MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE-RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS SATTLER ◽  
STEFANIE WALTER
1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bernhard ◽  
David Leblang

Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, countries have been able to choose from a variety of exchange-rate arrangements. We argue that politicians' incentives condition the choice of an exchange-rate arrangement. These incentives reflect the configuration of domestic political institutions, particularly electoral and legislative institutions. In systems where the cost of electoral defeat is high and electoral timing is exogenous, politicians will be less willing to forgo their discretion over monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate. In systems where the costs of electoral defeat are low and electoral timing is endogenous, politicians are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange-rate regime. Consequently, differences in domestic political systems can help account for variations in the choice of exchange-rate arrangements. We test this argument using constrained multinomial logit and binomial logit on a sample of twenty democracies over the period 1974–95. Domestic political institutions have a significant effect on exchange-rate regime choice, even after controlling for systemic, macroeconomic, and other political variables.


Author(s):  
Lee J. Alston ◽  
Marcus André Melo ◽  
Bernardo Mueller ◽  
Carlos Pereira

This chapter discusses institutional deepening and the subsequent economic and political outcomes in the two terms of Lula and first term of Dilma. It also advances three main arguments. First, markets, as evidenced by exchange rate movements, did not anticipate the smooth political transition process from Cardoso to Lula. High uncertainty about a Lula presidency was the norm. After the initial shock resulting from the electoral results, Lula drastically reduced uncertainty by providing credible evidence that his administration would not abandon fiscal and monetary orthodoxy. Second, the new beliefs and institutions effectively constrained political and economic elites in their interaction, thereby enabling competitive processes in the political and economic arenas. The established political institutions locked-in and reinforced the direction of change by affecting the incentives facing individuals, organizations, and politicians.


2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bernhard ◽  
J. Lawrence Broz ◽  
William Roberts Clark

In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (100) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elías Albagli ◽  
Mauricio Calani ◽  
Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov ◽  
Mario Marcel ◽  
Luca Ricci

Chile offers an example of a country that has overcome the fear of floating by reducing balance sheet mismatches, enhancing financial market development, as well as improving monetary, fiscal, and political institutions, and strengthening policy credibility. Under the floating regime, Chile’s economic adjustment to external shocks appears significantly improved, and its exchange rate pass-through has substantially declined. Our results reinforce the case that moving to a clear and credible floating regime can be associated with a reduction in the fear of floating via economic transformation (like smaller balance sheet mismatches, a larger hedging market, and a lower exchange rate pass-through).


2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 751-774 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Keefer ◽  
David Stasavage

In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions and information asymmetries. However, the impact of these two factors differs. We argue that the presence of one institution—multiple political veto players—should be crucial for the effectiveness of central bank independence, but should have no impact on the efficacy of exchange-rate pegs. In contrast, exchange-rate pegs should have a greater anti-inflationary impact when it is difficult for the public to distinguish between inflation generated by policy choice and inflation resulting from exogenous shocks to the economy. Such information asymmetries between the public and the government, however, do not increase the efficacy of central bank independence. Empirical tests using newly developed data on political institutions provide strong support for our hypotheses.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document