scholarly journals MANAGING LOCAL PUBLIC DEBT IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: AN ISSUE OF SELF-CONTROL

2009 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Dafflon ◽  
Krisztina Beer-Tóth
Economica ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 204
Author(s):  
Ursula K. Webb

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 100043
Author(s):  
José Vicente Romero ◽  
Hernando Vargas ◽  
Pamela Cardozo ◽  
Andrés Murcia

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-103
Author(s):  
Mehmed Ganic ◽  
Lejla Hodzic ◽  
Ognjen Ridic

This study seeks to test the existence of the crowding-out (or- in) hypothesis in a sample of 17 Emerging Europe countries divided in two panels. The study employs a panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model based on three estimators, Mean Group Estimator (MG), Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE), in order to evaluate the of stability of short run and long run coefficients using consistently compiled public borrowing and private investment data between 2000 and 2019. The empirical findings of the paper generally confirm the existence of a crowding out effect in both long run and short run in European post-transition countries, and in the long run for European transition countries. More specifically, elasticity of private investment with respect to public debt is greater in the European transition countries than in the European post-transition countries. However, the findings on the crowding out (in) effect of government spending and economic growth on private investment are mixed and conflicting in both the long run and the short run. Accordingly, the study recommends that selected countries should reassess their austerity agendas employed for lowering debt levels, and follow new strategies for managing public debt burden.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Vicente Romero ◽  
Hernando Vargas-Herrera ◽  
Pamela Cardozo ◽  
Andrés Murcia

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ashworth ◽  
Benny Geys ◽  
Bruno Heyndels

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (6) ◽  
pp. 1711-1737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Bisin ◽  
Alessandro Lizzeri ◽  
Leeat Yariv

Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for benevolent government intervention. This paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self-control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets. In equilibrium, government accumulates debt to respond to individuals' desire to undo their commitments, which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio, in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation. As a consequence, (i) large (and distortionary) government debt accumulation occurs, and (ii) banning illiquid assets could improve individuals' welfare. These results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments' responses to voters' self-control problems.(JEL D2, D72, D78, H62, H63)


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1323) ◽  
pp. 1-83
Author(s):  
Bernardo Morais ◽  
◽  
Javier Perez-Estrada ◽  
José-Luis Peydró ◽  
Claudia Ruiz-Ortega ◽  
...  

We study the impact of public debt limits on economic growth exploiting the introduction of a Mexican law capping the debt of subnational governments. Despite larger fiscal consolidation, states with higher ex-ante public debt grew substantially faster after the law, albeit at the expense of increased extreme poverty. Credit registry data suggests that the mechanism behind this result is a reduction in crowding out. After the law, banks operating in more indebted states reallocate credit away from local governments and into private firms. The unwinding of crowding out is stronger for riskier firms, firms borrowing from banks more exposed to local public debt, and for firms operating in states with lower public spending on infrastructure projects.


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