MULTI‐AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY

Author(s):  
Tetsuya Hoshino
Author(s):  
Chenghu Ma ◽  
Wing-Keung Wong

This paper provides a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts to extend game theory for multi-agent interactions. We explain why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost. Some arguments claim that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. Under common assumptions of rationality, an incomplete contract can be the final solution if the agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral. Assuming that agents can form coalitions by participating in the game and they are uncertainty averse, we develop equilibrium solutions for complete/incomplete contracts in an extensive game of multi-agent interactions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 134 (10) ◽  
pp. 1515-1523
Author(s):  
Akihiro Ogawa ◽  
Kazunari Maki ◽  
Kiyoshi Hata ◽  
Yasunori Takeuchi ◽  
Fumio Ishikawa

2013 ◽  
Vol 133 (9) ◽  
pp. 1652-1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takeshi Nagata ◽  
Kosuke Kato ◽  
Masahiro Utatani ◽  
Yuji Ueda ◽  
Kazuya Okamoto ◽  
...  

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