

The theme of this chapter includes topics of matching, auction and negotiation. We have shown that the knowledge of game theory is very important when designing an agent-based matching or negotiation system. The problem of bounded rationality in multi¬-agent systems is also discussed; we put forward the mechanism design and heuristic methods as solutions. A real negotiation scenario is presented to demonstrate our proposed solutions. In addition, we discuss the future trends of the agent technology in e¬commerce system.


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