The Impact of Mandatory Auditor Tenure Disclosures on Ratification Voting, Auditor Dismissal, and Audit Pricing†

Author(s):  
Ryan T. Dunn ◽  
Nathan G. Lundstrom ◽  
Michael S. Wilkins
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkataraman M. Iyer ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama

Audited financial statements can be viewed as the product of negotiations between a company's management and its auditor. Relative power of these two parties is a major factor that determines the outcome of the negotiation. This study examines the impact of auditor tenure, importance of a client to an audit partner, nonaudit purchases, and prior audit firm experience of client personnel on client perceptions about their ability to persuade the auditor in the context of an accounting disagreement. We obtained responses to a survey from 124 CPAs in industry who are employed as CEOs, CFOs, controllers, or treasurers. Our results indicate that respondents from companies with short auditor tenures were somewhat more likely to indicate that they could persuade the auditor to accept their (client's) position in case of a disagreement. This finding is consistent with the argument that auditors are susceptible to influence in the early years as they are still in the process of recouping start-up costs, but is not consistent with concerns expressed by legislators and others that long auditor tenures will adversely affect audit quality. Respondents who believed their business was more important for the audit partner were also more likely to believe that they could persuade the auditor. However, the purchase of nonaudit services and prior audit experience were not related to client's perceptions about their ability to persuade the auditor.


Author(s):  
Paul N. Tanyi ◽  
Dasaratha V Rama ◽  
K Raghunandan

The PCAOB mandated, over the objections of the large audit firms and others, that for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2017, the audit report shall include information about auditor tenure. In this paper we answer the call for academic research about “the impact and usefulness of the auditor tenure disclosure as it becomes implemented” from Franzel (2017). We use data from 2,718 firms in our analyses. We find that in the case of clients with long (short) auditor tenure, the proportion of shareholder votes not ratifying the auditor increased (decreased) after public disclosure of auditor tenure. Thus, it appears that public disclosure of auditor tenure influenced shareholder voting and sensitized shareholders to longer audit tenures.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 913-930
Author(s):  
Shaban Mohammadi ◽  
Nader Naghshbandi ◽  
Zahra Moridahmadibezdi

Purpose The purpose of the present study is to investigate the impact of audit features, including audit quality, audit fees and auditor tenure on money laundering in Iranian stock companies. Design/methodology/approach This research is descriptive-correlational and applied in terms of purpose. To evaluate the audit features, variables including audit quality, audit fee and auditor tenure were used. The statistical population of this study includes all companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and the research period from 2012 to 2018. A sample of 150 companies was selected by the screening method. In this study, logistic regression and Eviews 10 software were used for data analysis and hypothesis testing. Findings The results showed that variables including audit quality, normal audit fee and auditor tenure have a significant effect on money laundering. Originality/value Observing money laundering rules and regulations for businesses involves is a critical issue. In auditing the financial statements of the business units subject to these laws, the auditor reviews their actions to obtain reasonable assurance of guaranteeing the money laundering laws, evaluates their effectiveness and gains approval of managers regarding observing laundering regulations. In this regard, the auditor is required to report definitive or suspected money-laundering cases or its certain or suspected evidence to the relevant authorities. Although the law prohibits the auditor from disclosing such matters to the client, it is not necessary. It seems that even if the auditors perform non-audit functions, they should report money laundering or suspicious operations and transactions.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mai Dao ◽  
Suchismita Mishra ◽  
K. Raghunandan

SYNOPSIS: Legislators and regulators have expressed concerns about the effect of long auditor tenure on audit quality. There is little direct evidence on investors’ perceptions about long auditor tenure. In this paper, we use shareholder votes on auditor ratification as a proxy for investor perceptions about audit quality. We find, using data from 635 firms during 2006, that shareholder votes against (or abstaining from) auditor ratification are positively correlated with auditor tenure. The results suggest that shareholders view long auditor tenure as adversely affecting audit quality, and provide an empirical basis for arguments related to the impact of long auditor tenures on shareholders’ perceptions of audit quality.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 97-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron D. Crabtree ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
John J. Maher

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Kohlbeck ◽  
Jomo Sankara ◽  
Errol G. Stewart

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether external monitors (auditors and analysts) constrain earnings strings, an indicator of earnings management, and whether this monitoring is more effective after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), given the emphasis of SOX on improving auditing, financial reporting and the information environment. Design/methodology/approach Agency theory establishes the premise between external monitoring and earnings strings. Auditor tenure and number of analysts following provide measures for external monitoring quality. Using prior research, empirical models explaining the presence of an earnings strings and earnings strings trend are developed to test the hypotheses. Findings Pre-SOX, extreme auditor tenure, indicating lower quality external monitoring, is associated with greater earnings strings trend, and analyst coverage is associated with increased likelihood of earnings strings and greater earnings strings trend consistent with analyst pressure on management. More effective auditor and analyst monitoring occurs post-SOX in terms of reduced likelihood of earnings strings and earnings strings trend. Originality/value The authors provide evidence on how elements of external monitoring are associated with increased earnings strings pre-SOX. Further, they contribute to the debate on the impact of SOX on external firm monitoring and the overall financial information environment. By focusing on earnings strings, the outcome of earnings management, the authors provide a unique understanding of external monitoring that also provides insight on the overvaluation of equity and ultimate destruction of firm value. The evidence demonstrates how regulation has contributed to an improved financial reporting environment and external monitoring.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 373-383
Author(s):  
Manel Hadriche Sahnoun ◽  
Mohamed Ali Zarai

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of some attributes of auditor quality such as: auditor tenure, auditor industry specialist, auditor experience and the audit firm size on auditor auditee negotiation outcomes. For the entire sample of 81 Tunisians firms, our results indicate positive and significant relationship between auditor tenure, auditor experience and the extent to which the auditee agreed with the auditor over the financial reporting issues. On the other hand, the results indicate a positive but non-significant relationship between the auditor industry specialist and the negotiation outcome. For the audit firm size, we find that auditees are more likely to agree with big 4 audits firms. Indeed, we find no significant relationship between importance, size and performance of the auditee and auditor auditee negotiation outcome


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