Alois Rašin – czeski i czechosłowacki ekonomista. Przegląd wybranych koncepcji, poglądów i doświadczeń

Alois Rašín (1867-1923) was a Czech and Czechoslovak politician, economist, one of the founders of Czechoslovakia and its first finance minister. Alois Rašín is also the author of the first Czechoslovak law and the creator of the national currency, i.e. the Czechoslovak koruna. Rašín was a representative of conservative liberalism. The paper presents a review of Alois Rašín's concepts, views as the Minister of Finance of Czechoslovakia. Particular attention was paid to his efforts to regulate the currency and monetary system of Czechoslovakia, and to fight galloping inflation (hyperinflation). Rašín supported the free competition, believed in an entrepreneurial society, and believed that the state should strive to maintain a balanced budget.

Present-biased Government, Creative Accounting and a Pitfall in Balanced Budget Rules

I propose a general equilibrium model with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting government that optimally decides upon using creative accounting in order to evaluate a balanced budget rule and a debt rule. In that context, I find that a binding balanced budget rule could fail to properly constrain public overindebtedness when government uses creative accounting while a debt rule is effective, since targets are set on total public liabilities. Results suggest that a balanced budget fiscal rule can also deteriorate welfare due to the higher interest rates derived from doing operations under the line, implying future expenditure cuts that are harmful for households, who value public goods and services. A debt rule is also preferred for its capacity to reverse some welfare losses generated by the present-biased government.

The Line Between Medicaid and Marketplace: Coverage Effects from Wisconsin’s Partial Expansion

Context: States have sought to experiment with the income eligibility threshold between Medicaid coverage and access to subsidized Marketplace plans in an effort to increase coverage for low-income adults while meeting other state priorities, particularly a balanced budget. In 2014, Wisconsin opted against adoption of an ACA Medicaid expansion, instead setting the Medicaid eligibility threshold at 100% of the poverty level—a state-funded partial expansion. Childless adults gained new eligibility, while parents and caregivers with incomes between 101–200% of poverty lost existing eligibility. Methods: We use Wisconsin’s all-payer claims database to assess health insurance gains, losses, and transitions among low-income adults affected by this partial expansion. Findings: We find that less than one third of adults who lost Medicaid eligibility definitely took up commercial coverage, and many returned to Medicaid. Among those newly Medicaid eligible, there was little evidence of crowd-out. Both groups experienced limited continuity of coverage. Overall, new Medicaid enrollment of childless adults was offset by coverage losses among parents and caregivers, rendering Wisconsin’s overall coverage gains similar to non-expansion states. Conclusions: Wisconsin’s experience demonstrates the difficulty in relying on the Marketplace to cover the near poor and suggests that full Medicaid expansion more effectively increases coverage.

Do balanced-budget fiscal stimuli of investment increase its economic value?

We examine the timing of a business investment providing valuable external benefits to society. A surge in uncertainty about private returns, a typical feature if not a cause of recessions, delays capital outlays to an extent that may be detrimental to social welfare. Is there an efficiency-improving public policy directed at accelerating investment? By real option analysis, we try answering this question by comparing three fiscal policies: (i) a simple subsidy on investment, (ii) a balanced-budget fiscal stimulus where the subsidy is subsequently covered by profit taxation, and (iii) by taxing external benefits as well. We show that, under a balanced-budget stimulus, investment acceleration may come at the expense of a net economic loss, and the higher is uncertainty on private returns, the higher the likehood of a negative outcome. However, this risk strongly declines when government spending is balanced by taxing both private and public returns on investment.