EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

2006 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Vittoria Levati
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Approach ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Private Provision

scholarly journals Conditional cooperation in group contests

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. e0244152
Author(s):  
Hubert János Kiss ◽  
Alfonso Rosa-Garcia ◽  
Vita Zhukova
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Performance ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Panel Regression ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Private Provision

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants’ contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members contribute more than rivals (even if they lose), but it vanishes in those groups that lose the contest due to low group performance. A random-effect linear panel regression analysis with an extensive set of controls confirms the findings.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

1995 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Buchholz ◽  
Kai A. Konrad
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber ◽  
Philipp C. Wichardt
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision
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