scholarly journals MINIMUM GUARANTEED PAYMENTS AND COSTLY CANCELLATION RIGHTS: A STOPPING GAME PERSPECTIVE

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-751 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis H. R. Alvarez
Keyword(s):  
Stopping Game

scholarly journals On a stopping game in continuous time

2016 ◽  
Vol 144 (8) ◽  
pp. 3589-3596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhan Bayraktar ◽  
Zhou Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Stopping Game

EQUILIBRIUM IN n-PERSON GAME OF SHOWCASE SHOWDOWN

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Mazalov ◽  
Anna Ivashko
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Random Variables ◽  
Programming Approach ◽  
Dynamic Programming Approach ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Level 1 ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Independent And Identically Distributed

In this article we consider a noncooperative n-person optimal stopping game of Showcase Showdown, in which each player observes the sum of independent and identically distributed random variables uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Players can decide to stop the draw in each moment. The objective of a player is to get the maximal number of scores that does is not exceeded level 1. If the scores of all players exceed 1, then the winner is the player whose score is closest to 1. We derive the equilibrium in this game on the basis of the dynamic programming approach.

On a discrete-time non-zero-sum Dynkin problem with monotonicity

1991 ◽  
Vol 28 (02) ◽  
pp. 466-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Ohtsubo
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Time Parameter ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Zero Sum

We consider a monotone case of the non-zero-sum stopping game with discrete time parameter which is called the Dynkin problem. Marner (1987) has investigated a stopping game with general monotone reward structures, but his monotonicity is too strong to apply our problem. We establish that there exists an explicit equilibrium point in our monotone case. We also give a simple example applicable to a duopolistic exit game.

A MULTIPLEX INTERDEPENDENT DURATIONS MODEL

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Zhongjian Lin ◽  
Ruixuan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Distribution ◽  
Semiparametric Estimation ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Simultaneous Equations ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Optimal Timing ◽  
Nonparametric Model ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Stopping Game ◽  
Nonlinear Simultaneous Equations

We propose a multiplex interdependent durations model and study its empirical content. The model considers an empirical stopping game of multiple agents making optimal timing decisions with incomplete information. We characterize the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the stopping game in a system of simultaneous equations involving the conditional distribution of each duration with a moderate strategic interaction condition. The system of nonlinear simultaneous equations allows us to obtain constructive identification results of the interaction effects and other nonparametric model primitives. We propose two consistent semiparametric estimation methods based on different parameterizations of modeling components with right-censored duration data.

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