“Practical reason is not the will”: Kant and Reinhold's dilemma

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 852-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Noller
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Will

Kant on Judging and the Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Vance Buroker
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Voluntary Activity ◽  
The Will ◽  
Direct Use

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.

Practical Reason

Philosophy ◽  
1942 ◽  
Vol 17 (68) ◽  
pp. 351-367
Author(s):  
Reginald Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Will

“The will is nothing but practical reason.” In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral lightness is validity of choice.

Morality within the limits of practical reason: a critique of Kant’s concept of moral virtue

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216
Author(s):  
Edward Uzoma Ezedike
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Synthetic Application

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate Kant’s idea of grounding morality within the limits of practical reason. Kant argues that morality must be devoid of emotions if the authors must make the right decisions. His idea of morality is basically ratiocentric. This paper, therefore, seeks a justification of Kant’s ratiocentricism, which excludes subjective emotional dimensions in moral actions and judgements. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a critical and analytic method of research. It is not empirical research, and hence, does not make use of tables and quantifiable data. The methodology is exclusively qualitative in nature. Findings The major finding of this research work is that an application of practical reason is necessary for the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency. The existential realities demand a synthetic application of reason and emotion in moral issues. So then, a good will is determined by the rational principle. The reason is an organic whole that is capable of functioning both practically and theoretically. The practical reason is not reasoned functioning to acquire knowledge but reason operating as a guide and as the directing force of the will. The application of pure, practical reason and relevant emotional considerations is both necessary and sufficient for moral agency. Originality/value This paper is the outcome of deep critical reflections on Kant’s moral philosophy by the author.

scholarly journals On the Role of Gesinnung in Kant’s Ethics and Philosophy of Religion. Part II

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexei N. Krouglov
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Critical Period ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The Novel ◽  
The World ◽  
The Will ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
The Revolution

The sources of Kant’s term Gesinnung and a review of the problems of its translation into English were presented in the first part of this article; the second part examines the novel features that Kant brings to the interpretation of this concept in the critical period. In the Critique of Practical Reason these include the questions of manifestation of Gesinnung in the world, apprehended through the senses, the method of establishing and the culture of truly moral Gesinnung, as well as the problem of the immutability of Gesinnung in the progress towards the good. The new theses that appear in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason are Gesinnung as the internal subjective principle of maxims, on virtue as evidence of the presence of Gesinnung, on act as a manifestation of Gesinnung, on the unintelligibility of Gesinnung in its noumenal, suprasensible character, on the innateness of Gesinnung in the sense that it exists not in time, but in the form of its acceptance by free expression of the will, on the singleness of Gesinnung and its indivisibility into periods, on revolution in Gesinnung as distinct from empirical reform, on the creation of the new human being as distinct from the ancient one as a result of the revolution of Gesinnung, on the link between the revolution in Gesinnung and “conversion” or second birth. After discussing the problem of distinguishing the terms Gesinnung and Denkungsart in translation as well as a review of all the existing variants of translating Kant’s concept of Gesinnung into Russian (aspiration, inclination, intention, virtue, virtuousness, conviction, attitude, mode of thinking, thoughts, mood, disposition and umonastroenie), the author comes to the conclusion that the uniform variant umonastroenie is best suited for Russian translations of Kant’s works.

Rational Agency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Kosch
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Causal Efficacy ◽  
Practical Deliberation ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
The Will ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

Chapter 2 presents Fichte’s conception of rational agency and of the psychological dispositions and capacities on which he takes it to depend. It begins with an examination of Fichte’s notion of the spontaneity of the will, and compares his account of it to Kant’s. It then explains Fichte’s account of practical deliberation and its necessary conditions. Practical deliberation is means/ends or part/whole reasoning toward the end (viz. independence) provided by practical reason. Its conditions of possibility include empirical cognition, a set of naturally given conative attitudes, embodiment, causal efficacy, social interaction, and a sense of itself as one individual among others. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the variability of rational agency among individuals and the reasons for it.

God and the Good

2020 ◽  
pp. 124-154
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Insole
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
External Object ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Good Will ◽  
The Will

This chapter studies Kant’s dramatic rupture, both with his own earlier position about the highest created good, and with any theological or philosophical tradition that he would have received (from scholastic or Lutheran sources). The unconditioned, that which is all-sufficient for practical reason and the will, is not, as it would be for traditional Christian theology, loving and knowing God. Pivotal here is Kant’s rejection of any ‘external object’ for the will and practical reason. Rather, the unconditioned, for Kant, is the will itself, in its activity of rational willing, or, as Kant puts it, the ‘good will’. Kant is convinced that only in this way is genuine human freedom protected.

Scotus and Ockham

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
The Right

Scotus and Ockham reject the Aristotelian outlook, as Aquinas presents it, and develop a voluntarist account of the will and of morality. In their view, determination by practical reason does not ensure free will; a free will must be wholly undetermined by reason. Nor can it be determined by the desire for one’s ultimate good; the impulse towards the right is separate from the impulse towards happiness. If we apply these principles to the freedom of the divine will, we find that God could not be free if the nature of right and wrong were independent of the divine will. We must infer that moral rightness and wrongness are ultimately constituted by divine commands.

Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will

1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-328
Author(s):  
Theodore Scaltsas ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Will ◽  
Weakness Of The Will

Quid mihi?

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Konrad Utz
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
Normative Criterion ◽  
The Will

AbstractKant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the first is the will as practical reason; the latter is the turn of the will towards itself as autonomy. The result of such groundwork is, first, the evidence of the authenticity of morality and, hence, its unconditional validity – since such original validity is not conditioned on anything extra-moral. Second, we get a normative criterion for the contents of morality, which in Kant takes the form of the Categorical Imperative. The article seeks to defend the view that there is no alternative to Kant’s method of the foundation of ethics. However, by describing this method in a purely formal way, the author aims to open up the possibility to implement it in another way and with other results than Kant does.

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