Institutional uncertainty and growth expectations of businesses: the case of Jordan

2020 ◽  
Vol 70 (237-238) ◽  
pp. 239-261
Author(s):  
Serena Sandri ◽  
Nooh Alshyab
2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-199
Author(s):  
Omer Y. Pelled

Abstract Judges and juries often make factual decisions even if the facts are disputed and there is no clear-cut evidence available. Despite this common state of uncertainty, verdicts are thought of as having clear winners and losers––either the plaintiff wins and receives a full remedy, or the defendant wins and the plaintiff gets nothing. In private disputes, factfinders base their binary factual determinations on the preponderance of the evidence. There are, however, several doctrines that allow for partial remedy, discounted by the probability that the facts support the plaintiff’s case, given the available evidence (proportional liability). This Article offers a general theory for proportional liability in private law. It identifies three types of factual uncertainty—mutual uncertainty, unilateral uncertainty, and institutional uncertainty—and shows that legal economists should support proportional liability when the state of uncertainty is shared by the parties and the court (mutual uncertainty), and they should adopt an all-or-nothing rule whenever the information is observable but unverifiable (institutional uncertainty). In cases where one party holds private information (unilateral uncertainty), proportional liability is sometimes, but not always, superior to an all-or-nothing rule.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. Hansen ◽  
Thilde Langevang ◽  
Lettice Rutashobya ◽  
Goodluck Urassa

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-440
Author(s):  
Kashif Ahmed ◽  
Ralf Bebenroth ◽  
Jean-François Hennart

Purpose This study aims to examine how the effect of host country formal institutional uncertainty on the percentage of equity sought in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) is moderated by the host country industry (i.e. targets from the technology versus those from the non-technology industry). Design/methodology/approach This study is based upon the legitimacy perspective of institutional theory and uses Tobit regression analysis on a sample of 1,340 CBAs. Findings Results show that cross-border acquirers prefer a lower equity level for targets in institutionally less developed countries and that this negative effect of the host country institutional risk on the equity percentage sought is more pronounced for technology-based targets. Research limitations/implications Three major limitations of the study are as follows: The data were collected from only Japanese acquirers. The study measured formal institutional uncertainty by applying only secondary data. The study used the Bloomberg Industry Classification Systems, instead of the Standard Industry Classification that has been used widely in prior studies. Practical implications This study shows that the industry selected has a bearing on equity sought in CBAs. Investing in institutionally less developed countries is particularly challenging when the targets of acquisition are in the technology industry. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the moderating effects of an industry on the relationship between host country formal institutional uncertainty and the percentage of equity sought in CBAs.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Zambelli

The institutional environment regulating mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is crucial for the private equity industry, especially for leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions, which are currently at the center of an intensive debate in the US, as seen in many European countries over the last decade. One of the most controversial issues of an LBO deal is associated with its ultimate economic result, often perceived as an indirect and fraudulent example of financial assistance provided by the acquired firm for the purchase of its own shares, to the detriment of its assets and stakeholders. Given the potential damage to the target’s stakeholders, LBOs have been strongly debated and even prohibited in Italy. The institutional uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of LBOs had a negative impact on the Italian private equity market. Recently, Italy issued an innovative corporate governance reform which offered a more favorable legal environment to this type of transactions and represented an important turning point for the domestic private equity market. The institutional change, induced by the above reform, provides scholars and policy makers with guidelines on how PE transactions may be spurred with an appropriate regulation aimed at legalizing LBOs, as well as protecting the interests of the target firm and its stakeholders. Notwithstanding the new reform, several issues remain unsolved and the admissibility of certain types of LBOs is still under debate. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: a) to shed some light on the debate on the legitimacy of LBOs by emphasizing, from an economic and financial point of view, the critical features of this class of transactions, and b) to highlight unsolved problems associated with the new LBO reform, particularly with reference to the investors’ liability. The Italian buyout market, whose transactions were previously prohibited and only recently legalized, offers a unique example in order to better understand the current international debate on the admissibility of LBOs and the related consequences for the target’s stakeholders.


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