Scotus and Ockham

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-108
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Divine Commands ◽  
The Right

Scotus and Ockham reject the Aristotelian outlook, as Aquinas presents it, and develop a voluntarist account of the will and of morality. In their view, determination by practical reason does not ensure free will; a free will must be wholly undetermined by reason. Nor can it be determined by the desire for one’s ultimate good; the impulse towards the right is separate from the impulse towards happiness. If we apply these principles to the freedom of the divine will, we find that God could not be free if the nature of right and wrong were independent of the divine will. We must infer that moral rightness and wrongness are ultimately constituted by divine commands.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

Morality within the limits of practical reason: a critique of Kant’s concept of moral virtue

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216
Author(s):  
Edward Uzoma Ezedike
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Synthetic Application

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate Kant’s idea of grounding morality within the limits of practical reason. Kant argues that morality must be devoid of emotions if the authors must make the right decisions. His idea of morality is basically ratiocentric. This paper, therefore, seeks a justification of Kant’s ratiocentricism, which excludes subjective emotional dimensions in moral actions and judgements. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a critical and analytic method of research. It is not empirical research, and hence, does not make use of tables and quantifiable data. The methodology is exclusively qualitative in nature. Findings The major finding of this research work is that an application of practical reason is necessary for the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency. The existential realities demand a synthetic application of reason and emotion in moral issues. So then, a good will is determined by the rational principle. The reason is an organic whole that is capable of functioning both practically and theoretically. The practical reason is not reasoned functioning to acquire knowledge but reason operating as a guide and as the directing force of the will. The application of pure, practical reason and relevant emotional considerations is both necessary and sufficient for moral agency. Originality/value This paper is the outcome of deep critical reflections on Kant’s moral philosophy by the author.

Peter Lombard’s on God’s Will: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 45-46

2018 ◽  
pp. 136-152
Author(s):  
R. Tkachenko
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Doctrine Of God ◽  
Divine Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Biblical Texts ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theology Proper

The global Peter Lombard research continues, but the Master of the Sentences’ theology proper is still to be analyzed in detail. In particular, a more thorough exposition of the distinctions 45-48 of his Book of Sentences, which deal with the notion of God’s will and its relation to the human free will, has for some while remained a desideratum. The given article partly fills this lacuna and elucidates on the doctrine of the divine will as presented by the Lombard. In particular, it is shown that for him there exist two ways of speaking about God’s will: «simply and absolutely» and «not simply and absolutely» which may be identified with intransitive and transitive use of the verb «to will,» respectively. The will is primarily understood in terms of execution of one’s will (active willing) but its relation to one’s desires and inclinations (wanting) are downplayed or altogether omitted from the Lombardian doctrine of God. The divine will is by definition free and efficient but Lombard highlights that there is place for human free will, too. His explanation of the relationship between the divine and the human wills seems somewhat unconvincing but the unfolding of his theory on the basis of a few biblical texts should be acknowledged a peculiar theological exercise.

scholarly journals Acquisition of Ownership for Unauthorized Construction

2020 ◽  
pp. 160-168
Author(s):  
Olha BORTNYK
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Building Codes ◽  
Land Plot ◽  
Special Construction ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Will ◽  
Under Construction ◽  
The Right

Legal relations concerning spontaneous construction are a special construction, which is not a classic example of civil relations, which are characterized by legal equality, free will, property independence of their participants, which are collectively considered the fundamental foundations of civil law. The study identifies and reveals the components of the basis for the acquisition of ownership of unauthorized construction, including: ownership can be recognized as a person for the property, which must have certain characteristics, necessary and integral features (characteristics); such property, by its legal nature, must belong to immovable property; construction must be under construction or already built; illegality (illegality) of such construction; constructed real estate or property that is under construction is located on a land plot that has not been allocated for this purpose, property is built or is being built with significant violations of applicable building codes and regulations, etc. Provisions on the understanding of each of the components of the basis for the acquisition of ownership of unauthorized construction are disclosed. Peculiarities of application of norms on unauthorized construction depending on the will of the owner of the land plot on which the unauthorized construction was carried out are stated, as well as attention is paid to the possibility of acquiring ownership of unauthorized construction by a person who did not carry out construction or the land owner. Opinions were expressed regarding the referral of the issue of acquiring the right of ownership for unauthorized construction to judicial jurisdiction.

scholarly journals Gribas izpauduma nozīme tiesiska darījuma noslēgšanā

2021 ◽  
pp. 199-205
Author(s):  
Laura Kadile ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Crucial Aspect ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Right

The expression of will is a crucial aspect of lawful transaction in civil law. The will of the individual and its expression is significant in ensuring for the ability of an individual to enjoy and exercise his or her right to self-determination, as well as for the legal transaction to be recognized as valid. Only the transactions made by a person capable of expressing their free will and being able to be aware of the content and consequences of the legal transaction are in force. Therefore, the observation and assessment of such capacity is particularly important in view of the fact that, in circumstances where a person is unable to express his will freely, he may be denied the right to enter into a legal transaction, or, if the legal transaction has been concluded in circumstances where the individual has not been able to express free will, such transaction may be declared invalid.

James Dundas, the First Lord Arniston, on the Idea of Moral Philosophy and the Concept of Will

2020 ◽  
pp. 158-173
Author(s):  
Alexander Broadie
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Special Reference ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Deliberative Process ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Last Judgment ◽  
The Will ◽  
Made In

This chapter focuses on the Scottish judge James Dundas, the first Lord Arniston, whose 313 page manuscript Idea philosophiae moralis (The idea of moral philosophy) has only recently come to light. Written in 1679, the year of Dundas’s death, the Latin manuscript, the only philosophical work he is known to have written, fits squarely within the category of Reformed orthodox scholasticism. Dundas begins in an Aristotelian spirit by expounding a concept of moral philosophy that rather closely resembles the concept that emerges from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, though Dundas believes Aristotle’s exposition to be the poorer for its not including a concept corresponding to that of the Fall. Dundas also discusses the concept of the will, with special reference to the question whether the will necessarily wills in accordance with the last judgment made in a deliberative process by practical reason, and he emerges from his discussion as a determinist who nevertheless believes that we have free will.

Aquinas

2020 ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Human Society ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Divine Grace ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Rational Part ◽  
The Will

Aquinas develops Aristotelian themes as a foundation for his account of the Christian virtues. The will is both rational, being directed towards the ultimate good, and free, being determined by practical reason about what contributes to the ultimate good. Virtue is the good use of free will; it requires both the appropriate training of the passions (the non-rational part of the soul) and the correct practical reason. Practical reason finds the first principles of the natural law (the rational principles that are suitable for human nature), and the action-guiding rules that specify the implications of the natural law for human beings with a social nature, and for human society. The virtues, embodying the natural law, guide us towards the good that is proper to human beings. They do not guide us all the way, because we are subject to the influence of the sins that turn us away from God. Divine grace moves our free will to overcome the effects of these sins, and to form the Christian virtues that lead us towards the complete good.

Higher Necessity

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg U. Noller ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling’s compatibilist account of freedom of the will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). I shall argue that against Kant’s transcendental compatibilism Schelling proposes a “volitional compatibilism,” according to which the free will emerges out of nature and is not identical to practical reason as Kant claims. Finally, I will relate Schelling’s volitional compatibilism to more recent accounts of free will in order to better understand what he means by his concept of a “higher necessity.”

Reasoning and Lapses in James’ The Will to Believe

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 387-399
Author(s):  
Jonathan Adler
Keyword(s):  
Ethics Of Belief ◽  
Insufficient Evidence ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Ethics Of Belief

James’ The Will to Believe is the most influential writing in the ethics of belief. In it, James defends the right and rationality to believe on non-evidential grounds. James’ argument is directed against Clifford’s “Evidentialism” presented in The Ethics of Belief in which Clifford concludes that “[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. After an overview of the James-Clifford exchange and James’ argument, I reconstruct his argument in detail. Subsequently, I examine four steps in James’ argument, and try to show that these amount to fallacies – enticing to reason, but not cogent.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Evan Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Causal Role ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
The Right

This chapter lays out the book’s central question: Assuming agency reductionism—that is, the thesis that the causal role of the agent in all agential activities is reducible to the causal role of states and events involving the agent—is it possible to construct a defensible model of libertarianism? It is explained that most think the answer is negative and this is because they think libertarians must embrace some form of agent-causation in order to address the problems of luck and enhanced control. The thesis of the book is that these philosophers are mistaken: it is possible to construct a libertarian model of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework that silences that central objections to libertarianism by simply taking the best compatibilist model of freedom and adding indeterminism in the right junctures of human agency. A brief summary of the chapters to follow is given.

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