Explaining preferences for redistribution: A unified framework to account for institutional approaches and economic self-interest for the case of monetary transfers for families and children

2011 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUIDO MEHLKOP ◽  
ROBERT NEUMANN
Keyword(s):  
Unified Framework ◽  
Preferences For Redistribution ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Monetary Transfers

scholarly journals Discrete-Choice-Experimente zur Ermittlung der Präferenzen für Umverteilung

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Pfarr ◽  
Volker Ulrich
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Budget Constraint ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Discrete Choice Experiments ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Redistributive Policies ◽  
Preferences For Redistribution ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
The Government ◽  
Household Incomes

SummaryAs in most industrialized countries, the inequality regarding the distribution of household incomes in Germany has steadily increased. By collecting taxes and granting monetary transfers, the government tries to affect the personal distribution of incomes. Whereas the supply of redistribution is relatively easy to determine, it is rather difficult to identify the determinants of the citizens′ demand for redistribution. Most of the literature concerning the individuals′ preferences for redistribution relies on survey based analysis. A shortcoming of these studies is the failure of imposing a budget constraint. Discrete-Choice-Experiments (DCE) solve this problem by forcing individuals to take the consequences of their decisions with respect to their own income into account. This study aims at developing a theory based approach to elicit individuals′ preferences for redistribution using DCEs. For the specific case of Germany, we show how to design and implement such a DCE. In particular, we discuss how the price attribute in a DCE should be specified and which levels adequately define the price an individual is willing to pay for redistribution. We are able to demonstrate that even for a highly complex topic such as redistribution a correctly applied DCE can provide authoritative results. This allows deriving policy implications on how to design redistributive policies which are in line with citizens’ preferences.

scholarly journals Preferences for redistribution and pensions. What can we learn from experiments?

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANZISKA TAUSCH ◽  
JAN POTTERS ◽  
ARNO RIEDL
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Preferences For Redistribution ◽  
Pension Schemes ◽  
Actuarial Fairness ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Distributional Preferences ◽  
Mandatory Participation ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Individual Choices

AbstractRedistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. However, little is known on how these preferences interact with preferences for different pension schemes. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution and suggest some links to redistribution through pensions. For that purpose we distinguish between three types of situations. The first deals with distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than individual choices. In the closing sections of the paper, we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we have less redistribution and more actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved?

Responsible gambling:The need for collaborative government, industry, community and consumer involvement

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 307-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Blaszczynski
Keyword(s):  
Responsible Gambling ◽  
Consumer Involvement ◽  
Harm Minimization ◽  
Harm Minimisation ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Gambling Expenditure ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Industry Community

Abstract. Background: Tensions exist with various stakeholders facing competing interests in providing legal land-based and online regulated gambling products. Threats to revenue/taxation occur in response to harm minimisation and responsible gambling policies. Setting aside the concept of total prohibition, the objectives of responsible gambling are to encourage and/or restrict an individual’s gambling expenditure in terms of money and time to personally affordable limits. Stakeholder responsibilities: Governments craft the gambling environment through legislation, monitor compliance with regulatory requirements, and receive taxation revenue as a proportion of expenditure. Industry operators on the other hand, compete across market sectors through marketing and advertising, and through the development of commercially innovative products, reaping substantial financial rewards. Concurrently, governments are driven to respond to community pressures to minimize the range of negative gambling-related social, personal and economic harms and costs. Industry operators are exposed to the same pressures but additionally overlaid with the self-interest of avoiding the imposition of more stringent restrictive policies. Cooperation of stakeholders: The resulting tension between taxation revenue and profit making, harm minimization, and social impacts creates a climate of conflict between all involved parties. Data-driven policies become compromised by unsubstantiated claims of, and counter claims against, the nature and extent of gambling-related harms, effectiveness of policy strategies, with allegations of bias and influence associated with researchers supported by industry and government research funding sources. Conclusion: To effectively advance policies, it is argued that it is imperative that all parties collaborate in a cooperative manner to achieve the objectives of responsible gambling and harm minimization. This extends to and includes more transparent funding for researchers from both government and industry. Continued reliance on data collected from analogue populations or volunteers participating in simulated gambling tasks will not provide data capable of valid and reliable extrapolation to real gamblers in real venues risking their own funds. Failure to adhere to principles of corporate responsibility and consumer protection by both governments and industry will challenge the social licence to offer gambling products. Appropriate and transparent safeguards learnt from the tobacco and alcohol field, it is argued, can guide the conduct of gambling research.

Love and Self-Interest

1998 ◽  
Vol 43 (7) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Graham L. Staines
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest

When Self-Interest and Altruism Conflict: Diffusion of Responsibility and Victim Retribution

1971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Wolosin ◽  
Steven J. Sherman ◽  
Clifford R. Mynatt
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest ◽  
Diffusion Of Responsibility

Power, Self-Interest, and Financial Risk Taking

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Didem Kurt
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Financial Risk ◽  
Self Interest

From the president: Psychoanalytic self-interest and psychoanalytic vision

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy McWilliams
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest

No Good Deed Goes Unquestioned: Belief in the Self-interest Norm

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton R. Critcher
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Good Deed ◽  
Self Interest

Ethics and self-interest, me and you

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Peters ◽  
Kees Van den Bos ◽  
Ramona Bobocel
Keyword(s):  
Self Interest
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