Analysis of the Brazilian tax incentives to innovation and patent data: a Principal-Agent model approach

We propose to evaluate Lei do Bem (law 11.196/05) for Brazilian regions (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South). This is the first study that analyzes Lei do Bem using extensive game simulations for the different regions of the country. Based on data from 2006 to 2015, we find moral hazard between government and innovative Brazilian companies, as there was no express incentive in the Lei do Bem to stimulate the industrial sector to innovate and register the innovation as a patent. Thus, policies that review the tax incentives structure contained in the Lei do Bem as well as encourage industries and companies to file patents in public patent databases may have positive effects on the Brazilian innovation system.

Analysis of the Brazilian tax incentives to innovation and patent data: a Principal-Agent model approach

We propose to evaluate Lei do Bem (law 11.196/05) for Brazilian regions (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South). This is the first study that analyzes Lei do Bem using extensive game simulations for the different regions of the country. Based on data from 2006 to 2015, we find moral hazard between government and innovative Brazilian companies, as there was no express incentive in the Lei do Bem to stimulate the industrial sector to innovate and register the innovation as a patent. Thus, policies that review the tax incentives structure contained in the Lei do Bem as well as encourage industries and companies to file patents in public patent databases may have positive effects on the Brazilian innovation system.

A game strategy model in the digital curling system based on NFSP

The digital curling game is a two-player zero-sum extensive game in a continuous action space. There are some challenging problems that are still not solved well, such as the uncertainty of strategy, the large game tree searching, and the use of large amounts of supervised data, etc. In this work, we combine NFSP and KR-UCT for digital curling games, where NFSP uses two adversary learning networks and can automatically produce supervised data, and KR-UCT can be used for large game tree searching in continuous action space. We propose two reward mechanisms to make reinforcement learning converge quickly. Experimental results validate the proposed method, and show the strategy model can reach the Nash equilibrium.

A theoretical foundation for games of complete/incomplete contracts

This paper provides a theoretical foundation for complete/incomplete contracts to extend game theory for multi-agent interactions. We explain why rational agents may agree to sign incomplete contracts even though signing a complete contract incurs no cost. Some arguments claim that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. Under common assumptions of rationality, an incomplete contract can be the final solution if the agents’ attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral. Assuming that agents can form coalitions by participating in the game and they are uncertainty averse, we develop equilibrium solutions for complete/incomplete contracts in an extensive game of multi-agent interactions.

Stable producer–scrounger dynamics in wild birds: sociability and learning speed covary with scrounging behaviour

There has been extensive game-theoretic modelling of conditions leading to equilibria of producer–scrounger dichotomies in groups. However there is a surprising paucity of experimental evidence in wild populations. Here, we examine producer–scrounger games in five subpopulations of birds feeding at a socially learnt foraging task. Over four weeks, a bimodal distribution of producers and scroungers emerged in all areas, with pronounced and consistent individual tactic specialization persisting over 3 years. Tactics were unrelated to exploratory personality, but correlated with latency to contact and learn the foraging task, with the late arrivers and slower learners more likely to adopt the scrounging role. Additionally, the social environment was also important: at the broad scale, larger subpopulations with a higher social density contained proportionally more scroungers, while within subpopulations scroungers tended to be central in the social network and be observed in larger foraging flocks. This study thus provides a rare example of a stable, dimorphic distribution of producer–scrounger tactics in a wild population. It further gives support across multiple scales for a major prediction of social foraging theory; that the frequency of scroungers increases with group size.