Monetary remedies for breach of confidence in privacy cases

Legal Studies ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Normann Witzleb

In Campbell v MGN Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed an expansive interpretation of the breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. The scope and content of this transformed cause of action have already been subject to considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion. This paper focuses on the remedial consequences of privacy breaches. It undertakes an analysis of the principles which govern awards for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, the availability of gain-based relief, in particular an account of profits, and exemplary damages.Even in its traditional scope, the monetary remedies for breach of confidence raise complex issues, mainly resulting from the fact that this doctrine draws on multiple jurisdictional sources such as equity, contract and property law. The difficulties of determining the appropriate remedial principles are now compounded by the fact that English law also aims to integrate its obligation to protect the right to privacy under Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 into the conceptual framework of the breach of confidence action.The analysis provided in this paper supports the contention that not only the scope of the cause of action but also important remedial issues are likely to remain in doubt until the wrong of ‘misuse of private information’ is freed from the constraints of the traditional action for breach of confidence. A separate tort would be able to deal more coherently and comprehensively with all wrongs commonly regarded as privacy breaches.

2020 ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Ivan Vukčević

The subject of this paper is a comparative analysis of the right to respect for private and family life in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the right to privacy in the Constitution of Montenegro. To this end, the paper presents relevant provisions in these documents along with a critical approach to their (in) compliance, both in the determination of specific rights and in cases of their restriction. The paper seeks to offer an answer to the question on whether this right is adequately implemented in the Constitution of Montenegro, as well as whether its different content, analyzed on the concrete example, requires direct application of international law. The author also seeks to provide information on whether insufficient harmonization of the provisions of international and national law in this area may affect more complete protection of this right. To this end, the paper analyzes one of the cases in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the violation of Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in relation to Montenegro. Starting from the presented subject matter, at the end of the paper, appropriate conclusions are drawn about possible directions of improvement of existing solutions and practices in which they are realized. Author primarily used normative and comparative law method together with the case-law analysis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 1439-1444
Author(s):  
Miodrag N. Simović ◽  
Marina M. Simović ◽  
Vladimir M. Simović

The paper is dedicated to ne bis in idem principle, which is a fundamental human right safeguarded by Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This principle is sometimes also referred to as double jeopardy.The principle implies that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted (internal ne bis in idem principle), and that in some other State or before the International Court (ne bis in idem principle in respect of the relations between the states or the State and the International Court) the procedure may not be conducted if the person has already been sentenced or acquitted. The identity of the indictable act (idem), the other component of this principle, is more complex and more difficult to be determined than the first one (ne bis).The objective of this principle is to secure the legal certainty of citizens who must be liberated of uncertainty or fear that they would be tried again for the same criminal offence that has already been decided by a final and binding decision. This principle is specific for the accusative and modern system of criminal procedure but not for the investigative criminal procedure, where the possibility for the bindingly finalised criminal procedure to be repeated on the basis of same evidence and regarding the same criminal issue existed. In its legal nature, a circumstance that the proceedings are pending on the same criminal offence against the same accused, represents a negative procedural presumption and, therefore, an obstacle for the further course of proceedings, i.e. it represents the procedural obstacle which prevents an initiation of new criminal procedure for the same criminal case in which the final and binding condemning or acquitting judgement has been passed (exceptio rei iudicatae).The right not to be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which s/he has already been finally convicted or acquitted is provided for, primarily, by the International Documents (Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). The International framework has also been given to ne bis in idem principle through three Conventions adopted by the Council of Europe and those are the European Convention on Extradition and Additional Protocols thereto, the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, and the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments.Ne bis in idem principle is traditionally associated with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Likewise, no derogation from Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention at the time of war or other state of emergency which is threatening the survival of the nation (Article 4, paragraph 3 of Protocol No. 7). Thereby it is categorised as the irrevocable conventional right together with the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of slavery, and the legality principle. Similarly, ne bis in idem principle does not apply in the case of the renewed trials by the International criminal courts where the first trial was conducted in some State, while the principle is applicable in the reversed situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia could have conducted a trial even if a person had already been adjudicated in some State, in the cases provided for by its Statute and in the interest of justice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 368-385
Author(s):  
Yana Litins’ka ◽  
Oleksandra Karpenko

Abstract COVID-19 became a stress-test for many legal systems because it required that a balance be found between rapid action to prevent the spread of the disease, and continued respect for human rights. Many states in Europe, including Ukraine, chose to enforce an obligation to self-isolate. In this article we review what the obligation to self-isolate entails in the case of Ukraine. We also analyse whether such an obligation should be viewed as a deprivation or a mere restriction of liberty, and if it is permissible under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Gilles Cuniberti

In Sabeh el Leil v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (‘‘ECtHR’’ or ‘‘the Court’’) ruled for the second time that a contracting state had violated the right to a fair trial afforded by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘‘Convention’’) by denying access to its courts to an embassy employee suing for wrongful dismissal on the grounds that the employer enjoyed sovereign immunity. The ECtHR had first ruled so a year earlier in Cudak v. Lithuania, where the plaintiff was also an embassy employee.


2014 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 317-368
Author(s):  
Karen Morrow

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (ECHR) regime has, in the absence of specific coverage of environmental rights, developed a “creative” approach in its jurisprudence in this area, pressing a variety of other rights, notably: Article 6 (the right to a fair hearing); Article 8 (the right to privacy and family life); and Article 1 to the First Protocol of the ECHR (the right to enjoyment of property) into service. This creativity has achieved much in according indirect protection to individuals in this regard, but has also placed additional pressure on the already congested Convention system. The entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) made long-held rights under the ECHR directly accessible in domestic law in the United Kingdom. This naturally spawned a wave of litigation. One of the most prominently litigated areas concerned the pursuit of a variety of environment-based rights claims. In the intervening decade, the application of the ECHR to environmental claims in the UK courts has generated somewhat mixed results. This is in part a result of the “patchwork” approach that has developed toward environmental claims within the Convention regime itself, but it is also a product of the nature of the relationship between the ECHR and domestic law and the content and ethos of both regimes. This article will conclude by briefly considering the on-going role of the ECHR regime in environmental cases in light of subsequent developments in this area of law, notably under the Aarhus Convention.


2021 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-525
Author(s):  
Jovana Vojvodić

Starting from the 21st century, the European Court of Human Rights has changed the approach regarding the interpretation of the right to marry protected under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The new liberal attitude towards the content of this right has opened up opportunities for new categories of persons to enter into marriage and start a family. The question arises whether the European Court of Human Rights will continue with this trend of interpretation and what consequences that could cause for the international understanding of marriage and family.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-132
Author(s):  
Gabrijela Mihelčić ◽  
Maša Marochini Zrinski ◽  
Renata Šantek

The authors discuss and analyse case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the right to respect for home under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with respect the issue of proportionality. In the paper, the proportionality category was viewed as a criterion for securing protection and as a material precondition for deciding whether the State party's interference with the right to respect for home was proportionate. The cases in which the applicant's eviction occurred after national proceedings for the enforcement of mortgages were addressed. In this context, the genesis of the proportionality category was analysed, from the cases where the Court found it necessary to examine the proportionality to the cases where the Court did not consider the proportionality test necessary.


Author(s):  
Olena Bilichak

Based on the analysis of the provisions of domestic law, the practice of pre-trial investigation and court, the scientific article develops recommendations on how to take into account the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in covert investigative (search) actions and use the results obtained in evidence. It is established that the current legislation provides for the possibility of conducting pre-trial investigation of serious and especially serious crimes of covert investigative (investigative) actions, which in most cases is related to intrusion into privacy and correspondence of a person protected by Art. 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Therefore, knowledge of the content and consideration of the case law of the ECtHR in making procedural decisions on the conduct of pre-trial investigation by certain NSDCs and the use of the results obtained by them in court evidence is a strong guarantee of the legality of court decisions. When making certain procedural decisions regarding the materials of covert investigative (investigative) actions at the pre-trial and court stages of criminal proceedings, it should be taken into account that the right to secrecy of correspondence guaranteed by Art. 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ensures the inviolability of all forms of communication between persons, both by means of communication and without them. All covert investigative (search) actions should be carried out only in accordance with the law. Audio and video materials submitted by private individuals and produced «with the help» of law enforcement officers cannot be considered admissible evidence. Carrying out NSRD to control the commission of a crime (Article 271 of the CPC of Ukraine) should exclude the possibility of provocation by the pre-trial investigation authorities. If their intelligence staff was involved in such a special operation, in the initial stages of its conduct the conduct of the pre-trial investigation body should be exclusively passive and limited to observation. In any case, the evidence in the criminal proceedings in which the relevant special operation took place should not be based only on its materials, and the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. Key words: criminal proceedings, European Court of Human Rights, covert investigative actions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-276
Author(s):  
Iwona Wrońska

Abstract The subject of these reflections is the analysis of issues concerning language translation of the treaty and connotations connected therewith of the meaning of legal regulations. As an example here one can cite Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, prepared in the two official languages of the Council of Europe, i.e. English and French. The problems of interpretation of Article 6, which regulates the right to a fair trial, resulted from the official translation of the term “prawo do sprawiedliwego procesu sądowego” (the right to a just trial). This triggered a quite widespread discussion in the Polish doctrine as to whether the English term “fair” should be translated as “sprawiedliwy”. Moreover, on the basis of a translation so constructed other proposals of the concept in Article 6 appeared in the literature on the subject, such as “uczciwy” (honest), “słuszny” (right) or “praworządny” (lawful) trial. The article presents the argumentation of Polish lawyers on adopting the aforementioned terms, demonstrating how the language used in translation of the treaty may affect the accurate understanding of legal terminology.


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