The behavioral agency model: Revised concepts and implications for operations and supply chain research

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez‐Mejia ◽  
Geoff Martin ◽  
Veronica H. Villena ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Stock Options and CEO Temporal Orientation: The Behavioral Agency Model and Inter-Temporal Choice

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 (1) ◽  
pp. 11356
Author(s):  
Geoff Martin ◽  
Robert M Wiseman ◽  
Luis R Gomez-Mejia
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Temporal Orientation ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Executive Stock Options as Mixed Gambles: Revisiting the Behavioral Agency Model

2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey P. Martin ◽  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Robert M. Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Does Greater Risk-Bearing in Stock Option Compensation Reduce the Influence of Problem Framing On Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior?

2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Sawers ◽  
Arnold Wright ◽  
Valentina Zamora
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Money Stock ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Problem Framing ◽  
Managerial Risk ◽  
Option Compensation ◽  
Behavioral Agency ◽  
Stock Option Compensation

ABSTRACT: We examine the extent to which the behavioral agency model reflects the relation between greater risk-bearing in stock option compensation and managerial risk-taking. The behavioral agency model predicts that managers with greater wealth at stake will avoid risky projects that threaten their wealth. This greater risk-bearing effect moderates the problem-framing effect, which predicts that loss-averse managers will be more (less) risk-taking when choosing among loss (gain) projects. Using a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment with 108 M.B.A. students acting as managers, we find that managers are more risk-taking in the loss context than in the gain context when they have at-the-money stock options but not when they have wealth at stake through in-the-money stock options. Further, we find that managers with in-the-money stock options are less risk-taking than managers with at-the-money stock options in the loss context. These findings support the behavioral agency model prediction that greater risk-bearing in stock option compensation (moving from at-the-money stock options to in-the-money stock options) reduces the problem framing effect on risk-taking behavior, particularly when the firm faces a loss decision context. Our results point to the importance of considering the implications of risk-bearing in stock option compensation for managers choosing risky projects that affect firm value.

A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Creativty

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nassim Belbaly ◽  
Autcharaporn Somsing
Keyword(s):  
Agency Model ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Not all Risk Taking is Born Equal: The Behavioral Agency Model and CEO's Perception of Firm Efficacy

2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Martin ◽  
Nathan Washburn ◽  
Marianna Makri ◽  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Takeover Premiums and Family Blockholders

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max P. Leitterstorf ◽  
Maximilian M. Wachter
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Special Case ◽  
Behavioral Agency

Blockholders impact strategic firm decisions because they are better at monitoring managers than dispersed shareholder groups. Nevertheless, we do not sufficiently understand how preferences of different blockholder types impact strategic firm decisions. We discuss this in the context of takeover premiums offered for publicly listed firms. Prior studies have argued that managers are often tempted to offer excessively high premiums. Consistently, blockholders might better control managers and ensure lower premiums. To better understand the impact of blockholder preferences, we focus on the special case of family firms. Specifically, drawing on the behavioral agency model, we hypothesize that bidders with family blockholders offer lower premiums than bidders with other blockholders or bidders without blockholders. Our empirical results support our hypotheses based on a sample of 149 takeover offers.

CEO pay and family firm heterogeneity: A behavioral agency model perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442110517
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Méndez ◽  
Rubén Arrondo García ◽  
Shams Pathan
Keyword(s):  
Family Firms ◽  
Firm Heterogeneity ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Family Control ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Pay Disparity ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Behavioral Agency

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38

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