Capital Income Taxation, Economic Growth and Heterogeneity in the Motivation to Give

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306
Author(s):  
Lars Kunze

Abstract This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between capital income taxation and economic growth within an overlapping generations model when individuals may bequeath wealth. The altruistic concern is modeled as a synthesis of joy-of-giving and family altruism so that individuals may derive utility from the amount of bequest itself and by providing children with a disposable income later on in life. Using this framework, it is shown that, in contrast to the existing literature, increasing the capital income tax rate may well enhance growth under operative bequests.

2014 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salem Abo-Zaid

AbstractThe optimality of the long-run capital-income tax rate is revisited in a simple neoclassical growth model with credit frictions. Firms pay their factors of production in advance, which requires borrowing at the beginning of the period. Borrowing, in turn, is constrained by the value of collateral that they own at the beginning of the period, leading to inefficiently low amounts of capital and labor. In this environment, the optimal capital-income tax in the steady state is non zero. Specifically, the quantitative analyses show that the capital-income tax is negative and, therefore, the distortions stemming from the credit friction are offset by subsidizing capital. However, when the government cannot distinguish between capital-income and profits, the capital-income tax is positive as the government levies the same tax rate on both sources of income. These results stand in contrast to the celebrated result of zero capital-income taxation of Judd (Judd, K. 1985. “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model.”


2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Conesa ◽  
Sagiri Kitao ◽  
Dirk Krueger

We quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity differences of households. The optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive at 36 percent. The optimal progressive labor income tax is, roughly, a flat tax of 23 percent with a deduction of $7,200 (relative to average household income of $42,000). The high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life-cycle structure of the model, whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system. (JEL E13, H21, H24, H25)


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Garriga

In this article, we explore the proposition that the optimal capital income tax is zero using an overlapping generations model. We prove that for a large class of preferences, the optimal capital income tax along the transition path and in steady state is nonzero. For a version of the model calibrated to the US economy, we find that the model could justify the observed rates of capital income taxation for an empirically reasonable intertemporal utility function and a robust demographic structure.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuuki Maruyama

This model shows that capital income taxation does not affect real wages. Judd's theorem (1985) that a zero capital income tax rate is optimal for workers is based on the assumption that all capital has the effect of increasing the marginal productivity of labor. However, in reality, some capital lowers the marginal productivity of labor through automation (technological unemployment). Therefore, this model assumes two types of capital. Labor-complementing capital increases the marginal productivity of labor (real wages), while labor-substituting capital decreases it. The rates of return are kept equal between the two. Using such an economic growth model, we analyze the long-run effects of taxes on real wages. Even if capital income tax is imposed, real wages don’t change because both labor-complementing capital and labor-substituting capital decrease. In contrast, value-added tax results in reduced real wages. This is because labor costs are deducted in capital income tax, but not in value-added tax. Capital income tax is more suitable for income redistribution than value-added tax. These conclusions also apply to an open economy.


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