The COMMIT Protocol for Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing in Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Eidenbenz ◽  
G. Resta ◽  
P. Santi
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Muhammad Altaf Khan ◽  
Moustafa M. Nasralla ◽  
Muhammad Muneer Umar ◽  
Zeeshan Iqbal ◽  
Ghani Ur Rehman ◽  
...  

In ad hoc networks, the communication is usually made through multiple hops by establishing an environment of cooperation and coordination among self-operated nodes. Such nodes typically operate with a set of finite and scarce energy, processing, bandwidth, and storage resources. Due to the cooperative environment in such networks, nodes may consume additional resources by giving relaying services to other nodes. This aspect in such networks coined the situation of noncooperative behavior by some or all the nodes. Moreover, nodes sometimes do not cooperate with others due to their social likeness or their mobility. Noncooperative or selfish nodes can last for a longer time by preserving their resources for their own operations. However, such nodes can degrade the network's overall performance in terms of lower data gathering and information exchange rates, unbalanced work distribution, and higher end-to-end delays. This work surveys the main roots for motivating nodes to adapt selfish behavior and the solutions for handling such nodes. Different schemes are introduced to handle selfish nodes in wireless ad hoc networks. Various types of routing techniques have been introduced to target different types of ad hoc networks having support for keeping misbehaving or selfish nodes. The major solutions for such scenarios can be trust-, punishment-, and stimulation-based mechanisms. Some key protocols are simulated and analyzed for getting their performance metrics to compare their effectiveness.


Algorithmica ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 358-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Karakostas ◽  
Euripides Markou

2011 ◽  
Vol 219-220 ◽  
pp. 351-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Song Gui ◽  
Zhi Gang Chen ◽  
Xiao Heng Deng

In vehicular ad hoc networks, uncooperative behaviors will impact the reliability of comfort applications, as well as drivers’ decisions, and even invoke serious traffic accidents. In this paper, we propose a novel game incentive scheme to stimulate cooperation among vehicle nodes, consider selfish nodes’ expectations to future payoff and their long-term desires for profit, and show analytically the three incentive-compatible conditions under which selfish nodes will be deterred from cheating by the subsequent punishments. We also discuss the impact on selfish nodes’ behavior, which is caused by their willingness for future collaboration, the parameter values of punishment mechanism and the variation of network load. Simulation results show that, the increase of network load and the deterioration of node’s future profit expectation will motivate nodes toward self-interested action, but our scheme can neutralize this tendency by the careful configuration of punishment parameters, and have favorable incentive effect.


2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 757-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongbin Wang ◽  
Mingzeng Hu ◽  
Hui Zhi ◽  
Jianwei Ye

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