Dealing with the consequences of flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) has become an important problem for nuclear utilities worldwide. Recent fatal accidents at the Mihama Unit 3 nuclear station in Japan and at the fossil-fired Iatan Power Plant in the US unit have highlighted the importance of this issue. This paper will examine and compare the programmatic approaches taken by the Japanese nuclear power industry and the approach taken in the United States. In both countries, formal FAC programs were initiated, to a large degree, in response to the failure of a condensate elbow at the Surry Unit 2 station in 1986. In spite of this common beginning, different paths were taken. In Japan, JSME established three voluntary consensus standards after the Mihama accident. One standard provides generic requirements and two separate standards for BWRs and PWRs. The two specific standards require a comprehensive inspection program followed by re-inspections at fixed intervals. The areas inspected were defined by the general operating conditions and the system design specifications. After the Surry accident, the United States nuclear utilities developed a consensus based on inspecting a sample of locations, and performing follow-on work based on the results of these inspections. The inspection locations were determined by analysis, operating experience, and engineering judgment. This approach was documented in NSAC-202L.