Attention in Augustine

The article treats the role of attention (intentio or attentio) in Augustine’s analysis of sense perception, the notion of time, and the Trinitarian structure of the human mind. The term intentio covers a broad range of meanings in Augustine’s usage. Its most fundamental meaning is the life-giving presence of the soul in the body, intensified in attention’s being concentrated on a particular thing or experience; Augustine also uses the term attentio in this latter sense. According to his analysis of time, by way of attention (intentio or attentio), the soul fixes the present in which the future passes into the past. Due to the intention of the soul, the form abstracted from an external object is both imprinted into the sense organ and retained in the memory in order to be, by intention again, recalled before the sight of mind. As “the intention of the will” or just “the will”, attention connects intellectual understanding with memory. In Augustine’s eyes, attention has a different quality depending on the object it is oriented to, and a different intensity, ranging from inattentive distraction (distentio) to concentrated effort (intentio).

ALGORITHMS FOR FINGERPRINT CLASSIFICATION

Currently, biometric methods of personality are becoming more and more relevant recognition technology. The advantage of biometric identification systems, in comparison with traditional approaches, lies in the fact that not an external object belonging to a person is identified, but the person himself. The most widespread technology of personal identification by fingerprints, which is based on the uniqueness for each person of the pattern of papillary patterns. In recent years, many algorithms and models have appeared to improve the accuracy of the recognition system. The modern algorithms (methods) for the classification of fingerprints are analyzed. Algorithms for the classification of fingerprint images by the types of fingerprints based on the Gabor filter, wavelet - Haar, Daubechies transforms and multilayer neural network are proposed. Numerical and results of the proposed experiments of algorithms are carried out. It is shown that the use of an algorithm based on the combined application of the Gabor filter, a five-level wavelet-Daubechies transform and a multilayer neural network makes it possible to effectively classify fingerprints.

ALGORITHMS FOR FINGERPRINT CLASSIFICATION

Currently, biometric methods of personality are becoming more and more relevant recognition technology. The advantage of biometric identification systems, in comparison with traditional approaches, lies in the fact that not an external object belonging to a person is identified, but the person himself. The most widespread technology of personal identification by fingerprints, which is based on the uniqueness for each person of the pattern of papillary patterns. In recent years, many algorithms and models have appeared to improve the accuracy of the recognition system. The modern algorithms (methods) for the classification of fingerprints are analyzed. Algorithms for the classification of fingerprint images by the types of fingerprints based on the Gabor filter, wavelet - Haar, Daubechies transforms and multilayer neural network are proposed. Numerical and results of the proposed experiments of algorithms are carried out. It is shown that the use of an algorithm based on the combined application of the Gabor filter, a five-level wavelet-Daubechies transform and a multilayer neural network makes it possible to effectively classify fingerprints.

SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE REFERENCE OF MENTAL AND LANGUAGE REPRESENTATIONS

This paper is an attempt to answer the question, what is exactly represented by our thoughts or language expressions. At the beginning, the article presents the main philosophical problems regarding the understanding of the nature of the subject of reference of such representations as names or descriptions. Is the name directly referred to the real object or rather to the content of thought? What about cases when the name cannot be referred to the real object? What is the relation between the intentional subject connected with every name (or description) and the external object to which only some names can be referred to, and which one is prior to the constitution of representation? The idea to understand the subject of mental or language representations as a complex structure which has a relational nature is the solution proposed in this paper. This structure is constituted by cognition and ties internal elements of a given representation such as the content with the elements which are external with regard to this given representation. This structure reflects such elements as the content of representation, the way in which this content is given, the correlate of the content and its mode of existence as well as additional systemic information coordinated with given representation. Some consequences of this proposal are discussed at the end of the article. It is explained how the differentiation of the elements of this structure can lead to different types of reference. The basis to understand the issue in question is the relation between internal and external object of reference. It can be interpreted (as is suggested in the paper) as a connection between internal elements of the described structure.

Expanding Your DAW

The activity described in this chapter is designed for teenage students and older, using free and open source software called Pure Data (Pd). This activity outlines how to connect a DAW to an open-source object-oriented program, which enables the user to control any function of the external object-oriented program (e.g., Pure Data) with a DAW via MIDI. It must be noted that the method of controlling Pure Data with a DAW outlined in this chapter is but one possible means of achieving this end. With further exploration and study, many alternative and interesting ways to perform a range of exciting and highly imaginative tasks not mentioned here become achievable.

Extending the Body Ownership to Affective Experience of an Embodied Artificial Hand: a Power Spectra Investigation

According to implicit accounts, human self-awareness grounds on the so-called sense of ownership (SoO). Empirical investigations of SoO have mostly focused on the manipulation of self-ascription of sensations and experiences involving the body via the induction of bodily illusions, such as the Rubber-Hand Illusion (RHI). While it has been proposed that the affective dimension necessarily contributes to the development of a full ownership ascription, the relationship between affective experience and body ownership still presents many open questions. This study thus aimed at investigating the boundaries of ownership ascriptions and the extent to which an external object can be incorporated within one’s own body representation, with a specific focus on the possibility for it to become a potential object of own affective experience marked by specific electrophysiological responses. Therefore, we induced RHI in 16 participants and then applied an aversive vs. pleasant stimulation to the embodied external object, while monitoring their electrophysiological activity for central physiological markers of affective processing. Data analysis revealed the effect of the stimulation condition on alpha band power over frontal areas, with higher alpha power during the pleasant stimulation condition with respect to the aversive stimulation one over medial and right frontal electrode sites. The present findings add to the limited pieces of evidence concerning the link between experiences of illusory body ownership, embodiment mechanisms, and affective factors, suggesting that the boundaries of body ownership might be extended to making incorporated objects the source of complex emotional responses beyond basic defensive reactions.

Overcoming dream‐reality confusion using a complex numeric data generator

This paper presents a method that allows a patient to distinguish whether a current experience is dreamt or real. The method is based on mathematical analysis of complex data that are generated by an external object (for instance, a computer or another person). High complexity of the data and possibility to quantitatively analyze it allow one to unambiguously disentangle dream‐reality confusion. The author hopes that the method will help patients that experience lucid dreaming and suffer from dream‐reality confusion.

The Autonomy of Justification

This chapter clarifies similarities and differences between justification and knowledge. Justification is characteristically produced in ordinary perceptual experiences, but similar sensory justification can occur without any external object as cause. Here the justifying elements remain accessible to the subject by introspection or reflection, and they are adducible in a process of justifying beliefs about ostensibly perceived objects. Knowledge is not process-relative in the same way. Perceptual knowledge can indeed arise where justificatory processes are not possible for the knower. It is also external in requiring actual causal connections to relevant truthmaking facts. This external causal grounding may yield a reliable route to truth without providing, as is normal, internally accessible grounds of justification. Justification, then, is autonomous in a certain way relative to knowledge, as the latter is autonomous in a certain way relative to the former. Their similarities and common co-occurrence must not be allowed to obscure our view of their differences.

God and the Good

This chapter studies Kant’s dramatic rupture, both with his own earlier position about the highest created good, and with any theological or philosophical tradition that he would have received (from scholastic or Lutheran sources). The unconditioned, that which is all-sufficient for practical reason and the will, is not, as it would be for traditional Christian theology, loving and knowing God. Pivotal here is Kant’s rejection of any ‘external object’ for the will and practical reason. Rather, the unconditioned, for Kant, is the will itself, in its activity of rational willing, or, as Kant puts it, the ‘good will’. Kant is convinced that only in this way is genuine human freedom protected.