Refugees, Asylum Seekers and the Rule of Law: Comparative Perspectives, edited by Susan Kneebone. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, xiii + 309 + (appendix, bibliography + index) 24pp (£59 hardback). ISBN 978-0-521-88935-3.

Legal Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 334-336
Author(s):  
Hélène Lambert
Author(s):  
Molly Joeck

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.


2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 477-483
Author(s):  
Jamie Cameron

What the rule of law means and how it constrains the exercise of state power raise issues which have been debated-without resolution-over the ages. Times of emergency bring fresh energy to the discussion, and David Dyzenhaus is one of many who have entered the fray to debate the balance between liberty and national security in the post 9/11 period. It has not been easy for those who place their trust in written constitutions to account for the way textual guarantees are diluted when the state is under threat. Rather than address that dilemma, Dyzenhaus sets his ideas apart by proposing a theory which maximizes the protection of rights in emergency circumstances, without straining the institutional capacities or legitimacy of the judiciary. This theory invokes the pedigree of the common law-and “common law constitutionalism”-and is grounded in the constitutive properties of the rule of law, or principle of legality. Dyzenhaus may not have answered the questions readers will want to ask, but he has opened up the middle ground between the competing supremacies yet more, by drawing common law constitutionalism and its rule-of-law pedigree into constitutional theories of review. More to the point, he has challenged the judiciary to draw on the moral resources of the law to make executive and legislative action as accountable as possible at all times, in emergencies as well as in normal times. Readers can and should engage, at many levels, with the complexity of his thought in this important book.


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